MORAL JUDGMENTS

Thus, then, contemplating social structures and actions from the evolution point of view, we may preserve that calmness which is needful for scientific interpretation of them, without losing our powers of feeling moral reprobation or approbation." (Principles, Vol. II, p. 242. N.Y., 1899)

Nowhere (?) does Spencer exhibit that Victorian bias of which he has been so often accused. Wrong: In speaking of wife-lending he refers to the "prevalence in rude societies of practices which are so repugnant" (Vol. I, p. 634, 1st ed.). Spencer talks about societies practicing brother-sister marriages and other close consanguineal unions as practicing "the most degraded relations of the sexes" (Vol. I, p. 638, 1st ed.) But he seldom speaks thusly.

"Social phenomena have their laws like all other phenomena, and it is the sole business of science to elucidate and declare them. Science has no schemes to propose, no reforms to carry out. Whether society is bad or good, rude or cultivated, getting better or getting worse, developing or perishing, it is all the same: science simply takes note of the facts, and draws from them the general principles to which social changes conform ...." (Edward L. Youmans, "Editor's Table," The Popular Science Monthly, Vol. 2, pp. 240-243, December, 1872. P. 240)
"While inditing tragedies and a huge epic in the romantic vein (fortunately long ago burnt), I was plotting out a rationalistic philosophy which should accomplish what Darwin and Spencer had failed to finish (and this too went to the flames)." (Paul Elmer More, quoted in Arthur Hazard Dakin, Paul Elmer More, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1960, p. 313)

"... Paul More was, as far as he was aware, wholly converted to romanticism, while nevertheless deeply impressed by the philosophy of Herbert Spencer ...." (p. 63) "... the really characteristic qualities of their author ... which at the same time had made him a disciple of Herbert Spencer." (p. 66) (Robert Shafer, Paul Elmer More and American Criticism, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1935)
"It was undoubtedly partly Morgan's religious orientation that led him to be antagonistic to Herbert Spencer's work. Other traditionalists in America were opposed to Spencer on this ground, as is indicated by the letter of President Porter of Yale written at this time to William Graham Sumner, with whom Morgan seems never to have come in contact." (Bernhard J. Stern, *Lewis Henry Morgan: Social Evolutionist*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1931. P. 27)

"Morgan appears to have had similar sentiments to those of President Porter about Spencer's writings, although he also attacked him on other grounds, as well, in one of the clubs which he organized, called the Spencer Club, which met fortnightly to discuss Spencer's work. Morgan criticized Spencer in a letter to McIlvaine, to which the latter responded: "... Nor have I read Spencer, not having a doubt but that he has proved himself as great an ass in the discussion of ancient society as you say. As for reviewing him I am doing greater work and cannot come down."" (Bernhard J. Stern, *Lewis Henry Morgan: Social Evolutionist*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1931 P. 28)

"The words of Christ reveal to my mind a depth and comprehension of the nature of man and of what constitutes his true well being, to which Herbert Spencer, Darwin, Huxley, Tyndall and the rest of them cannot make the least pretension. In their several scientific specialties I sit at their feet." (Letter from J. H. McIlvaine to Lewis H. Morgan, dated ???. Quoted in Bernhard J. Stern, *Lewis Henry Morgan: Social Evolutionist*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1931. P. 23)

"Morgan also wrote to Darwin in disparagement of Spencer's work; ..." (P. 28) "Herbert Spencer, in acknowledging the receipt of Ancient Society, wrote: "I am much obliged by the copy of your work on Ancient Society. It would have been useful to me had I had it earlier, when I was treating of the social composition and of family arrangements. I doubt not hereafter that when I come to deal with political organization, I shall find much matter in it of value to me." Dated July 19, 1877." (P. 198) (Bernhard J. Stern, *Lewis Henry Morgan: Social Evolutionist*, University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1931.)

"It was undoubtedly partly Morgan's religious orientation that led him to be antagonistic to Herbert Spencer's work." (P. 27) "Morgan appears to have had similar sentiments to those expressed by President Porter of Yale to William Graham Sumner over Spencer's *The Study of Sociology*, although he also attacked him on other grounds, as well, in one of the clubs which he organized, called the Spencer Club, which met fortnightly to discuss Spencer's work. Morgan criticized Spencer in a letter to McIlvaine, to which the latter responded:"... Nor have I read Spencer, not having a doubt but that he has proved himself as great an ass in the discussion of ancient society as you say. As for reviewing him I am doing greater work and cannot come down."" (P. 28) (Bernhard J. Stern, *Lewis Henry Morgan: Social Evolutionist*, U. of Chi. Press, 1931.)
"But Mr. Spencer had no conception of gentile society and the fundamental distinction between it and political society, so clearly set forth by Morgan." (Lester F. Ward, "The Career of Herbert Spencer," The Popular Science Monthly, Vol. 74, pp. 5-18, 1909. P. 15)

"The Spencer Club was organized in Rochester in 1872 by a few men for the purpose of studying the works of Herbert Spencer. "Mr. Morgan was not at first interested in metaphysical studies, saying they were 'dry chips' to him. He later, however, read with care the works of Herbert Spencer, ... and joined the Club ..." "Sketch of the Life of Lewis H. Morgan with Personal Reminiscences," by Charles A. Dewey, M.D., in The Rochester Historical Society, Publication Fund Series, vol. II, p. 44." (Leslie A. White, Pioneers in American Anthropology, The Bandelier-Morgan Letters, 1873-1883, Vol. 2, The University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, 1940. P. 180n.)

While in England in 1871 Morgan was to be introduced to Spencer by John F. McLennan, but the meeting apparently never took place. (Leslie A. White, ed., "Extracts from the European Travel Journal of Lewis H. Morgan," Rochester Historical Society Publications, Vol. 16, pp. 221-390, 1937. P. 368)

"The choice fruit of his long years of study and reflection, Ancient Society, depicted man's cultural development in distinct social strands through successive stages of from savagery through barbarism to civilization. In early drafts of the manuscript he occasionally used the word evolved in connection with basic social or technological ideas, yet in his final published text the term implanted was substituted, thus retaining the vitalistic view, holding a door open for divine action." (For a brief discussion of Morgan's use of the word "evolution" in Ancient Society and elsewhere, see Leslie A. White, "Morgan's Attitude toward Religion and Science," American Anthropologist, Vol. 46, pp. 216-230, 1944. Pp. 224-2257 (Blake McKelvey, Rochester, The Flower City, 1855-1890, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1949. P. 319)

"Dissension within their ranks contributed to the weakness of Rochester's evolutionists during the mid-seventies. Close study of Spencer's writings, pressed eagerly by the Spencer Club, revealed implications not at first suspected, contributing, perhaps, to the suspension of its meetings. Morgan himself became so dubious of Spencer's works that he wrote to Darwin about them. "Reference here to letter from Charles Darwin to Lewis H. Morgan, Kent, July 9, 1877, Morgan Letters, University of Rochester. " Darwin's reply recommended cautious analysis, rather than blind acceptance or rejection, and Morgan took an active part in the deliberations of the Spencer Club after its revival a few years later. The presence of Robert Mathews, Newton Mann, and a new clerical member, Myron Adams, assured lively sessions. The club turned in its last years from an analysis of Spencer to a study of Morgan's own work—a step which many serious students of anthropology had already taken." (Blake McKelvey, Rochester, The Flower City, 1855-1890, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1949. P. 318)
"When this work [McLennan's *Primitive Marriage*] appeared it was received with favor by ethnologists, because as a speculative treatise it touched a number of questions upon which they had long been working. A careful reading, however, disclosed deficiencies in definitions, unwarranted assumptions, crude speculations and erroneous conclusions. Mr. Herbert Spencer in his "Principles of Sociology" (Advance Sheets, Popular Science Monthly, Jan., 1877, p. 272), has pointed out a number of them. At the same time he rejects the larger part of Mr. McLennan's theories respecting "Female Infanticide," "Wife Stealing," and "Exogamy and Endogamy." What he leaves of this work, beyond its collocation of certain ethnological facts, it is difficult to find." (Lewis H. Morgan, *Ancient Society*, Charles H. Kerr & Co., Chicago, 1909. P. 518)

"I am much indebted to you for the present of your great work on Systems, etc., which lately reached me. Hitherto, I have had but time to glance through it and to be impressed with the value of its immense mass of materials collected and arranged with so much labour. I thank you for it in more than a mere formal way that is common in the acknowledgment of presentation copies; for it comes to me at a time when I am making elaborate preparations personally and by deputy for the scientific treatment of Sociology, and its contents promise to be of immediate service." (Letter from Herbert Spencer to Lewis H. Morgan, probably written in 1871. Quoted by Bernhard J. Stern in "Lewis Henry Morgan: American Ethnologist," *Social Forces*, Vol. 6, pp. 344-357, 1928. P. 345)

"Morgan's greatest work was still ahead, and while he would pause occasionally to discuss Darwin or Spencer with the younger men of the Spencer club, established in 1872, he refused to be distracted by public controversy from the more important task of developing his own theories of social evolution." (p. 194) "... and the dissension among the intellectuals of Rochester, N.Y., over issues of evolution and religion became more complex as Spencer's books raised new disputes even within the Spencer club, which soon suspended its meetings." (pp. 194-195) (Blake McKelvey, *Rochester, the Flower City, 1855-1890*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1949)

"Mr. Morgan was not at first interested in metaphysical studies, saying they were "dry chips" to him. He later, however, read with care the works of Herbert Spencer, and as we have seen, joined the club named after that eminent and original philosopher, which had been started in 1872 by the late Dr. C. E. Rider and W. S. Sherman." (Charles Ayrault Dewey, M.D., "Sketch of the Life of Lewis H. Morgan with Personal Reminiscences." The Rochester Historical Society, Publication Fund Series, Vol. 2, pp. 34-48, 1923. P. 44.)

"Herbert Spencer's work, on the other hand, was much broader both in point of view and in its influence [than that of Tylor and Morgan]." (George W. Stocking, Jr., Race, Culture, and Evolution, The Free Press, New York, 1968. P. 117)

"I am to drive with him [John F. McLennan] tomorrow to meet Herbert Spencer, whom Darwin in his "Descent of Man" calls "our great philosopher," and possibly Sir John Lubbock. Of course I anticipate much pleasure from meeting these men, that is if McLennan can catch them." (Entry for July 5, 1871, in Extracts from the European Travel Journal of Lewis H. Morgan, ed. by Leslie A. White, Rochester Historical Society Publications, Vol. 16, pp. 221-389, 1937. P. 368)

"London, July 31, 1871. I have written to Dr. Henry this morning acknowledging a sight at my book, and thanking him cordially for giving it the individuality of a volume in the series (XVII) of the Smithsonian Contributions. I have asked him to send to his agent here, Mr. Nesley, five copies for distribution on my account as follows, one to Professor George M. Humphrey, Cambridge; one to George Waring, the Terrace, Oxford; one to Charles Darwin, Down, Beckingham, Kent; one to Herbert Spencer, London; and one to Prof. Huxley, Museum of Practical Geology, London. (VI:110-11)." (Lewis H. Morgan, Extracts from the European Travel Journal of Lewis H. Morgan, ed. by Leslie A. White, reprinted from Vol. 16 of the Rochester Historical Society Publications, Rochester, N.Y., 1937. P. 371.)

One difference between Morgan and Spencer was that Morgan was more interested in stages, while Spencer was more interested in process.
Regarding Grant Allen's interpretation of tree-worship in accordance with the ghost theory, Spencer wrote: "Not that you will convince Max Müller and Co. Men in their position are beyond the reach of reason." (Letter from Herbert Spencer to Grant Allen, dated November 26, 1892. Quoted in Edward Clodd, Grant Allen, A Memoir, Grant Richards, London, 1900. P. 144)

"Men, in Mr. Müller's opinion, had originally pure ideas about the gods, and expressed them in language which we should call figurative. The figures remained, when their meaning was lost; the names were then supposed to be gods, the nomina became numina, and out of the inextricable confusion of thought which followed, the belief in cannibalism, bestial, adulterous, and incestuous gods was evolved. That is Mr. Müller's hypothesis; with him the evolution, a result of a disease of language, has been from early comparative purity to later religious abominations. Opposed to him is what may be called the school of Mr. Herbert Spencer: the modern Euhemerism, which recognises an element of historical truth in myths, as if the characters had been real characters, and which, in most gods, beholds ancestral ghosts raised to a higher power." (Andrew Lang, Custom and Myth, Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1884. Pp. 198-199)
In attempting to account for his failure to hit upon the principle of natural selection to explain organic evolution, Spencer says: "One [reason] was my espousal of the belief that the inheritance of functionally-produced modifications suffices to explain the facts. Recognizing this as a sufficient cause for many orders of changes in organisms, I concluded that it was a sufficient cause for all orders of changes. There are, it is true, various phenomena which did not seem reconcilable with this conclusion; but I lived in the faith that some way of accounting for them would eventually be found. Had I looked more carefully into the evidence, and observed how multitudinous these inexplicable facts are--had I not slurred over the difficulties, but deliberately contemplated them; I might perhaps have seen that here was the additional factor wanted." (Auto. I, §§ 390).

"Mr. Spencer admits that the influence of natural selection is very great, but thinks that Darwin gives it a somewhat undue importance. Lamarck failed to grasp this principle, and attributed all organic modification to the inherited results of use and disuse--i.e., to direct equilibration. Darwin almost wholly neglects this, and relies chiefly upon the new and brilliant conception of natural selection. Spencer gives to each its proper weight, and, what is chiefly to his credit, assigns to both their exact place in the system of laws pertaining to vital phenomena." (Lester Frank Ward, Dynamic Sociology, 2 Vols., D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1883. Vol. I, p. 181)

(According to Lester Ward, Lamarck has "quite distinct adumbrations of the law of natural selection" in the first volume of his Philosophie Zoologique, pp. 112-114, 259, and 265.)

Spencer turned out to be on the wrong side of several arguments: natural selection(?), telegony, inheritance of acquired characteristics.

"Partly by weeding out those of lowest development, and partly by subjecting those who remain to the never-ceasing discipline of experience, nature secures the growth of a race who shall both understand the conditions of existence, and be able to act up to them." (Herbert Spencer, Social Statics, John Chapman, London, 1851. P. 378)

"Why the whole effort of nature is to get rid of such—to clear the world of them, and make room for better. Nature demands that every being shall be self-sufficing. All that are not so, nature is perpetually withdrawing by death. Intelligence sufficient to avoid danger, power enough to fulfill every condition, ability to cope with the necessities of existence—these are qualifications invariably insisted on." (Herbert Spencer, Social Statics, John Chapman, London, 1851. P. 379)

"Beings thus imperfect are nature’s failures, and are recalled by her laws when found to be such. Along with the rest they are put upon trial. If they are sufficiently complete to live, they do live, and it is well they should live. If they are not sufficiently complete to live, they die, and it is best they should die." (p. 380) "... only such as are robust enough to resist these—that is, only such as are tolerably well adapted to both the usual and incidental necessities of existence, remain." (p. 380) (Herbert Spencer, Social Statics, John Chapman, London, 1851.)

"For, necessarily, families and races / whom this increasing difficulty of getting a living which excess of fertility entails, does not stimulate to improvements in production—that is, to greater mental activity—are on the high road to extinction; and must ultimately be supplanted by those whom the pressure does so stimulate." (Herbert Spencer, "A Theory of Population, Deduced from the General Law of Animal Fertility," The Westminster Review, Vol. 57, pp. 468-501, 1852. Pp. 499-500)

"Nature secures each step in advance by a succession of trials, which are perpetually repeated, and cannot fail to be repeated, until success is achieved. All mankind in turn subject themselves more or less to the discipline described; they either may or may not advance under it; but, in the nature of things, only those who do advance under it eventually survive." (Herbert Spencer, "A Theory of Population, Deduced from the General Law of Animal Fertility," The Westminster Review, Vol. 57, pp. 468-501, 1852. P. 499)

"At that time / 1857, the date of publication of "Progress: Its Law and Cause," I ascribed all modifications to direct adaptation to changing conditions; and was unconscious that in the absence of that indirect adaptation effected by the natural selection of favourable variations, the explanation left the larger part of the facts unaccounted for." (Auto., I, 502).
NATURAL SELECTION

"Up to that time, ... I held that the sole cause of organic evolution is the inheritance of functionally-produced modifications. The Origin of Species made it clear to me that I was wrong; and that the larger part of the facts cannot be due to any such cause." (Auto. II, 50)

Spencer sees natural selection as a great operating principle which has given rise to new structures and adaptations among animals, and also among societies. Competition for survival among animals is, among men, war. (Vol. I, p. 520, 2nd ed.).

"I have always regretted that Mr. Darwin chose this phrase [natural selection] to describe his hypothesis. The word 'selection' connotes a conscious process, and so involves a tacit personalisation of Nature. By tacitly personalised that aggregate of surrounding agencies which we call Nature, it introduces vaguely the idea that Nature may select as a human breeder selects—can select and increase a particular quality; which is true only under certain conditions. Further, it raises the thought of choice—suggests the notion that Nature may or may not operate in the alleged way." (Herbert Spencer, "Lord Salisbury on Evolution," The Nineteenth Century, Vol. 38, pp. 740-757, 1895. P. 748)


"Natural selection, or survival of the fittest, is almost exclusively operative throughout the vegetal world and throughout the lower animal world, characterised by relative passivity. But with the ascent to higher types of animals, its effects are in increasing degrees involved with those produced by inheritance of acquired characters; until, in animals of complex structures, inheritance of acquired characters becomes an important, if not the chief, cause of evolution." (Herbert Spencer, "The Inadequacy of Natural Selection," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 63, pp. 153-166, 439-456, 1893. P. 456)

"Still more remarkable [than Wells'] and Matthew's adumbration of the theory of natural selection] is the fact that Mr. Herbert Spencer—notwithstanding his great powers of abstract thought and his devotion of those powers to the theory of evolution, when as yet this theory was scorned by science—still more remarkable, I say, is the fact that Mr. Herbert Spencer should have missed what now appears so obvious an idea." (George John Romanes, Darwin, and After Darwin. Vol. 1: The Darwinian Theory, third edition, The Open Court Publishing, Chicago, 1901. P. 257)
"He [Spencer] adopted, it is true, the theory of natural selection, as did every other evolutionist of his time (except Mr. Samuel Butler), but he adopted it merely as one among the factors of organic evolution, and, while valuing it highly, he never attributed to it the same almost exclusive importance as did Darwin himself—certainly not the same quite exclusive importance as has since been attached to it be the doctrinaire school of Neo-Darwinians, who employ it as the sole key which unlocks, in their opinion, all the problems of biology." (Grant Allen, "Spencer and Darwin," Appleton's Popular Science Monthly, Vol. 50, pp. 815-827, 1896-97. P. 823. [reprinted from Fortnightly Review])

"Once, indeed, no less than seven years before the publication of The Origin of Species, Mr. Spencer even trembled for a moment on the verge of the actual discovery of natural selection. This was in the essay on population in the Westminster Review in 1852. [Here the passage is quoted.] Now, this is the doctrine of natural selection, / or, as Mr. Spencer himself afterward called it, survival of the fittest. Only, it is limited to the human race; and it is not recognized as an efficient cause of specific differentiation. As Mr. Spencer himself remarks, the passage "shows how near one may be to a great generalization without seeing it." Moreover, Mr. Spencer here overlooks the important factor of spontaneous variation, which forms the corner-stone of Darwin's discovery, and which was also clearly perceived by Mr. Wallace. In short, in Mr. Spencer's own words, the paragraph "contains merely a passing recognition of the selective process, and indicates no suspicion of the enormous range of its effects, or of the conditions under which a large part of its effects are produced." (G. A.)


"Spencer himself points out cogently the debt which the biology of the mid-nineteenth century owed to economics, as in the relation between the concept of economic competition and that of natural selection. Essentially, what Spencer was doing—spelled out much more fully in his Principles of Sociology—was to apply the basic principles of the economists to the society as a whole." (Talcott Parsons, Introduction to The Study of Sociology, by Herbert Spencer, pp. v-x, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1961. P. vi)

"There was no serious effort on the part of [the classical] evolutionists, however, to demonstrate that particular social systems had evolved by the selection of institutions that better satisfied certain functional requisites." (Kenneth E. Bock, "Evolution, Function, and Change," American Sociological Review, Vol. 28, pp. 229-237, 1963. P. 230)
"Darwin, looking at this process [organic evolution] from a practical point of view, saw it in the light of a selection by nature of those modifications which proved of economic advantage to the organism. He, therefore, called it "Natural Selection." Herbert Spencer, regarding it from the stand-point of the physicist, saw it to be only another manifestation of the universal tendency of all the forces of the universe to approach the statistical condition. He, therefore, dropped it into its appropriate niche in his cosmical system, and named it "Indirect Equilibration." (Lester Frank Ward, Dynamic Sociology, 2 Vols., D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1883. Vol. 1, p. 178)

"The great law of competition, of which natural selection is the most important subordinate law, finds here another extensive application, which Mr. Darwin had overlooked, but which did not escape the vigorous generalizing powers of Mr. Spencer. This he characterizes as "the truth that each species of organism tends ever to expand its sphere of existence—to intrude on other areas, other modes of life, other media; and, through these perpetually recurring attempts to thrust itself into every accessible habitat, spreads until it reaches limits that are, for the time, insurmountable."" (Lester Frank Ward, Dynamic Sociology, 2 Vols., D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1883. Vol. 1, p. 174)
"Furthermore, pragmatic philosophy was beginning its ascendancy and it soon replaced the somewhat naïve naturalistic philosophy of Spencer (in the United States)." (Nicholas S. Timasheff, Sociological Theory: Its Nature and Growth, third edition, Random House, New York, 1967. P. 48)

"Spencer offered, now that the biological theory of evolution was being widely accepted, what many were searching for, a system which substituted natural law for divine law, and natural order, harmony, and progress for divine order, harmony, and progress." (Donald Pizer, "Herbert Spencer and the Genesis of Hamlin Garland's Critical System," Tulane Studies in English, Vol. 7, pp. 153-168, 1957. P. 154)

"Unfortunately, the historical forms of naturalism have often been distinguished by their readiness to compromise, or cautiously to set limits to the use of scientific method. Thus, the naturalism of Spencer was tempered by his agnosticism; and the same may be said of Huxley." (Roy Wood Sellars, V. J. McGill, and Marvin Farber, "Foreword" to Philosophy for the Future, pp. v-xii, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1949. P. ix)

"In its simplest shape Spencerian evolution is an assertion of the all-sufficiency of natural law, a denial of intervention from outside at any stage in the process by which the universe has become what it is." (The author, a theist with a D.D. degree from Glasgow, does not seem too happy with this concept.) (Robert Mackintosh, From Comte to Benjamin Kidd, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1899. P. 77)

"Stifled for a time in the United States because it had neither an organization nor a sufficient number of enthusiastic devotees to further it, naturalism was given new life through the development of evolutionary concepts. Less tied to any particular ideology than their opponents, the naturalists were inclined toward a freer interpretation of new knowledge. The result was that they came to look upon Darwin as the empirical basis for their thinking and upon Spencer as the philosopher who gave it systematic form." (Paul Russell Anderson and Max Harold Fisch, Philosophy in America, from the Puritans to James, D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1939. Pp. 327-328)
"It is not surprising that Garland turned to Spencer more than to any other writer on evolution. Now that the theory of biological evolution was being widely accepted, Spencer offered what many were searching for, a system that substituted natural law for divine law, and natural order, harmony, and progress for divine order, harmony and progress. Spencer had derived from biological evolution a law of progress which he used to explain and systematize change and variation in every phase of life, and in the late nineteenth century such a method attracted profound interest." (Donald Pizer, Hamlin Garland's Early Work and Career, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960. Pp. 7-8)

"When the agnostic says that we cannot know anything about the reality beyond nature or experience, he implies that there is such a reality; and some, like Spencer, clearly accept this inference. To this extent they are not pure naturalists. They are only naturalists for all practical purposes; that is, since we can know nothing of supernature, we have nothing to do with it either in thought or conduct,—we can manage our lives as if it did not exist. At the same time, it is possible to maintain a sentiment of reverence toward the "Unknowable"; in this limited sense, the agnostic is often a profoundly religious man." (William Earnest Hocking, Types of Philosophy, Revised edition, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1939. P. 136)

"So far as this system /The philosophy of evolution/ accepts the simple fact or process of development as applied to natural phenomena, it is true, and should be accepted. So far as it professes to determine the mode or law of development, it is still an hypothesis, and should be held sub judice. But so far as it presumes to afford an adequate, or assign a sufficient cause for the development and organization of the universe, it is false, and should be rejected. The rejection of the persistence of force, as the sole and adequate cause of universal evolution, does not, of course, involve the rejection of the conservation of energy as a law of general physics. It simply involves the acceptance of the doctrine already emphasized by Aristotle, Leibnitz, and Kant, that no purely mechanical principle can explain the facts of /adjustment and co-ordination which exist in nature, and which are inexplicable except as being the result of thought as well as force." (William C. Morey, "Herbert Spencer in the Light of History," Baptist Quarterly Review, Vol. 5, pp. 279-309, 1883. Pp. 307-308)
"Up to that moment, science was a mere collection of facts and rules, with no coherent body of governing truths, while the new conception of the unity of nature bound all these facts together in a web of causation. It seemed possible to write nature's history back to the primitive chaos, and one saw that all its phenomena, instead of being unrelated and produced by the Creator's personal whim, were parts of an unbroken chain of cause and effect. Suns and stars, plants and animals had followed one law of development from a common source, and man was also a part of this cosmic drama. Through all the vast sweep of time, from the primordial vapour to the multifarious world one knew today, one saw the various forms of nature evolving from previous forms.... Such was the great Spencerian vision that Fiske expounded at Harvard, with his own interpretations and amplifications." (Van Wyck Brooks, New England: Indian Summer, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York, 1965, P. 114)

"In 1855 Mr. Herbert Spencer (Principles of Psychology, 2nd edit. vol. I, p. 465) expressed "the belief that life under all its forms has arisen by an unbroken evolution, and through the instrumentality of what are called natural causes." (John Tyndall, Address Delivered Before the British Association Assembled in Belfast, With Additions. Longmans, Green, and Co. London, 1874. P. 37, n. 17)

"As indicating most clearly the state of national feeling, we have the immense popularity of Mr. Rudyard Kipling, in whose writings one-tenth of nominal Christianity is joined with nine-tenths of real paganism; who idealizes the soldier and glories in the triumphs of brute force; and who, in depicting school-life, brings to the front the barbarizing activities and feelings and shows little respect for a civilizing culture." (Herbert Spencer, Facts and Comments, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1902. P. 165)

"In its simplest shape Spencerian evolution is an assertion of the all-sufficiency of natural law, a denial of intervention from outside at any stage in the process by which the universe has become what it is." (The author, a theist with a D.D. degree from Glasgow, does not seem too happy with this concept.) (Robert Mackintosh, From Comte to Benjamin Kidd, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1899. P. 77)


"I demur entirely to the supposition, which is implied in the book [Henry George's Progress and Poverty], that by any possible social arrangements whatever the distress which humanity has to suffer in the course of civilisation could have been prevented. The whole process, with all its horrors and tyrannies, and slaveries, and wars, and abominations of all kinds, has been an inevitable one accompanying the survival and spread of the strongest, and the consolidation of small tribes into large societies; and among other things the lapse of land into private ownership has been, like the lapse of individuals into slavery, at one period of the process altogether indispensable. I do not in the least believe that from the primitive system of communistic ownership to a high and finished system of State ownership, such as we may look for in the future, there could be any transition without passing through such stages as we have seen and which exist now." (Letter from Herbert Spencer to A. R. Wallace, July 6, 1881. Quoted in Alfred Russel Wallace; Letters and Reminiscences, by James Marchant. Two Volumes. Cassell and Company, Ltd. London, 1916. Vol. 2, pp. 154-155)

NECESSARY EVOLUTION

NEGLECT OF SPENCER


The curriculum of St. John's College in Annapolis Maryland involves the reading of 110 books, which do not include any work of Spencer, although it does include Virchow's Cellular Pathology, Peacock's Treatise on Algebra, and Dedekind's Essays on Numbers. (Mark Van Doren, Liberal Education, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1943, Pp. 150-152)
"Although the serious history of later-nineteenth-century British anthropology has barely been begun, it seems at first glance a rather dry and dull period, of interest primarily for the light it casts back on the intellectual and institutional effort of the earlier evolutionary generation, and forward to the surge of activity out of which modern British social anthropology emerged after 1900."


"... the failure of historians of science seriously to consider Spencer at all. Their books are symptomatic of the mutual isolation between the study of the history of science and the study of social theory, while their subject is someone who never made that distinction." (Robert M. Young, Darwin's Metaphor, Nature's Place in Victorian Culture, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985. P. 185)

"Herbert Spencer, from whom anthropology has taken some of its most important methodological concepts and whom it has forgotten ...." (E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Theories of Primitive Religion, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1965. P. 23)

Thus it appears that Herbert Spencer, like Karl Marx suffered in that their scientific propositions about society have been ignored or resisted because of the fact that, combined with these, were political doctrines strongly defending certain courses of action, while attacking others. (RLE)
"Nietzsche adopted a Spencerian attitude. Many of his ideas are derived from evolutionary theories." (Emanuel Radl, *The History of Biological Theories*, translated from the German by E. J. Hatfield, Oxford University Press, London, 1930. P. 373)

Early in 1902 the Society of Authors in England had recommended that the Nobel Prize in Literature for that year be awarded to Herbert Spencer. The other leading candidate was George Meredith. Of this decision Mrs. Humphry Ward wrote: "... to compare Mr. Spencer's power of clear statement with the play of imaginative genius in Meredith would be absurd—in the literary field. And this is or should be a literary award.... I am not venturing to dispute Mr. Spencer's great position in the history of English thought .... But to be the philosopher of evolution is one thing; to be our first man of letters is another." (In 1901 the Nobel Prize in Literature seems to have gone to Sully Proudhomme.7 (Letter from Mrs. Humphry Ward to the Society of Authors dated January 19, 1902. Quoted in Janet Penrose Trevelyan, *The Life of Mrs. Humphry Ward*, Dodd, Mead and Company, New York, 1923, P. 181)

"In 1902, the Academy had to strike a balance between two such outstanding but incommensurable literary works as those of Herbert Spencer and the German Historian, Theodor Mommsen, the outcome being that the latter was finally selected because of his superior literary artistry." (This was for the Nobel prize in Literature.7 (H. Schück, et al., *Nobel—the Man and His Prizes*, Elsevier Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1962. P. 87)

"... the letters of Alfred Nobel also reveal that he had carefully studied and valued the philosophical work of his contemporary, Herbert Spencer, whose ideas tallied with his own in so many respects." (Nils K. Ståhle, *Alfred Nobel*, Translated by Alan Blair, Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, London, 1962. P. 165)
Spencer had lost out to Sully Prudhomme for the Nobel prize in literature in 1901, the year the prizes were first awarded. This information does not appear in the book quoted above, but I have seen it in print elsewhere.

"On the invitation of Mr. Edmund Gosse, given on behalf of the Society of Authors, Lord Avebury came on the Committee to decide (in the absence of a British Academy of Letters) on the candidate for the Nobel prize for literature, and was appointed Chairman. The choice of the Committee eventually fell on Mr. Herbert Spencer, though not without some little searchings of heart ...." (Horace G. Hutchinson, editor, The Life of Sir John Lubbock, Lord Avebury, 2 Vols., Macmillan and Co., Limited, London, 1914. Vol. 2, pp. 164-165)

"My Dear Avebury--Your letter gave me a double surprise. Being now so much out of the world I did not know that a Nobel Prize Committee had been appointed, still less did I know that I had been nominated by it. Let me thank you heartily for the part you have taken in the matter, but I doubt not that your advocacy as President had much to do with the decision. Whatever may be the issue it will always be a pleasure hereafter to remember this mark of appreciation and sympathy given by the select of my brother authors. Sincerely yours, Herbert Spencer." (Letter from Herbert Spencer to Sir John Lubbock dated January 27, 1902. Quoted in Horace G. Hutchinson, editor, The Life of Sir John Lubbock, Lord Avebury, 2 Vols., Macmillan and Co., Limited, London, 1914. Vol. 2, p. 166)

W. E. H. Lecky had declined to join the Committee to select a candidate for the Nobel Prize in Literature, primarily because of ill health. "...I have however received an urgent notification from the Society of Authors to a committee of which was to select the English candidate asking me to vote without delay and suggesting Herbert Spencer as their Candidate. Would you tell me whether this is the unanimous recommendation of your Committee, or at all events whether it has your approval? I suppose the First Principles may be said to have "an idealistic tendency" (evidently this is what the Committee, feeling this to be an important consideration, was contending), though I am not very clear about what that means. I don't think any of his other works can be said to have it. I have not been following carefully the Nobel question, but I was under the impression that the prize was to be awarded to a work recently published; and the First Principles appeared I suppose half a century ago. I have a great admiration for Herbert Spencer (though I should never have thought of him as an idealist) and should be glad to do anything I could for him ... but I am a good deal perplexed about what to do, and if my vote is not particularly wanted I should be rather inclined to do nothing." (Letter from W. H. Lecky to Sir John Lubbock dated January 18, 1902. Quoted in Horace G. Hutchinson, editor, The Life of Sir John Lubbock, Lord Avebury, 2 Vols., Macmillan and Co., Limited, London, 1914. Vol. 2, p. 165)
"... the letters /of Alfred Nobel/ also reveal that he had carefully studied and valued the philosophical work of his contemporary, Herbert Spencer, whose ideas tallied with his own in so many respects." (Nils K. Ståhle, Alfred Nobel, Translated by Alan Blair, Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, London, 1962. P. 165)
In 1867 Spencer was asked to become a candidate for the professorship of Mental Philosophy and Logic at University College, London, but he declined. Several other such offers were tendered to him in subsequent years, but he always turned them down. (Auto. II, 146-70)

Spencer could not have been more unacademic. He had practically no formal schooling at all. Never took an examination. Never taught a course, hardly ever lectured. Turned down every offer of an honorary degree.
Frank Norris, at the end of The Octopus, wrote: "... the individual suffers, but the race goes on. Annixter dies, but in a far-distant corner of the world a thousand lives are saved. The larger view always and through all shams, all wickedness, discovers the Truth that will, in the end, prevail, and all things, surely, inevitably, resistlessly work together for good." (Complete Works of Frank Norris, Vol. 2, p. 361) Those were the words of a disciple of Spencer; the law of the survival of the fittest was a law that sometimes bore hard on the individual but was of the greatest importance for the race. Like Spencer and his followers Norris saw only the group, the nation, the world as the unit of survival, favoring the belief that the species counted for more than the individual." (Lars Ånethrink, The Beginnings of Naturalism in American Fiction, 1891-1903, Russell & Russell, Inc., New York, 1961. P. 230)

Darwin and Spencer are referred to in Frank Norris' (1870-1902) "Kiplingesque" story, "A South Sea Expedition." (Norris, Complete Works, Vol. 10, p. 88)
"In brief, trustworthy interpretations of social arrangements imply an almost passionless consciousness. Though feeling cannot and ought not to be excluded from the mind when otherwise contemplating them, yet it ought to be excluded when contemplating them as natural phenomena to be understood in their causes and effects." (Principles, Vol. II, p. 232. N.Y., 1899)

"The natural man would rather be passionately denounced than treated as a phenomenon to be co-ordinated [as Spencer does]. His disposition, when so treated, is to leave the philosopher who so treats him severely alone upon the pinnacle to which he has made out his title." (Francis Gribble, "Herbert Spencer: His Autobiography and His Philosophy," The Fortnightly Review, Vol. 81, pp. 984-995, 1904. P.988)


Spencer's distinction between operative and regulative institutions is a good one which no one is contemporary social science makes.
Early chiefdoms are generally based on the personal qualities of the (war) leader. Often the chiefdom is named after him (Powhatan, Coosa(?), Calusa, some Cauca Valley chiefdoms). The persistence of the chiefdom may depend on him. If no good successor emerges, the chiefdom may not outlive him. But gradually, the chiefdom becomes institutionalized. There is a role or office of paramount chief, that somebody has to fill. An ideology of the chiefdom and of obligations toward the chief develop (e.g., tax collecting in Fiji).

During the Middle Ages, the king thought of the kingdom as his personal property, to be divided up among his sons when he died, if he so wished. The concept of the state as an entity in and of itself, above and beyond the person of any given ruler, was yet to come. It still survived into the age of Louis XIV ("L'état c'est moi.")

In a well establish chiefdoms, the power of the chief resides in the office, rather than in the individual, as is the case with the New Guinea "Big Man."

The fact that the early Frankish kings were elected reflects their original status as war leaders—where ability was paramount and heredity negligible. (Claessen, p. 209)

The position of paramount chief is first a personal attainment before it becomes an institutional role.

When does "the office" of paramount chief become divorced from the individual qualities of the political leader?
"In the light of fuller knowledge and in the face of the demands of a critical method other elements than the derivation of animal worship from the misinterpretation of nicknames of Spencer’s theory of the origin of religion prove equally fallacious. The very idea of a double as the first form of spirit is question-able, for multiplicity of spirits or souls of individuals is so commonly encountered among even the most primitive communities that it may well be assumed that in many instances, if not all, a plurality of souls preceded one soul." (Alexander A. Goldenweiser, Early Civilization, F. S. Crofts & Co., New York, 1922. P. 332)

"The fact is that there has not been a single tribe, no matter how rude, known in history or visited by travellers, which has been shown to be destitute of religion, under some form. The contrary of this has been asserted by various modern writers of weight, for example by Herbert Spencer and Sir John Lubbock, not from their own observation, for neither ever saw a savage tribe, but from the reports of travellers and missionaries. I speak advisedly when I say that every assertion to this effect when tested by careful examination has proved erroneous." (Daniel G. Brinton, Religions of Primitive People, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1897. Pp. 30-31)

"Mr. Spencer asserts that all forms of religious sentiments spring from the primitive idea of a disembodied double of a dead man. I assert that this is a rather complicated and developed form of thought; and that the simplest and earliest form of religious sentiment is the idea of the rudest savage, that visible objects around him--animal, vegetable, and/or inorganic--have quasi-human feelings and powers, which he regards with gratitude and awe. Mr. Spencer says that man only began to worship a river or a volcano when he began to imagine them as the abode of dead men’s spirits. I say that he began to fear and adore them, so soon as he thought the river or the volcano had the feelings and the powers of active beings; and that was from the dawn of the human intelligence. The latter view is, I maintain, far the simpler and more obvious explanation; and it is a fault in logic to construct a complicated explanation when a simple one answers the facts." (Frederic Harrison, The Philosophy of Common Sense, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1907. Pp. 366-367)
"Biologists have been led to believe, as Herbert Spencer and others have sug-/gested, that anterior to the appearance of living things on the Earth there would probably first have been a very slow elaboration of some proteid compounds before the actual production of protoplasm in some amorphous condition like the hypothetical Bathybius of Huxley, followed in the course of time by the evolution of actual Amoebae." (H. Charlton Bastian, The Origin of Life, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1911. Pp. 20-21)

"As the first origin of life on this earth, as well as the continued life of each individual, is at present quite beyond the scope of science, I do not wish to lay much stress on the greater simplicity of the view of a few forms, or of only one form, having been originally created, instead of innumerable period miraculous creations having been necessary at innumerable periods; though this more simple view accords well with Maupertuis's philosophical axiom "of least action."" (Charles Darwin, The Variation of Animals and Plants Under Domestication, Orange Judd & Company, New York, 1868. P. 24)

"During those vast periods that expired before the appearance of mammalia, and whilst animate life was chiefly confined to rivers and seas ...." (p. 90) "Even after the creation of the higher orders of vertebrata ...." (p. 91) " ... in ascending the scale of creation we find ...." (p. 93) " ... there appears to have been an aera in which the earth was occupied exclusively by cold-blooded creatures requiring but little oxygen; that it was subsequently inhabited by animals of superior organization consuming more oxygen, and that there since has been a continual increase of the hot-blooded tribes and an apparent diminution of the cold-blooded ones." (p. 94) (Herbert Spencer, "Remarks upon the Theory of Reciprocal Dependence in the Animal and Vegetable Creations, as regards its bearing upon Palaeontology," The London, Edinburgh, and Dublin Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science, Vol. 24, pp. 90-94, 1844)

"This is the point [the origin of consciousness] at which the theory of evolution offers aid in the completion of the view of naturalism. It proposes to explain the origin of life and of mind. Darwin's theory made no such attempt: his work was limited to changes within the different forms of life,--the origin of species, the descent of man. He took life for granted, as summing that life always comes from life; but he broke down the lines between species and thus between lower forms of life and higher forms. It remained for a generalized theory of evolution to attempt the passage from non-living to living, and from non-mental to mental. This generalized theory in its philosophical form we owe chiefly to Herbert Spencer. He assembled the scattered scientific work of his day into a picture so vast, and so impressive in its cumulation of details corroborating the universal law of development through "differentiation and integration," that it became much easier to believe that the remaining difficulties would eventually be resolved." (William Earnest Hocking, Types of Philosophy, Revised edition, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1939. Pp. 52-53)
"I have been favoured with a letter from Mr. Spencer touching this reference to his views on the origin of life, which appeared first in a note attached to the concluding Essay in the first edition of this work [1868], in which he uses the following language: 'At the close of your appended note you refer to certain views of mine, and to my apparent disbelief in spontaneous generation. This reference and the apparent incongruity that seems to be indicated, made me feel that it might have been well to express the limit to that disbelief. Were it to be shown that these [misprint for "there"] arise in some other way than by ordinary genesis, minute aggregates of protoplasm altogether indefinite and variable, the fact would not impress me as intrinsically anomalous; but that which I regard with scepticism, is the alleged spontaneous production of organisms of quite specific characters.' It will be seen that the view here expressed by Mr. Spencer, with his usual remarkable lucidity, accords # most accurately with that which I have here endeavoured to work out, and which was indicated in my paper read before the Royal Society, and elsewhere in my writings." (Gilbert W. Child, Essays on Physiological Subjects, second edition, Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1869. Pp. 142n.-143n. Child was a botanist at Oxford.)
"Spencer was not a pioneer whose ideas had to be caught up with by society. He took the prevailing social conceptions--of social progress and the perfectability of man--and gave them a cosmic justification in a synthesis of the scientific knowledge of the day." (Abram Kardiner and Edward Preble, They Studied Man, The World Publishing Company, Cleveland, 1961. P. 55)

In the Herbert Spencer lecture for 1909 Prof. Bourne had gone along with the idea that Spencer had borrowed his zoology from Huxley and his botany from Hooker. Tillett wrote to Hooker about the matter and Hooker replied: "Spencer owes little if anything to me beyond a cordial encouragement in his botanical studies and perhaps a few suggestions and specimens from Kew to experiment with." (Letter from Sir Joseph Hooker to Alfred W. Tillett, dated October 2, 1910. Quoted in Alfred W. Tillett, Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy: What It Is All About, P. S. King & Son, London, 1914. P. 163)

"The thinker who elaborates a new system of philosophy deeper and more comprehensive than any yet known to mankind, though he may work in solitude, nevertheless does not work alone. The very fact which makes his great scheme of thought a success and not a failure is the fact that it puts into definite and coherent shape the ideas which many people are more or less vaguely and loosely entertaining, and that it carries to a grand and triumphant conclusion processes of reasoning in which many persons have already begun taking the earlier steps." (John Fiske, Edward Livingston Youmans, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1894. P. 102)

"Probably the points which would most strike any one reading these essays [Spencer's] from 1850 to 1860 casually and for the first time would be their strong grasp upon deep-lying principles, and their extraordinary originality. On every page they reveal, be the subject what it may, an astonishing independence of thought, and an absolute freedom from all trace of traditional methods and ideas. It was this freshness of treatment and firmness of touch which perhaps most attracted the attention of thoughtful readers when they were first published--for the most part anonymously--in the pages of the various English magazines and reviews." (William Henry Hudson, "Herbert Spencer and the Synthetic Philosophy," The Popular Science Monthly, Vol. 41, pp. 1-16, 1892. P. 7)
"His general outlook on the universe has certainly not been discredited; it is in sum the attitude of science, of which the dominion grows daily more assured." (J. M. Robertson, Modern Humanists Reconsidered, Watts & Co., London, 1927. P. 180)

"... he is a man beyond all other men of his age to control the thought of the future ...." (Letter from Edward L. Youmans to his sister, dated August 24, 1862. Quoted in John Fiske, Edward Livingston Youmans, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1894. Pp. 124-125)


"In philosophy Herbert Spencer was a great master; in biology, a great organizer; in psychology, a great founder and in sociology, a great pioneer." (Arthur M. Lewis, An Introduction to Sociology, Charles H. Kerr & Company, Chicago, 1913. P. 88)

Allen referred to Spencer as "... the greatest brain of our time ...." (Grant Allen, "The Gospel According to Herbert Spencer," Part I, The Pall Mall Gazette, April 26, 1890, pp. 1-2. P. 2)

"Mr. Spencer had a radium mind which gave forth, of its own spontaneity, light and heat." (George Jacob Holyoake, Bygones Worth Remembering, 2 Vols., T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1905. Vol. 2, P. 37)

"An original mind must be judged by those positions that are in advance of his time at the moment when he takes them." (Franklin H. Giddings, "The Greatness of Herbert Spencer," The Independent, Vol. 55, pp. 2959-2962, December 17, 1903. P. 2960)

Leslie called Spencer: "... one of the most eminent living philosophers ...." (Thomas Edward Cliffe Leslie, Essays in Political and Moral Philosophy, Longmans, Green, & Co., London, 1879. P. 235)

"... Kant, Leibnitz, Newton, and Descartes. In point of comprehensiveness, coherence, and steady rationality of thought Spencer is comparable to the greatest of these." (J. M. Robertson, Explorations, Watts & Co., London, n.d. (ca. 1923). P. 114)
"To pretend that this body of doctrine [Spencer's theories] is as a whole discredited or superseded is the device of men whose animus is father to their thought. So far, it holds the ground, no similarly comprehensive scheme challenging it." (J. M. Robertson, Explorations, Watts & Co., London, n.d. (ca. 1923). P. 113)

"... a great figure in science should be judged by the characteristics which set him apart from and ahead of his contemporaries, not by the errors and shortcomings which he shares with them." (Leslie A. White, "Evolutionism in Cultural Anthropology: A Rejoinder," American Anthropologist, Vol. 49, pp. 400-413, 1947. P. 401)

"Admitting that he has probably said some things about man and the universe that are not true, it must at the same time be said that probably no other man has lived on this planet who has known so many true things about the universe as Mr. Spencer did." (Franklin H. Giddings, "The Greatness of Herbert Spencer," The Independent, Vol. 55, pp. 2959-2962, December 17, 1903. P. 2960)

"... his [Spencer's] contribution to the development of anthropological theory and method clearly equals, if it does not surpass, the contributions of the more highly regarded figures of Edward Tylor and Lewis Henry Morgan." (Marvin Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1968, P. 129)

"... the balance to the good in any fair estimate of Mr. Spencer's work is so enormous, that we should not hesitate to recognize as correct the verdict of all the world to the effect that he is one of the main factors in the main movement in the history of modern thought." (James Mark Baldwin, "Mr. Spencer's Psychology," The American Naturalist, Vol. 31, pp. 553-557, 1897. P. 557)

Speaking of Spencer's work: "It is work of the calibre of that which Aristotle and Newton did. Though coming in this latter age, it as far surpasses their work in its vastness of performance as the railway surpasses the sedan-chair, or as the telegraph surpasses the carrier-pigeon." (John Fiske, Excursions of an Evolutionist. Houghton, Mifflin and Company. Boston, 1894. P. 295.)

"But if we want to measure minds, as minds, one against another, I say fearlessly that scientific and philosophic grasp is the one true standard of the highest attainment, and that no man who ever yet trod our planet gave proof of such mastery in both these lines as Herbert Spencer." (Grant Allen, "Personal Reminiscences of Herbert Spencer," The Forum, Vol. 35, pp. 610-628, 1904. P. 610)
"Measured by the range of its influence, it [Spencer's mind] stands alone among the intellects of modern times. The summit that is seen from all distances and that baffles and deceives upon the nearer view is presumably loftier than others; it is broader based and more mysterious in its structure." (Franklin H. Giddings, "The Greatness of Herbert Spencer," The Independent, Vol. 55, pp. 2959-2962, December 17, 1903. P. 2959)

"The last of the great Thinkers who has attempted to reduce the history of intellectual development to law and order, is Mr. Herbert Spencer, who, in his magnificent and colossal work on Evolution, has, with a genius all his own, made the world of Thought his eternal debtor." (John Beattie Crozier, History of Intellectual Development: On the Lines of Modern Evolution, 2 Vols., 2nd edition, Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1902. Vol. 1, pp. 10-11)

"Of no modern thinker have so many or so various estimates been offered to the world as of Herbert Spencer. By his disciples he has been described as the greatest intellect since Aristotle. By his traducers he has been characterized as a purveyor of pretentious explanations of the universe that already have passed into the shadow-world of bygone philosophies." (Franklin H. Giddings, "The Greatness of Herbert Spencer," The Independent, Vol. 55, pp. 2959-2962, December 17, 1903. P. 2959)

"Spencer is thus the philosopher of vastness. Misprised by many specialists, who carp at his technical imperfections, he has nevertheless enlarged the imagination, and set free the speculative mind of countless doctors, engineers, and lawyers, of many physicists and chemists, and of thoughtful laymen generally. He is the philosopher whom those who have no other philosopher can appreciate." (William James, Memories and Studies, Longmans, Green, and Co., New York, 1911. P. 126)

"It is strange, but it is true, that many British writers find it impossible to do any sort of justice to Spencer. And yet where is there the British writer, save Darwin, whose name and theories are to be found in the whole world's literature of a half-dozen great subjects, since 1850, as Spencer's are? We hear it said that half the world nowadays thinks in terms of Darwinism: but it is truer to say, "in terms of evolutionism"; for half of the half thinks its evolutionism in terms, not of Darwinism, but of Spencerism. Moreover, in the Latin countries and in the United States, it was the leaven of Spencer's evolutionism that first worked its way through the lump. Why not, then, recognise Spencer as what he was, one of the greatest intellectual influences of modern times, a glory to British thought? In psychology this is especially worth insisting upon, since Spencer came / just at a time of surprising barrenness in this department in England." (James Mark Baldwin, History of Psychology, 2 Vols., G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1913. Vol. 2, pp. 98n.-99n.)
OVERALL EVALUATION

Spencer's detractors continually point to his shortcomings as if they cancelled out his scientific contributions, or at least seriously diluted them. But such a view seems to disregard the way in which science advances. Scientific progress does not come to us unalloyed in any individual. The same person who advances science in some significant respect may at the same time harbor ideas and attitudes reflecting traditional and unscientific modes of thought. No greater stride forward was ever taken in science than that brought about by Sir Isaac Newton. It was Newton's formulation of the laws of celestial mechanics that changed man's conception of the universe from one run by capricious and inscrutable divine will to one governed by definite and immutable natural laws. Yet Newton himself was far from rejecting the idea of God. On the contrary, it is well known that he believed his own work to have presented more clearly the divine plan, and that what he had accomplished was for the greater glory of God. Thus, in Newton, traditional and pre-scientific views of the cosmos comingled with those of a radically new science.

It was much the same with Herbert Spencer. Spencer's formulation of the general principle of evolution provided, for the first time, the explanatory key which laid bare the continuous process which had led from cosmic dust to the most complex human societies. Yet the same brain that conceived this law also entertained beliefs that represented the feelings of small British shopkeepers of the early 1800's, and, at the very time he was vigorously championing them, were already considered obsolete by many of Spencer's contemporaries. But in evaluating Spencer's contribution to the history of thought it is his breakthroughs and innovations that deserve to be stressed. As White has said in evaluating the contributions of Morgan, ....

"The last-named writer [Spencer] is one daily rising into wider influence. In spite of the internecine warfare between his principles and the theological and metaphysical principles officially admitted, even antagonists are compelled to admit the force and clearness of his genius, the extent and profundity of his scientific knowledge. It is questionable whether any thinker of finer calibre has appeared in our country; although the future alone can determine the position he is to assume in History." (George Henry Lewes, The History of Philosophy from Thales to Comte, 3rd edition, Longmans, Green, and Co, London, 1867. 2 Vols. Vol. 2, p. 653)

"It is now many years ago, and at a time when he [Spencer] was not known so extensively as he is now, that I had occasion to publish my estimate of him (Intuitions of the Mind, Part III., c. i. §8). "His bold generalizations are always instructive, and some of them may in the end be established as the profoundest laws of the universe." I find that the American publishers of his works have been using this testimony of mine in their advertisements, and I have no objections / that they continue to do so." (James McCosh, Herbert Spencer's Philosophy as Culminated in His Ethics, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1885. Pp. 5-6)
"A star of the first magnitude went out of the firmament of original thought by the death of Herbert Spencer.... Men have to go back to Aristotle to find Spencer's compeer in range of thought, and to Gibbon for a parallel to his protracted persistence in accomplishing his great design of creating a philosophy of evolution. Mr. Spencer's distinction was that he laid down new landmarks of evolutionary guidance in all the dominions of human knowledge."


In making an over-all assessment of Spencer we would do well to keep in mind the remark of Leslie White in reappraising Lewis H. Morgan: "... a great figure in science should be judged by the characteristics which set him apart from and ahead of his contemporaries, not by the errors and shortcomings which he shares with them."


"Surveying his work as a whole, we may confidently assert that Spencer brought to a conclusion a great task and was himself great in its execution. The present generation can, perhaps, hardly realize how potent his influence was on the thought of the latter half of the last century. Many of his conclusions run counter to those which were, in his day, widely accepted. If only they seemed to him to be true, however, he held to them with a tenacity which his opponents branded as obstinacy." (C. Lloyd Morgan, Spencer's Philosophy of Science, The Herbert Spencer Lecture for 1913, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1913. P. 46)

"In spite of the internecine warfare between his principles and the theological and metaphysical principles officially admitted, even antagonists are compelled to admit the force and clearness of his genius, the extent and profundity of his scientific knowledge. It is questionable whether any thinker of finer calibre has appeared in our country; although the future alone can determine the position he is to assume in History.... He alone of British thinkers has organised a System of Philosophy." (George Henry Lewes, The History of Philosophy from Thales to Comte, 2 Vols., third edition, Longmans, Green, and Co, London, 1867. Vol. 2, p. 653)
"... it is impossible to-day for the specialist in physics, in biology, in psychology, in sociology, or in ethics to offer any new hypothesis or constructive doctrine without directly or indirectly defining its relation to the philosophy of Herbert Spencer. It is this fact that justifies the comparison of Spencer to Aristotle. For, in the whole history of human thought, these two men alone have so presented and interpreted the knowledge of their time that all other thinkers must of necessity take a position of antagonism to these masters or of agreement with them." (Franklin H. Giddings, "The Greatness of Herbert Spencer," The Independent, Vol. 55, pp. 2959-2962, December 17, 1903. P. 2960)

"Spencer's philosophy was admirably suited to the American scene. It was scientific in derivation and comprehensive in scope. It had a reassuring theory of progress based upon biology and physics. It was large enough to be all things to all men, broad enough to satisfy agnostics like Robert Ingersoll and theists like Fiske and Beecher. It offered a comprehensive world-view, uniting under one generalization everything in nature from protozoa to politics. Satisfying the desire of "advanced thinkers" for a world-system to replace the shattered Mosaic cosmogony, it soon gave Spencer a public influence that transcended Darwin's." (Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, revised edition, The Beacon Press, Boston, 1955. P. 31)

"Until about 1860 Spencer was ahead of his generation: a pre-Darwinian evolutionist; a republican Radical with leanings towards Chartism, feminism, and Godwinian anarchism; a formidable, sceptical, unconventional, revolutionary reformer. After 1860, for some quarter of a century, while he was working out the great scheme of his synthetic philosophy, he was— as the arch-agnostic, and as the supreme interpreter of the universe (within the limits of time and space) in terms of evolutionary science—one of the prime representatives of his contemporaries. He marched with his generation, holding aloft their banner of scientific affirmation and religious negation. From 1885, however, when he sank into chronic invalidism, he fell out of the ranks of the progressives. Even as an exponent of evolution he, with his continued insistence on the inheritance of acquired characteristics, fell behind Darwin and Weismann. Still more did his pacifism, secularism, little-Englandism, and administrative nihilism alienate him from a new generation dominated by militarism, irrationalism, imperialism, socialism, and sentimentalism. Abandoning his juvenile adhesion to the causes of Charism, feminism, and land-nationalisation, he became the exponent of a reactionary conservatism, the guide, philosopher, and friend of the leaders of the Liberty and Property Defence League." (F. J. C. Hearnshaw, "Herbert Spencer and the Individualists," in The Social & Political Ideas of Some Representative Thinkers of the Victorian Age, ed. by F. J. C. Hearnshaw, pp. 53-83, George G. Harrap & Co., London, 1933. P. 54)
"Throughout his entire discussion of social evolution Pareto utilises Spencer's concept of social differentiation. His notion of a cumulative increase in the degree of social differentiation from Roman times to the present also derives from Spencer; and, so we may surmise, does his basic concept of the mutual interdependence of all social phenomena." (S. E. Fø Finer, Introduction to Vilfredo Pareto: Sociological Writings, pp. 1-91, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1966. P. 16)

"It is more than a minor irony that Professor Talcott Parsons, who opened his first major work with a hearty assent to these words ['Who now reads Spencer?'], should in recent years have revived the doctrine of social evolution and led several other prominent sociologists back to Spencerian conceptions." (J. D. Y. Peel, "Spencer and the Neo-Evolutionists," Sociology, Vol. 3, pp. 173-191, 1969. P. 173)

"... and even Talcott Parsons, who is more conscious of his intellectual forbears, seems to stress the novelties and improvements of his own approach rather than the respects in which he is directly indebted to Spencer. But as I have shown elsewhere "Spencer and the Neo-Evolutionists," Sociology, Vol. 3, 1969/ and as Nisbet Social Change and History has also argued, the differences are more apparent than real; the core of neo-evolutionism is thoroughly Spencerian." (J. D. Y. Peel, Herbert Spencer on Social Evolution, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1972. P. xliii)
"Concerning the present position of the human race, we must therefore say, that man needed one moral constitution to fit him for his original state; that he needs another to fit him for his present state; and that he has been, is, and will long continue to be, in process of adaptation. By the term civilization we signify the adaptation that has already taken place. The changes that constitute progress are the successive steps of transition. And the belief in human perfectibility, merely amounts to the belief, that in virtue of this process, man will eventually become completely suited to his mode of life." (Herbert Spencer, Social Statics, John Chapman, London, 1851. P. 63)

"For the old static conception of the Cosmos, with its hopeless and baseless dogmas, such as the assertion that human nature is the same in all ages, Spencer, more than all his contemporaries and predecessors put together, has given us the dynamic view ...." (C. W. Saleeby, Evolution The Master-Key, Harper & Brothers Publishers, New York, 1906. P. 14)

"Man, in common with lower creatures, is held to be capable of indefinite change by adaptation to conditions. In both [Social Statics and Principles of Ethics] he is regarded as undergoing transformation from a nature appropriate to his aboriginal wild life, to a nature appropriate to a settled civilized life; and in both this transformation is described as a moulding into a form fitted for harmonious co-operation." (Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Ethics, 2 Vols., D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1904. Vol. 1, p. vi)

"It is not a little strange that, at the very moment when Germany is uttering its doleful cry of pessimism, scientific writers in England [especially Spencer] are seeking to build a theory of the future no less optimistic than the doctrine of human perfectibility preached at the close of the last century." (James Sully, Review of Herbert Spencer's The Data of Ethics, The Academy, Vol. 16, pp. 232-234, 1879. P. 233)

"Concerning the present position of the human race, we must therefore say, that man needed one moral constitution to fit him for his original state; that he needs another to fit him for his present state; and that he has been, is, and will long continue to be, in process of adaptation. By the term civilization we signify the adaptation that has already taken place. The changes that constitute progress are the successive steps of the transition. And the belief in human perfectibility, merely amounts to the belief, that in virtue of this process, man will eventually become completely suited to his mode of life." (Herbert Spencer, Social Statics, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1883. P. 78)
"... it is a rather amazing example of speculative self-confidence, even among philosophers, that anyone should have been able to convince himself that the whole necessary course of cosmic development is predictable from the base proposition that energy persists." (Arthur Kenyon Rogers, English and American Philosophy Since 1800, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1922. P. 154)

"In a work now issuing from the press, and still unfinished [Spencer's First Principles], it is suggested, with considerable plausibility, that Persistence of Force would be a more accurate expression than Conservation of Force." (Henry Thomas Buckle, History of Civilization in England, new edition, 3 Vols., Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1872. Vol. 3, p. 364n. [Vol. 3 was written in 1861])

"When Mr. Spencer tells us that if we will grant him the single indubitable truth of the persistence of force, he will show us how nebulae and suns and planets and rocks and plants and brutes and men and histories and civilizations and literatures and philosophies have been necessarily evolved, we seem to be hearing Anaximander over again as he tells us that all things come from infinity ...." (Augustus Hopkins Strong, Philosophy and Religion. A. C. Armstrong and Son, New York, 1888. P. 40)

"His principle of the "Persistence of Force," which in his book of "First Principles" he supposes to be the same as the mechanical doctrine of the conservation of force--only a better name for it--has none of the technical precision and definiteness which belong to this doctrine; and the important conclusions which he deduces from the more general philosophical doctrine, "the Law of Causation," Mr. Spencer's "Persistence of Force" is in fact only a mechanical name for this fundamental postulate of science." (Anonymous (Chauncey Wright), "Spencer's Biology," The Nation, Vol. 2, pp. 724-725, 1866. P. 725)

"My first introduction to the fact of Huxley's existence was in February, 1861, when I was a sophomore at Harvard. The second serial number of Herbert Spencer's First Principles, which had just arrived from London, an on which I was feasting my soul, contained an interesting reference to Huxley's views concerning a "pre-geologic past of unknown duration." In the next serial number a footnote informed the reader that the phrase "persistence of force," since become so famous, was suggested by Huxley, as avoiding an objection which Spencer had raised to the current expression "conservation of force." Further References (John Fiske, "Reminiscences of Huxley," Smithsonian Institution Annual Report, 1900 (1901), pp. 713-728. P. 713)
Referring to a passage in *First Principles* discussing the "persistence of force," Spencer says: "This passage was written in 1862 at a time when the nomenclature now current was not established. Hence the use of the word force instead of energy. I still, however, adhere to the use of the word persistence, for the reason that the word conservation is doubly inappropriate. Conservation connotes a conserver and an act of conserving--conceptions utterly at variance with the doctrine asserted; and it also implies that in the absence of a conserver and an act of conserving, the energy would disappear, which is also a conception utterly at variance with the doctrine asserted." (Herbert Spencer, "Stereo-Chemistry and Vitalism," *Nature*, Vol. 58, pp. 592-593, 1898. Pp. 592n.-593n.) Here Spencer's argument is exactly parallel to that he used in maintaining that "survival of the fittest" is superior to "natural selection."

"Did I think that men were likely to remain in the far future anything like what they now are, I should contemplate with equanimity the sweeping away of the whole race." (Herbert Spencer, letter to the poet Wilfrid Scawen Blunt dated October 6, 1898. Quoted in *Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer*, 2 Vols., D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1908. Vol. 2, p. 137)
"Wendell Phillips, the "golden-tongued," was happy to be ranked as a reader and admirer of Mr. Spencer's writings. He had read Social Statics early, often quoted its author in his discussions, and asked me when I wrote you to convey his cordial respects, with an acknowledgement of his deep indebtedness to your labours. He was delighted with the project of reissuing your books, and begged to be used in any way that would forward the undertaking." (Letter from E. L. Youmans to Herbert Spencer dated November 23, 1863. Quoted in John Fiske, Edward Livingston Youmans, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1894. P. 163)

"Spencer, furthermore, was a philosopher rather than a scientist, concerned with constructing a formal, abstract system." (Harris E. Starr, William Graham Sumner. Henry Holt and Company. New York, 1925. P. 394.)

"Spencer ranks, in other words, among those who have made the two countries, science and philosophy, realize that they must reckon with each other; each admitting the other to its counsels." (A. H. Lloyd, "The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer," The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 11, pp. 97-111, 1920. P. 99)

"... he [Spencer] worked as a ... spider-philosopher weaving a web from his own entrails, and not as the scientist he fancied himself." (Israel Zangwill, "Herbert Spencer," The Reader Magazine, Vol. 4, pp. 27-29, 1904. P. 27)

"For Herbert Spencer, though a philosopher amongst men of science, was a scientist among philosophers; whilst with metaphysicians he may have been both, he was certainly not one of them." (John Butler Burke, "Herbert Spencer and The Master Key," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 89, pp. 783-794, 1906. P. 784)
"The scientists, it seems, found him [Spencer] too philosophical; the philosophers, too scientific; so that his success may be said to have fallen between the two. Thus he was actually and successfully neither, because on the whole both." (A. H. Lloyd, "The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer," The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 11, pp. 97-111, 1920. P. 97)


"... Mr. Spencer bases philosophy upon science, and makes it what may be called a science of the sciences." (Edward L. Youmans, "Herbert Spencer and the Doctrine of Evolution," The Popular Science Monthly, Vol. 6, pp. 20-48, 1874-75. P. 42)

"Herbert Spencer's significance in the history of English thought depends on his position as the philosopher of the great scientific movement of the second half of the 19th century ...." (p. 635) (F. C. S. Schiller, "Herbert Spencer," The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th ed. 1911. Vol. 25, pp. 634-637)

"It is as the philosophical embodiment of modern physical science, that Mr. Spencer is pre-eminentely distinguished." (Anonymous, ["clearly by Mivart"—Herbert Spencer], Review article of Spencer's Principles of Psychology, First Principles, and Essays, The Quarterly Review, Vol. 135, pp. 509-539, 1873. P. 511)
"I habitually speak of him as the only living Englishman who can fairly lay claim to the name of philosopher; nay, he is, I believe, the only man in Europe now living who has constructed a real system of philosophy." (Frederic Harrison, *The Philosophy of Common Sense*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1907. P. 353)

"... there perhaps never lived a philosopher more enthusiastically bent upon explaining the phenomena which he actually observed, rather than the mass of accumulated testimony and opinion about it." (L. L. Bernard, "Herbert Spencer: The Man and His Age," *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. 21, pp. 241-251, 1922) (p. 243)

"Mr. Herbert Spencer has received, and probably deserves, the title of England's greatest philosopher; and when we reach England's greatest in any achievement of mind, we have usually also reached the world's greatest." (Lester F. Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, 2 Vols., D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1894. Vol. I, p. 139)


The Synthetic Philosophy "... constitutes one of the most complete coordinated systems of philosophy in existence ...." (Walter B. Pillsbury, *The History of Psychology*, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, 1929. P. 190)

"Spencer was really a cosmic philosopher unlike people like Giddings, Bernard, and Ogburn, who were simply sociologists who turned to social problems as an incidental phase of the application of his laws of physical development to social evolution." (Harry Elmer Barnes, "The Fate of Sociology in England," *American Sociological Society, Papers and Proceedings*, Vol. 21, pp. 26-46, 1926. P. 27)

"... England has for the first time in her history produced a system of philosophy—that of Mr. Herbert Spencer; and this with the distinct understanding that the object of philosophy is the unification of knowledge." (John Theodore Merz, *A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, 6 Vols., William Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh, 1907. Vol. 1, p. 48)
"... the philosophical system which is without doubt the clearest profoundest expression of the general culture of the second half of the nineteenth century--i.e. the philosophy of Spencer." (Guido Villa, Contemporary Psychology, translated by Harold Manacorda, Swan Sonnenschein & Co Ltd, London, 1903. P. 322)

Spencer is referred to as "... this latest "runner" in the wonderful race of British empirical "torch-bearers."" (R. M. Wenley, Review of Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer, by David Duncan, Science, Vol. 28, pp. 760-763, 1908. P. 761)

"Whatever may be the verdict of the future, the man who is regarded as the great philosopher of evolution [Herbert Spencer] has within his own time won an acceptance and renown such as no preceding philosopher ever personally enjoyed." (Henry George, A Perplexed Philosopher, Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, New York, 1965. P. xiii)

"But whatever part of his philosophy may be transitory, Mr. Spencer's influence is indisputable; and since the lamented death of Mill, no one can now contest his claim to the philosophic supremacy in these islands." (Anonymous, "The Development of Psychology," The Westminster Review, Vol. 101, pp. 377-406, 1874. P. 400)

"Herbert Spencer holds the present greatest name among the philosophers. He is scarcely known in his own country outside the circles of fogies, but abroad he enjoys a wonderful reputation as the leader of all modern thought." (Jehu Junior, "Men of the Day.--No. CXCVIII., Mr. Herbert Spencer," Vanity Fair, April 26, 1879, p. 241. P. 241)

"And in awarding "points" to the various candidates for immortality in the "Pantheon of Philosophy," few are entitled to a higher mark than Mr. Spencer on this score of positive and systematic form. Whatever greatness this quality imports--and surely it is as rare as great--belongs to Mr. Spencer in the fullest measure." (William James, "Herbert Spencer," The Critic, Vol. 44, pp. 21-24, January, 1904. P. 21)

"On the whole, with qualifications which will appear presently, I belong to Herbert Spencer's camp...." (p. 162)

"When I rub my eyes and look at things candidly, it seems evident to me that this world is the sort of world described by Herbert Spencer, not the sort of world described by Hegel or Bergson. At heart these finer philosophers, like Plato, are not seeking to describe the world of our daily plodding and commerce, but to supply a visionary interpretation of it, a refuge from it in some contrasted spiritual assurance, where the sharp facts vanish into a clarified drama or a pleasant trance. Far be it from me to deride the imagination, poetic or dialectical; but after all it is a great advantage for a system of philosophy to be substantially true." (p. 163) (George Santayana, Obiter Scripta; Lectures, Essays and Reviews. Charles Scribner's Sons. New York, 1936)

"As a member of the tribe of the arachnidae constructs its web out of its own bowels, so did Mr. Spencer construct his system of philosophy out of his own head." (Unsigned, "The Exploded Quack," Blackwood's Magazine, Vol. 201, pp. 717-727, 1917. P. 722)

"But his Williams's Principles of Psychology and his First Principles /as compared to Principles of Biology/ seem to me far too metaphysical; he is always steep in hypotheses, always explaining not how things are actually accomplished, but how it is possible that they might be accomplished. Nothing is more interesting and ingenious [sic] than his theory of universal evolution and his treatment of progressive differentiations. Yet to my mind there is something of romance in all this, just as I find in Hegel or in Schopenhauer. Darwin goes as far as I can follow; beyond this, especially when Haeckel leads the way, I have to stop, for the ground is no longer firm beneath my feet. I have the same impression when studying Spencer's negations after considering his affirmations." (Letter from Hippolyte Taine to Th. Ribot dated July 6, 1873. Quoted in Life and Letters of H. Taine, 3 Vols., abridged and translated from the French by E. Sparvel-Bayly, Archibald Constable & Co Ltd, London, 1908. Vol. 3, pp. 115-116)

"Herbert Spencer, indeed, has done for modern British philosophy what Byron did for British poetry: he has carried its prestige to the continent, which he has conquered even more than the island." (Israel Zangwill, "Herbert Spencer," The Reader Magazine, Vol. 4, pp. 27-29, 1904. P. 27)

"He [Herbert Spencer] brought home the idea of philosophic synthesis to a greater number of the Anglo-Saxon race than had ever conceived the idea before." (A. S. Pringle-Pattison, "The Life and Philosophy of Herbert Spencer," The Quarterly Review, Vol. 200, pp. 240-267, 1904. P. 267)

"His [Spencer's] contributions to moral and political philosophy still have a certain interest but we shall look in vain to Spencer for any rigorous discussion of philosophical issues. He is the nineteenth-century publicist par excellence." (John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, A Pelican Book, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1968. P. 42)

"Nowhere else ... is there a more beautiful and fearless exposition of ... recent scientific notions ... as affecting our views of metaphysical problems." (David Masson, Recent British Philosophy, Macmillan and Co., London, 1877. P. 165)

"Indeed, I should say that he [Spencer] is the British thinker who has most distinctly seen the necessity that Philosophy should deal with the total cosmological organism ... if it would grasp all the present throbings of the speculative intellect." (David Masson, Recent British Philosophy, Macmillan and Co., London, 1877. P. 166)

... the treatment of the latter subject (the "rhythm of motion") offers one of the most brilliant examples of strict philosophic thinking which the world has yet produced." (Lester F. Ward, Dynamic Sociology, 2 Vols., D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1894. Vol. 1, p. 160)

"St. George Mivart, who as a Catholic is also at variance with Spencer in important matters, says "we cannot deny the title of philosopher to such a thinker as Mr. Spencer, who does genuinely bind together different and hitherto alien subjects, and that by a clear and wide though neither an all-comprehensive nor a spiritual hypothesis, the principle of evolution."" (Henry George, A Perplexed Philosopher, Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, New York, 1965. P. xii)

"Of all our thinkers he (Spencer) is the one who, as it appears to me, has formed to himself the largest new scheme of a systematic philosophy, and, in relation to some of the greatest questions of philosophy in their most recent forms, as set or reset by the last speculations and revelations of science, has already shot his thoughts the farthest." (David Masson, Recent British Philosophy, Macmillan and Co., London, 1877. P. 165)

"All metaphysical problems and speculations Spencer explicitly excluded from the purview of philosophy, properly so called, and, whether or no we agree with such a limitation, we must not forget to estimate his work in the light of his own object and aim." (H. S. Shelton, "Spencer's Formula of Evolution," The Philosophical Review, Vol. 19, pp. 241-258, 1910. P. 242)

"There has been no noteworthy attempt (In English philosophy) to give a conception of the world, of man, and of society, wrought out with systematic harmonising of principles. There has not been an effort to systematise the scattered labours of isolated thinkers. Mr. Herbert Spencer is now for the first time deliberately making the attempt to found a philosophy." (George H. Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, first edition, 1873. Vol. 1, p. 84)

After discussing "the Unknowable," "the Universal Postulate," "Transfigured Realism," etc., Perry says: "... the powerful influence which it (Spencer's philosophy) exerted in the latter half of the nineteenth century was due rather to its grandiose architecture than to the solidity of its foundations." (Ralph Berton Perry, Philosophy of the Recent Past, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1926. P. 34)
"The real modern era of philosophy may be said in a way to begin with the publication of the System of Synthetic Philosophy..." (p. 795) "... his System's work must form the basis of any future system of philosophy evolved in the fulness of time." (p. 795) "While our own universities made themselves snug and smug in the half-way houses of Kant and Hegel, foreign nations were accepting England's great philosopher as of more value than the Germans." (p. 795) (W., "Herbert Spencer," The Athenaeum, No. 3972, December 12, 1903, pp. 794-795. P.795)

"It would be easy to enumerate the particular contributions which other great English thinkers like Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume have made to the evolution of human thought, but it would not be true to say of any one of them that he had essayed to produce a complete system of philosophy co-ordinated and articulated in all its parts. That is the unique distinction of Herbert Spencer among English thinkers." (Review of Herbert Spencer's An Autobiography, The London Times, reprinted in The Living Age (Boston), Vol. 241 (23 n.s.), pp. 560-565, 1904. P. 560)

"In English-speaking countries it [Spencer's philosophy] stood for several decades as the most imposing monument of science, in which the extensive but scattered results of research were so conjoined as to afford a unified picture of the total cosmos. The materials were drawn from all the special sciences, inorganic as well as organic, but they received / their structural and pictorial unity from the principle of development or evolution." (Ralph Barton Perry, Philosophy of the Recent Past, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1928. Pp. 34-35)

"It was a pity that he called his system a "philosophy," for it was really only a synthesis of the sciences. It dealt wholly with the phenomenal, and not at all with the noumenal; it was concerned with processes, not with essences; its scope was less wide than even epistemology, from ontology it deliberately held aloof." (F. J. C. Hearnshaw, "Herbert Spencer and the Individualists," in The Social & Political Ideas of Some Representative Thinkers of the Victorian Age, ed. by F. J. C. Hearnshaw, pp. 53-53, George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., London, 1933. P. 66)

"There are not a few, especially in America, who think that Herbert Spencer has reached the end of philosophic thought, has achieved a final and conclusive system and a logical and harmonious statement of the one all-embracing law into which can be ranged and classified all the phenomena of matter and force, of life and of mind, of society and of science, of art and of religion; in short, a philosophy of the universe which fails to be accepted by any, only because they fail to comprehend it." (Van Buren Denslow, Modern Thinkers, Principally upon Social Science, Belford, Clarke, & Co., Chicago, 1880. P. 211)
"... Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) endeavored to build the stray bricks of scientific knowledge into a philosophical structure." (Reuben Post Halleck, History of English Literature, American Book Company, New York, 1900. P. 387)

"Mr. Spencer exercises a wider influence than any contemporary philosopher ...." (Arthur W. Benn, "Another View of Mr. Spencer's Ethics," Mind, Vol. 5, pp. 489-512, 1880. P. 489)


"It is often made a reproach against English philosophy that it is deficient in system and comprehensiveness.... It can never be said again [after Spencer] that no English mind has conceived and carried out a comprehensive system of philosophy." (L. P. Austin, "Herbert Spencer," The Illustrated London News, Vol. 123, p. 898, December 12, 1903. P. 898)

"... in the power of synthesis and grasp of principles it is doubtful if any thinker of ancient or modern times, with the exceptions of Aristotle, has surpassed or even approached the level of his [Spencer's] great intellect, or achieved work of such colossal magnitude." (John Butler Burke, "Herbert Spencer and the Master Key," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 89, pp. 783-794, 1906. P. 785)

"However commonplace the oft-repeated saying may be that a prophet is without honour in his own country, it seems to be most truly applicable to the one great philosopher that Englishmen can claim. Others, from other lands, have been received with acclamation here, but he whose mind and character were most distinctly English for years found little sympathy. Such an one was Herbert Spencer, the philosopher, as we say, the only philosopher, indeed, that England has produced." (John Butler Burke, "Herbert Spencer and The Master Key," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 89, pp. 783-794, 1906. P. 783)

"A man like Spencer can afford to be judged, not by his infallibility in details, but by the bravery of his attempt. He sought to see truth as a whole. He brought us back to the old ideal of philosophy, which since Locke's time had well-nigh taken flight, -- the ideal, namely, of a "com-/ pletely unified knowledge," into which the physical and mental worlds should enter on equal terms. This was the original Greek ideal of philosophy, to which men surely must return." (William James, "Herbert Spencer," The Critic, Vol. 44, pp. 21-24, 1904. Pp. 23-24)
Spencer's leading positions, "... whether they be finally conclusive in their logic or not, they possess a rising and increasing momentum which will compel all persons, who make any pretense of giving attention to philosophic utterance, to weigh them, and will leave none at liberty to ignore them." (Van Buren Denslow, *Modern Thinkers, Principally upon Social Science*, Belford, Clarke, & Co., Chicago, 1880. P. 209)

"In 1880, Francis Greenwood Peabody (H.U. 1869) was appointed Parkman Professor in the Harvard Divinity School, where he taught homiletics, ethics, and the philosophy of religion. In 1882-83 he added to the scope of the philosophical instruction by offering two courses in the philosophical department of the College. One of these courses was upon the philosophy of religion and the other upon ethics in relation to religion. In the latter course, he used Spencer's "Data of Ethics" and Maurice's "Social Morality." (Benjamin Rand, "Philosophical Instruction in Harvard University from 1636 to 1906," Part III, *The Harvard Graduates' Magazine*, Vol. 37, pp. 296-311, 1928-29. P. 300)

"No system of natural philosophy has, with equal consecutiveness and completeness, adapted the achievements and hypotheses of modern natural science to the construction of a philosophy on a scientific foundation." (p. 197) "The works included in the "Synthetic Philosophy" form parts of a great system held together by the principle of evolution; displaying stupendous learning, and a rare universality of scientific culture, entitling their author to a place, mutatis mutandis, beside Aristotle himself. These comprehensive writings afford, even to those who can not accept their underlying principles, a plenitude of instruction." (Friedrich von Baerenbach, "A German View of the "Data of Ethics,"" *The Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. 23, pp. 195-202, 1883. Translated and abridged from PSM by Thomas Cross)

"Two courses in systematic philosophy are particularly identified with the instruction given by Professor Josiah Royce [at Harvard]. From 1885 to 1896 he conducted the course in cosmology or philosophy of nature which Professor James had previously taught from 1879 to 1885. Professor Royce here gave in review the fundamental presuppositions which enter into the more important theories of the order of nature and contrasted the mechanical and theological interpretations of the world. He chose, as the most influential example of cosmological speculation, Spinoza's "Ethics" and Spencer's "First Principles." (Benjamin Rand, "Philosophical Instruction in Harvard University from 1636 to 1906," Part III, *The Harvard Graduates' Magazine*, Vol. 37, pp. 296-311, 1928-29. P. 306)
"But the great force of his Spencer's philosophy grew from the fact that his metaphysical ideas were based upon sound science; if evolution had remained what it was in 1852—just another unsubstantiated theory—a great system of thought based upon the idea of evolution could not have won much adherence. On the other hand, with evolution in the physical world an accepted and all but demonstrated belief, any system of philosophy which was based upon it must have been respectfully listened to." (Julian M. Drachman, Studies in the Literature of Natural Science, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1930. P. 355)

"Philosophy to these men Comte, Mill, and Spencer was merely a synopsis of the fundamental concepts and principles employed in the specialized sciences (with Comte: mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and sociology; with Spencer: biology, psychology, sociology, and morals). The synoptic study of these sciences was 'philosophical' by virtue of its general positivistic character, its refutation of all transcendental ideas. Such philosophy thus amounted to the refutation of philosophy." (Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, Beacon Press, Boston, 1960. P. 376)

"Of Spencer's work it may be said that no more heroic, and I will add no more successful, attempt to wield singlehanded such a mighty weapon as unified science has ever been made. If science no longer looks askance at Philosophy, but recognizes therein a most powerful ally, it is mainly due in modern times to the impression produced by the author of the Synthetic Philosophy." (Raphael Meldola, Evolution: Darwinian and Spencerian. The Herbert Spencer Lecture for 1910. The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1910. P. 13.)

"I am now working at a review of Herbert Spencer published in the Academy, April, 1873, which, I think, adds to my general despair. I find myself compelled to form the lowest opinion of a great deal of the results, and yet I have an immense admiration for his knowledge, his tenacious hold of very abstract and original ideas throughout a bold and complicated construction, his power of Combination and Induction. But the grotesque and chaotic confusion of his metaphysics!" (Letter from Henry Sidgwick to H. G. Dakyns dated February, 1873. Quoted in Henry Sidgwick, A Memoir, by A. S. Arthur Sidgwick and E. M. S. Eleanor Mildred Sidgwick, Macmillan and Co., Limited, London, 1906. P. 277)

"The advent of Spencer's new work, however, took the American public by storm. There was in this country in the period after the Civil War a great mass of people who had become fairly prosperous, but who had not acquired much of a classical education. They were avid, as many people are today, for culture on easy terms, and Herbert Spencer offered them a vest pocket guide to all problems of philosophy and science. Thus one who did not know what life is might read in Spencer that it is the sum of all vital activities and feel that he had acquired the essence of philosophical thereby." (Morris Raphael Cohen, American Thought: A Critical Sketch, Collier Books, New York, 1962. P. 89. [first published by The Free Press, 1954])
"From this new theory of man (as having developed through organic evolution) there will be developed a new philosophy not like most of the airy systems of metaphysical speculation hitherto prevalent, but one founded upon the solid ground of Comparative Zoology. A beginning of this has already been made by the great English philosopher Herbert Spencer. (Haeckel refers here to Spencer's First Principles, Principles of Biology, and Principles of Psychology, 1869 (± 1855?) edition.) ... this new monistic philosophy first opens up to us a true understanding of the real universe ...." (Ernst Haeckel, The History of Creation, translated from the German, 2 Vols., D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1884. Vol. 2, p. 367)

"Enough has been said to show that as a philosopher Mr. Spencer can hardly be accorded high rank. His work began about the same time as the great naturalistic revival of the generation just past, and he became the official philosopher of the movement. In this way he acquired a prestige beyond what his speculative work deserves. It was a time of loose and yeasty thinking, with great evolution of speculative gas. Bubbles covered with prismatic colors looked solid. It was just the time for the philosophical impressionist; and Mr. Spencer, with his big canvas and big brushes, was just the man for the time. But works of art produced in this way suffer from close inspection." (Borden F. Bowne, "Spencer's Nescience," The Independent, Vol. 56, pp. 67-71, 1904. Pp. 70-71)

"The student of Spencer's First Principles cannot fail to notice the adoption of Mansel's Metaphysics, and especially its application by the author to fix the limits of religious thought. Mr. Spencer's doctrine of the unknowable depends on the validity of Mansel's theory. It is worth while, therefore, at the outset to look at the foundations of this theory. It is well known that Mansel borrowed the idea from Sir William Hamilton, his master, who claimed that the ideas of the Absolute and Infinite are negative ideas, expressing out incapacity to conceive the Infinite rather than our positive comprehension of it." (William T. Harris, "Herbert Spencer and His Influence on Education," Journal of Proceedings and Addresses of the National Education Association, 1904, pp. 214-223. P. 216)

"He [Spencer] assumed a world of noumena of which we can know absolutely nothing, except in the appearances which they present to us, and called by him phenomena. The relativity of all possible knowledge was stoutly defended by him. Herbert Spencer, in spite of his boast that he had never read Kant, formulated a not dissimilar theory. Both assumed that things in their reality were totally different from what they appeared to us to be. Both regarded the objective world as merely appearances, implying some deep underlying substratum which Kant called 'Dinge an sich' [thing in itself] and Spencer called 'The Unknowable.' We cannot but regard both these theories as rank metaphysics. What title have we to assume that there is a reality underlying our visible and tangible Universe?" (Hugh S. R. Elliott, Modern Science and the Illusions of Professor Bergson, Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1912. P. 161)
"His [Spencer's] philosophy is the only philosophy that satisfies an earnestly inquiring mind. All other philosophies (at least in my experience) serve more to perplex than to enlighten. As it seems to me, we have in Herbert Spencer not only the profoundest thinker of our time, but the most capacious and most powerful intellect of all time. Aristotle and his master were not more beyond the pygmies who preceded them than he is beyond Aristotle. Kant, Hegel, Fichte, and Schelling are gropers in the dark by the side of him. In all the history of science there is but one name which can be compared to his, and that is Newton's; but Newton never attempted so wide a field, and how he would have succeeded in it, had he done so, must be only matter of conjecture." (Letter from F. A. P. Barnard to Edward L. Youmans dated November 10, 1882. Quoted in Edward L. Youmans, editor/ Herbert Spencer on The Americans and The Americans on Herbert Spencer, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1883. P. 87)

"Stifled for a time in the United States because it had neither an organization nor a sufficient /number of enthusiastic devotees to further it, naturalism was given new life through the development of evolutionary concepts. Less tied to any particular ideology than their opponents, the naturalists were inclined toward a freer interpretation of new knowledge. The result was that they came to look upon Darwin as the empirical basis for their thinking and upon Spencer as the philosopher who gave it systematic form." (Paul Russell Anderson and Max Harold Fisch, Philosophy in America, from the Puritans to James, D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1939. Pp. 327-328)

"... his books being most carefully thought out and organized with a thoroughness and precision which have characterized the works of but few authors. He brought to each period of composition well digested material which expressed itself with an admirable lucidity, rendering his books the most fascinating reading of modern philosophers." (L. L. Bernard, "Herbert Spencer's Work in the Light of His Life," The Monist, Vol. 31, pp. 1-35, 1921. P. 20)

"Unfortunately, the historical forms of naturalism have often been distinguished by their readiness to compromise, or cautiously to set limits to the use of scientific method. Thus, the naturalism of Spencer was tempered by his agnosticism; and the same may be said of Huxley." (Roy Wood Sellars, V. J. McGill, and Marvin Farber, "Foreword" to Philosophy for the Future, pp. v-xii, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1949. P. ix)

"Resources of advanced physical science, such as Locke and Hume never knew, are marshaled in its [Spencer's philosophy's] defense. And to these Mr. Spencer adds a faculty of popular exposition such as no preceding thinker of his ability has possessed." (August Hopkins Strong, D.D., Philosophy and Religion, A. C. Armstrong and Spn, New York, 1888. P. 40)
"Bye the bye, see if they have any of Herbert Spencer's books in the Mechanics' Institute Library. He is perhaps our greatest living philosopher." (Letter from George Gissing to Algernon Gissing dated January 19, 1879. Quoted in Letters of George Gissing to Members of His Family, Collected and arranged by Algernon and Ellen Gissing, Constable and Company, Ltd., London, 1927. P. 40)

"Probably there never was anywhere before or since as widespread an interest in a philosophy as the American interest at that time in Spencer's." (P. 50) "Probably no other philosopher ever had such a vogue as Spencer had from about 1870 to 1890." (P. 298) (Henry Holt, Garrulities of an Octogenarian Editor. Houghton Mifflin Company. Boston, 1923.)

"While inditing tragedies and a huge epic in the romantic vein (fortunately long ago burnt), I was plotting out a rationalistic philosophy which should accomplish what Darwin and Spencer had failed to finish (and this too went to the flames)." (Paul Elmer More, quoted in Arthur Hazard Dakin, Paul Elmer More, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1960. P. 313)
"Spencer was not a sociological monist. He did not single out some one factor that pushes society ahead through the various phases of its evolution. The whole evolutionary process, for Spencer, was the prime force, the motive power which explains everything, an unknowable and impersonal force, determining every becoming in all realms of being. But his ideas about disturbances, ideas which he did not develop extensively, show that he was inclined to believe that there was a single determining factor in change." (Nicholas S. Timasheff, Sociological Theory: Its Nature and Growth, third edition, Random House, New York, 1967. P. 42)

"... although Mr. / Spencer has shown that the progress of Civilization thus depends remotely on the Law of Evolution, he has not shown us the immediate factors by which it has been produced, and the way in which they have united to produce it." (pp. 385-386) "And thus it is that Mr. Spencer, by attaching the progress of Civilization to a remote, abstract, and impersonal law of Nature, rather than to immediate, human, and concrete causes, has left the problem still unsolved." (p. 386) (John Beattie Crozier, Civilization and Progress, Outlines of a New System, 3rd edition, Longmans, Green, & Co., London, 1893)

"From beginning to end of these three volumes /of Principles of Sociology/ there is no pretence of anything like a continuous scheme of social evolution—nothing that can be called a philosophy of history; and yet a scientific theory of general history is the larger and far the most important part of Sociology. Spencer never had a glimmering of history." (Frederic Harrison, "Sociology: Its Definition and Its Limits," The Sociological Review, Vol. 3, pp. 97-104, 1910. P. 103)

"Mr. Spencer’s theory of social causation is thus neither purely psychological nor purely physiographic. It is rather a theory of the correlations of subjective states with external circumstances; of social systems conceived as products of a human nature that is itself molded by the physical conditions of existence." (Franklin H. Giddings, "The Greatness of Herbert Spencer," The Independent, Vol. 55, pp. 2959-2962, December 17, 1903. P. 2961)

"... studying these generalizations of political economy, we trace them all to the truth that each man seeks satisfaction for his desires in ways costing the smallest effort—such social phenomena being resultants of individual actions so guided; ..." (Herbert Spencer, First Principles, 4th edition, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1880. P. 135)

"On the other hand, the environmentalist (as, e.g., Spencer) who explains the spiritual occurrences as processes of adjustments to the situation or environment, which to him is the only basis of reality, often overestimates the importance of the milieu." (Leopold von Wiese, Sociology, edited by Franz H. Mueller, Oskar Piez, New York, 1941. P. 52)
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

"... it is best for the old to live on as long as it can, yielding inch by inch only as fast as the new grows up to replace it; and men's attachment to the old is the measure of its remaining vitality, and of the still continued need for it." (Letter from Herbert Spencer to Edward L. Youmans, probably written in 1866 or 1867. Quoted by Youmans in an unsigned article, "Herbert Spencer and His Reviewers," The Christian Examiner, Vol. 82, pp. 200-223(?), 1867? F. 223)

Spencer was an ecological determinist, but I would say that Spencer stressed too much the molding effect that war-like relations of a society with others had in shaping its social organization, and not enough the effect of the mode of subsistence on the social structure of a society, or more specifically, how the food quest could help develop the powers of the chief.

"Spencer ably explains in what manner evolution will be produced, if it does take place, but he does not tell us the source producing it. As a matter of fact, the question is not even raised for him." (Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, translated from the French by George Simpson, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1933. P. 265)

"Mr. Spencer's work has been mainly to give this century, and in part all time, its first great map of the field of sociology. He has brought all the pieces on the board, described them one by one, defined and explained the game. But what he has failed to do with sufficient precision, is to pick out the King and Queen." (Henry Drummond, The Lowell Lectures on the Ascent of Man, James Pott & Co., Publishers, New York, 1894. P. 43)

"Mr. Herbert Spencer's opinions on Parliament were published at the time of the Leicester election of 1884. Mr. Spencer held that "laws were practically made out of doors and simply registered by Parliament." (George Jacob Holyoake, Sixty Years of an Agitator's Life, 2 Vols., T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1892. Vol. 2. P. 256)

"In all Spencer's vast output there is nothing that can be called any theory of general history. What we have is the embryology of society. But no science is constituted if its conclusions are limited to embryology." (Frederic Harrison, "Sociology: Its Definition and Its Limits," The Sociological Review, Vol. 3, pp. 97-104, 1910. P. 103)

"... the law that opinion is ultimately determined by the feelings, and not by the intellect." (Herbert Spencer, Social Statics, John Chapman, London, 1851. P. 429)
"Ideas do not govern and overthrow the world: the world is governed or overthrown by feelings, to which ideas serve only as guides. The social mechanism does not rest finally on opinions; but almost wholly on character. Not intellectual anarchy, but moral antagonism, is the cause of political crises. All social phenomena are produced by the totality of human emotions and beliefs; of which the emotions are mainly pre-determined, while the beliefs are mainly post-determined. Men's desires are chiefly inherited; but their beliefs are chiefly acquired, and depend on surrounding conditions; and the most important surrounding conditions depend on the social state which the prevalent desires have produced. The social state at any time existing, is the resultant of all the ambitions, self-interests, fears, reverences, indignations, sympathies, etc., of ancestral citizens and existing citizens. The ideas current in this social state, must, on the average, be congruous with the feelings of citizens; and therefore, on the average, with the social state these feelings have produced. Ideas wholly foreign to this social state / cannot be evolved, and if introduced from without, cannot get accepted—or, if accepted, die out when the temporary phase of feeling which caused their acceptance, ends. Hence, though advanced ideas when once established, act on society and aid its further advance; yet the establishment of such ideas depends on the fitness of the society for receiving them. Practically, the popular character and the social state, determine what ideas shall be current; instead of the current ideas determining the social state and the character. The modification of men's moral natures, caused by the continuous discipline of social life, which adapts them more and more to social relations, is therefore the chief proximate cause of social progress." (Herbert Spencer, "Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte," in Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative, 3 Vols., Williams and Norgate, London, 1891; Vol. 2, pp. 118-144. Pp. 128-129)

"He [Spencer] saw that the evolutionary process in society, as in plant and animal life, takes the form of a continuing adaptation of organism to environment, and that in human history the essential of the adaptation is a molding of human character to the relatively permanent circumstances of collective life. This one part of Mr. Spencer's philosophy has received less consideration than his conclusions on various other subjects, and yet it is second to nothing else in his writings in scientific significance or in practical importance." (Franklin H. Giddings, "The Greatness of Herbert Spencer," The Independent, Vol. 55, pp. 2959-2962, December 17, 1903. P. 2961)

"It is becoming a common remark that we are approaching a state in which laws are practically made out of doors, and simply registered by Parliament; and if so, then the actual work of legislation is more the work of those who modify the ideas of electors than of those who give effect to their ideas. So regarding the matter, I conceive that I should not gain influence, but rather lose influence, by ceasing to be a writer that I might become a representative." (Letter from Herbert Spencer to Rev. J. Page Hopps dated February 21, 1884. Quoted in David Duncan, Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer, 2 Vols., D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1908. Vol. 1, p. 320)
"Progress, and at the same time resistance,"—that celebrated saying of M. Guizot, with which the foregoing position is in substance identical—no doubt expresses a truth; ...." (p. 469) "From time to time the struggle eventuates in change; and by composition of forces there is produced a resultant, embodying the right amount of movement in the right direction. Thus understood, then, the theory of "progress, and at the same time resistance," is correct." (p. 470) (Herbert Spencer, Social Statics, John Chapman, London, 1851)

"... we cannot find in Spencer even any sketch of general history, any dynamic laws of civilization at all, other than the mysterious all-explaining Evolution—which is little more than the statement that society does change and grows more and more heterogeneous. I will quote a passage from my Address/the first Herbert Spencer Lecture, delivered at Oxford in 1905: "The Synthetic Philosophy of Evolution contains no history of human civilization in its entirety, as a continuous biography of man. There is not in it, and he never has even projected, any philosophy of general history, the dynamics in fact of Sociology. In his 'Principles of Sociology' there are a body of acute but miscellaneous observations, and some profound suggestions as to the origin of institutions, primitive habits, rudimentary groups. But we never get farther than glimpses of savage life, the variations in primaeval rites, and the survival of ancient customs. In all Spencer's vast output there is nothing that can be called any theory of general history." (Frederic Harrison, "Sociology: Its Definition and Its Limits," The Sociological Review, Vol. 3, pp. 97-104, 1910. Pp. 102-103)

"In Social Statics almost everything is made to turn upon the doctrine—previously hardly more than hinted at—that from the very beginning of social life down to the present time there has been going on, and that there still is going on, a process of slow but none the less certain adjustment of the natures of men to society, and of the social organization to the natures of its constituent units: this adjustment being the result of a perpetual interaction between units and aggregates which ever tends to bring them into more perfect adaptation the one to the other. Such adaptation, it is further shown, is produced by the direct action of circumstances upon the natures of men, and by the preservation and accumulation by inheritance from generation to generation of the modifications thus initiated ...." (William Henry Hudson, "Herbert Spencer and the Synthetic Philosophy," The Popular Science Monthly, Vol. 41, pp. 1-16, 1892. P. 5)

"Spencer's dialectic of social change was not, as we have seen, derived from a study of history itself. It was merely the application of his cosmic law to historic data. The results appear formal and empty where they have not been proved wholly wrong or open to doubt. Obviously, not all social change is in the direction of greater complexity or heterogeneity. Nor do such developments, if and where they obtain, give greater stability to the aggregate. These and other objections cast doubt upon the validity of the formula as the correct law of change." (Newell LeRoy Sims, The Problem of Social Change, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1939. Pp. 84-85)
Spencer saw great social changes, not as the outcome of acts of will by great men, but as the product of larger social forces. Thus he paraphrases a statement of Aristotle to read that "political changes are generated by great causes but out of small incidents." (Vol. II, p. 424) This is how 'history' and 'evolution' meet. Evolutionary forces are expressed in historical incidents.

Spencer speaks of "the permanent sentiments and ideas produced in them [industrial communities, i.e., the population of towns and cities] by their mode of life." (Vol. 2, p. 424). This indicates how Spencer believed the causal chain ran: mode of life → sentiments and ideas.


All kinds of cultural developments are explained by Spencer as natural outgrowths, as responses to, certain problems or situations which did not require "a flash of insight" or the intervention of "genius". This point of view is consistently maintained.

"The things that make life possible are likely to take precedence over the things that life makes possible." --Herbert Spencer, as quoted or paraphrased by Arnold J. Toynbee, with no reference.

"PHILOSOPHY OF STYLE"

"... he [Spencer] wrote a valuable essay on style, and the admonition that made the deepest impression on me, when I read that little book in my nonage, was that style should vary with the subject ...." (Gertrude Atherton, Adventures of a Novelist. Blue Ribbon Books, Inc., New York, 1932. P. 314)

"Nevertheless, style is one thing and diction is another. If some one should compel me by force to explain the difference between the two, my answer would be something like this: Diction is the body--the flesh and bone--and style is the spirit. But some years ago, that able Heathen, Mr. Herbert Spencer, had something he wanted to say about diction, and so he wrote it out and called it An Essay on Style, and ever since then the Heathens, the Pagans, and not a few who still call themselves Christians, have persisted in referring to diction as style ...." (Letter from Joel Chandler Harris to his daughter Lillian, dated May Day, 1898. Quoted in Julia Collier Harris, The Life and Letters of Joel Chandler Harris. Constable & Co. Limited, London, 1919. P. 394)

In speaking of an essay of Spencer's dealing with "the laws of cause and effect in literary art," (undoubtedly "The Philosophy of Style"), the literary critic, Theodore Watts-Dunton, described it, many years after its publication, as " ... an essay so searching in its analyses, and so original in its method and conclusions, that the workers in pure literature may well be envious of science for enticing such a leader away from their ranks ...." (Quoted in James Douglas, Theodore Watts-Dunton, Poet--Novelist--Critic. John Lane, New York, n.d. P. 214)

"... [Edwin L.] Godkin [editor of The Nation] came to me one night at the Century [Club] with: "You remember your controversy with the Nation over Spencer's reputation? Well, I've just read his Philosophy of Style. I don't know anything about the topics in dispute between you and my contributor, but I do profess to know something about English style. Spencer's work on it is a masterpiece, and, judging what I don't know by what I now do know, I am ready to presume that all you claim for him is well founded."" (Henry Holt, Garrulities of an Octogenarian Editor, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1923. P. 292)

"... the article on The Philosophy of Style ... should be by all means included [in the collection of Spencer's essays be- ing prepared], as it has great value and is much admired. Bancroft was to-day eulogizing it to me in very high terms." (Letter from Edward L. Youmans to Herbert Spencer dated December 14, 1863. Quoted in John Fiske, Edward Livingston Youmans, D. Apple- ton and Company, New York, 1894. P. 169)
"In connection with growth and its limits Spencer made a simple but shrewd observation, which seems also to have occurred to Prof. Leuckart and to Dr. Alexander James. He pointed out, that in the growth of similarly shaped bodies the increase of volume continually tends to outrun the increase of surface. The volume of living matter must grow more than the surface through which it is kept alive, if the surface remain regular in contour. In spherical and all other regular units the volume increases as the cube of the radius, the surface only as the square of the radius. Thus a cell, for instance, as it grows, must get into physiological difficulties, for the nutritive necessities of the increasing volume are ever less adequately supplied by the less rapidly increasing absorbent surface. There is less and less opportunity for nutrition, respiration, and excretion. A nemesis of growth sets in, for waste gains upon, overtakes, balances, and threatens to exceed repair. Growth may cease at this limit, and a balance be struck; or the form of the unit may be altered and surface gained by flattening out, or very frequently ramifying processes; or--and this is the most frequent solution--the cell may divide, halving its volume, gaining new surface, and restoring the balance." (J. Arthur Thomson--Herbert Spencer. J. M. Dent & Co. London, 1906, pp. 112-113)

"Spencer, Leuckart, and James pointed out independently that, as a cell of regular shape increases in volume, it does not proportionately increase in surface. If it be a sphere, the volume of material to be kept alive increases as the cube of the radius, while the surface, through which the keeping alive is effected, increases only as the square. Thus there tends to be a hazardous disproportion between volume and surface, which may set up instability. The disturbed balance may be restored by the emission of processes from the surface of the cell, making it like a country with a big coastline, as in Rhizopod Protozoa or in the ameboid cells found in most multicellular animals. But the disturbed balance is normally restored by the cell dividing into two cells." (J. Arthur Thomson, The System of Animate Nature, 2 Vols., Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1920. Vol. 1, pp. 92-93)

"Let us next note another little-known but important contribution to general evolutionary theory which we owe to Spencer the biologist. Every living organism begins as a single cell; but there invariably comes a time when, if the cell reaches a certain size, it begins to divide. It is this division that conditions the development of the heterogeneous multicellular individual from the homogeneous unicellular creature which, whatever the size to which it grew, could never be other than a lowly and primitive object. Now, Spencer's law of limit of growth teaches that, as a cell enlarges, its volume increases at a greater rate than its surface, as is evident." (C. W. Saleeby, Evolution The Master-Key, Harper & Brothers Publishers, New York, 1906. P. 157)

The principle of similitude "by which weight varies as the linear dimensions cubed and strength as the linear dimensions squared." (J. T. Bonner)
PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES IN BIOLOGY

Largely because of the knowledge and outlook gained as an engineer Spencer became convinced that "to interpret the truths of a special science the truths of more general sciences have to be brought in aid." Certain problems of growth in living organisms, he maintained, "are inexplicable by one who limits himself to biology alone," and he argued that "mathematics and physics have to be invoked," and "certain relations between masses and surfaces, certain relations between proportional sizes and proportional strains" have to be determined before such problems can be solved.21


"The chapter on 'Growth' furnishes a good example, and furnishes, too, another illustration of the way in which, to interpret the truths of a special science the truths of more general sciences have to be brought in aid. The amounts and limits of growth exhibited by the different classes of organisms, plant and animal, are inexplicable by one who limits himself to biology alone. Mathematics and physics have to be invoked--certain relations between masses and surfaces, certain relations between proportional sizes and proportional strains, certain relations between the genesis of energy and the tenacity of the parts which expend energy." ("The Filiation of Ideas," in Duncan, p. 557)

"The first adequate discussion of growth is due to Spencer. He pointed out, that in the growth of similarly shaped bodies the increase of volume continually tends to outrun that of the surface. The mass of living matter must grow more rapidly than the surface through which it is kept alive. In spherical and all other regular units the mass increases as the cube of the diameter, the surface only as the square. Thus the cell, as it grows, must get into physiological difficulties, for the nutritive necessities of the increasing mass are ever less adequately supplied by the less rapidly increasing absorptive surface." (Patrick Geddes and J. Arthur Thomson, The Evolution of Sex, Walter Scott, London, 1889. P. 220)

"What he [Spencer] himself always aims at is to obliterate the separating lines between the organic and the inorganic, and to reduce all the phenomena of life to the terms of such purely physical agencies as the mechanical forces--light, heat, and chemical affinity, etc." (The Duke of Argyll [George Douglas Campbell], Organic Evolution Cross-Examined, John Murray, London, 1898. P. 21)
Spencer has some interesting observations on evolution:

"... the law that motion is along the line of least resistance or the line of greatest traction or the result of the two" (Vol. III, p. 359). We are acquainted with Zipf's "principle of least effort." Here we have it, plus a deeper generalization.

"... the law that motion follows the line of least resistance--a law previously recognized as one needful to be taken account of in the interpretation of evolutionary processes." (Auto. II, 49)

Spencer introduced engineering principles to explain how larger societies are less cohesive than smaller ones.


"... despite his Spencer's elaborate and extended use of the organic analogy, Spencer derived his social theory ultimately from physics." (Cynthia Eagle Russett, The Concept of Equilibrium in American Social Theory, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966. P. 38)

"... during the interval between First Principles and his Principles of Sociology Mr. Spencer grew cautious in the use of analogy, and came to prefer the laws of life to the laws of matter as the key to social processes...." (Edward Alsworth Ross, "Moot Points in Sociology. II. Social Laws." The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 9, pp. 105-123, 1903. P. 109)

"The truth is Spencer was primarily and essentially a physicist, holding development in a form which he could express in the terms of physics and which he applied not only to inorganic nature, but to organic and what he called super-organic forms." (A. M. Fairbairn, "Herbert Spencer," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 85, pp. 1-11, 1904. P. 10)
"... Herbert Spencer, in whose Synthetic Philosophy we have much the most elaborate and thoroughgoing expression of nineteenth century naturalism." (Arthur Kenyon Rogers, English and American Philosophy Since 1800, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1922. P.135)

"Mr. Spencer's fire and sword shine most brightly in criticism." (Gabriel Compayre, Herbert Spencer and Scientific Education, translated by Maria E. Findlayson, Thomas Y. Crowell & Co., New York, 1907. P. 51)

"In controversy he [Spencer] was scrupulously fair, aiming at truth, and not at the barren victories of dialectics." (Francis Gribble, "Herbert Spencer: His Autobiography and His Philosophy," The Fortnightly Review, Vol. 81, pp. 984-995, 1904. P. 985)


"Replying to criticisms is, indeed, a bootless undertaking, save in those cases where the positions defended are further elucidated, and so rendered more acceptable to those who are not committed to antagonist views. On such as are committed to antagonist views, replies, however conclusive, produce no appreciable effects; and especially is this so when such antagonist views are involved in theological systems." (Herbert Spencer, "Replies to Criticisms on The Data of Ethics, Mind, Vol. 6, pp. 82-98, 1881. P. 98)

"Other interruptions were from time to time occasioned by his [Spencer's] having to turn aside from his work itself with matters only indirectly connected with it; such as replies to criticisms and the correction of misconceptions and perversions of his statements (in which distracting exercise some of us feel that he has spent somewhat too large a share of his time) ...." (William Henry Hudson, "Herbert Spencer: A Biographical Sketch," The Arena, Vol. 5, pp. 273-285, 1891-92. P. 284)
Spencer saw the rise of particular political forms not as matters of deliberate choice. He denied that recognition of "advantages or disadvantages of this or that arrangement furnished motives for establishing or maintaining" (Vol. II, p. 395) a form of government. But argued instead that "conditions and not intentions determine." (Vol. II, p. 395).

Typology of Political Evolution
1. Simple
2. Compound
3. Doubly Compound
4. Trebly Compound


"In conformity with the law of evolution of all organized bodies, that general functions are gradually separated into the special functions constituting them, there have grown up in the social organism for the better performance of the governmental office, an apparatus of law-courts, judges, and barristers; a national church, with its bishops and priests; and a system of caste, titles, and ceremonies, administered by society at large." (Herbert Spencer, "Manners and Fashion," The Westminster Review, Vol. 5, n.s., pp. pp. 357-392, April, 1854. Pp. 371-372)
C. E. M. Joad in his article on Spencer in the ESS discusses only Spencer's political philosophy, and says nothing, virtually, about his treatment of social evolution.

C. E. M. Joad's evaluation of Spencer in the ESS is solely on the basis of his *propagandistic* writings and takes no account of his *scientific* writings about society.

Thus, in his article on Spencer in his *Introduction to the History of Sociology*, Barnes chose to stress Spencer's political individualism and laissez-faire rather than his contributions to sociological theory.
"POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY"

An announcement by D. Appleton & Company in the Popular Science Monthly in 1875 announced that: "The "Principles of Sociology" is published in Quarterly Parts of 80 to 96 pages each, by subscription, at $2.00 per year."


"Previous to the establishment of the 'Popular Science Monthly,' we had not in this country a single journal designed to diffuse the knowledge of either general or exact science." (Simon Newcomb, quoted in Charles M. Haar, "E. L. Youmans: A Chapter in the Diffusion of Science in America," Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 9, pp. 193-213, 1948. P. 197)

In the July, 1874, issue of The Popular Science Monthly there appeared what seems to be the first installment of The Principles of Sociology, an article entitled "Climate and Social Development" (The Popular Science Monthly, Vol. 5 [No. 27], pp. 322-327, 1874). A footnote to the title of the article reads: "From advance sheets of the "Principles of Sociology.--Part I. The Data of Sociology. Chapter III. Original External Factors." (P. 322n.)

On The Popular Science Monthly: "It has been started to help on the work of sound public education by supplying instructive articles on the leading subjects of scientific inquiry. It will contain papers, original and selected, on a wide range of subjects, from the ablest scientific men of different countries, explaining their views to non-scientific people." (Edward L. Youmans, "Purpose and Plan of Our Enterprise," The Popular Science Monthly, Vol. 1, May, 1872. P. 113)

"It [The Popular Science Monthly] was entered upon as an experiment, and generally thought to be a hopeless one." (p. 745) "... we had the most discouraging assurances that they [the reading public] will not sustain a solid and really instructive magazine, which requires them to think." (p. 745) "There has been an almost unanimous expression of opinion on the part of individuals and the press that THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY has met an urgent public need, that it is the most valuable magazine now before the American public, and deserves an extensive patronage." (p. 745) (Edward L. Youmans, "Our First Year's Work," The Popular Science Monthly, Vol. 2, pp. 745-746, April, 1873)

"... the Popular Science Monthly may be regarded as one of the by-products of his genius." (James McKeen Cattell, "The Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer," The Popular Science Monthly, Vol. 73, pp. 283-285, 1908. P. 285. Cattell was at that time editor of Popular Science Monthly)

The last article by Herbert Spencer in The Popular Science Monthly was "Professor Ward on "Naturalism and Agnosticism," which appeared in Vol. 56, pp. 349-357, January, 1900.


"We have, however, worked up a very deep feeling of hostility toward The Popular Science Monthly, and hear constantly of people who "won't have it in the house."" (Letter from Edward L. Youmans to Herbert Spencer, dated [? around the end of 1873]. Quoted in John Fiske, Edward Livingston Youmans, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1894. P. 313) (The circulation of the PSM was then around 11,000; same ref.)

"I must take this opportunity to tell you how much I depend on The Popular Science Monthly. It comes to me like the air they send down to the people in a diving bell. I seem to get a fresh breath with every new number." (Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Edward L. Youmans, dated May 3, 1874. Quoted in John Fiske, Edward Livingston Youmans, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1894. P. 315)
"Looking only at the present and the immediate future, it is unquestionably true, that, if unchecked, the rate of increase of people would exceed the rate of increase of food." (Herbert Spencer, "A Theory of Population, Deduced from the General Law of Animal Fertility," The Westminster Review, Vol. 57, pp. 468-501, 1852. P. 498)

"In all cases, Spencer has cited instances of increased agricultural productivity, manufacture, and commerce; increase of numbers is the efficient cause." (Herbert Spencer, "A Theory of Population, Deduced from the General Law of Animal Fertility," The Westminster Review, Vol. 57, pp. 468-501, 1852. P. 499)

"Evidently, so long as the fertility of the race is more than sufficient to balance the diminution by deaths, population must continue to increase: so long as population continues to increase, there must be pressure on the means of subsistence; and so long as there is pressure on the means of subsistence, further mental development must go on, and further diminution of fertility must result. Hence, the change can never cease until the rate of multiplication is just equal to the rate of mortality: ..." (Herbert Spencer, "A Theory of Population, Deduced from the General Law of Animal Fertility," The Westminster Review, Vol. 57, pp. 468-501, 1852. P. 500)


"... excess of fertility has itself rendered the process of civilization inevitable. From the beginning, pressure of population has been the proximate cause of progress. It produced the original diffusion of the race. It compelled men to abandon predatory habits and take to agriculture. It led to the clearing of the earth's surface. It forced men into the social state; made social organization inevitable; and has developed the social sentiments. It has stimulated to progressive improvements in production, and to increased skill and intelligence. It is daily pressing us into closer contact and more mutually-dependent relationships." (Herbert Spencer, "A Theory of Population, Deduced from the General Law of Animal Fertility," The Westminster Review, Vol. 57, pp. 468-501, 1852. P. 501)

"As to the adjustment of population to subsistence, Mr. H. Spencer has sufficient faith in the beneficence of nature to believe this will come about of itself through a biological law—that multiplication and individuation vary inversely, so that, as the physical and intellectual culture of the individual is more and more attended to, the increase of the species will gradually diminish. This "law" is however as yet only a mere speculation of Mr. Spencer's." (David G. Ritchie, Darwinism and Politics, Swan Sonnenschein & Co, London, 1889. Pp. 97-98)
"From the beginning pressure of population has been the prox-
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sive improvements in production, and to increased skill and intelli-
gence. It is daily thrusting us into closer contact and more mutual-
ly-dependent relationships. And after having caused, as it ultimate-
ly must, the due peopling of the globe, and the raising of its habi-
table parts into the highest state of culture ...." (Herbert Spence-
er, The Principles of Biology, revised edition, 2 Vols., D. Apple-

Spencer was the first (?) to point out (in First Principles,
4th ed., Ch. 22, Sec. 173; possibly earlier in Principles of Bio-
logy) that all plant and animal species fluctuate in number because
of variations in the amount of food and the number of enemies. But
he noted that "... amid these oscillations produced by their con-
flict lies that average number of the species at which its expan-
sive tendency is in equilibrium with surrounding repressive ten-
dencies." (Quoted by Lotka), p. 62). This notion, that the popula-
tion of organic species tends to fluctuate toward an equilibrium,
was accepted, expressed and interpreted mathematically by A. J.
Lotka, who concluded: "These conclusions are the analytical con-
firmation and extension of an inference drawn by Herbert Spencer
on qualitative grounds:" (pp. 57-63) (quote on p. 61) (Alfred J.
Lotka, Elements of Physical Biology, Williams & Wilkins Co., Bal-
timore, 1925)

"More influential than Thomas Doubleday's The True Law of Pop-
ulation (1842) was the famous population theory set forth by Her-
bert Spencer in 1852. He held that there is a fundamental antagonism
between what he called "individuation" and "genesis." As civiliza-
tion becomes more complex, a larger proportion of available physi-
ological energy is used up in problems of personal development and
expression; hence, there is less energy which remains available for
reproductive purposes. In short, advanced civilizations seem to be
antagonistic to high fecundity. Spencer's theory was widely adopted,
especially by the influential American economist, Henry C. Carey,
who used it as a means of combating the pessimism of Malthus. It
was upon the basis of this idea that Carey transformed the perspec-
tive of classical economics in the United States from a pessimistic
to an optimistic cast." (Harry Elmer Barnes, Society in Transition,

"The degree of agreement in many fundamental doctrines between the Positivist School of thought and Herbert Spencer is so large ..." (Frederic Harrison, "Herbert Spencer's "Life"", The Positivist Review, Vol. 16, pp. 145-149, 1908. P. 146)

"In looking over the American press notices of your works I find the dominant idea is that you belong to the positive school; although not one in a hundred knows what Positivism is, all are agreed that it is positively dreadful." (Letter from Edward L. Youmans to Herbert Spencer dated December 14, 1863. Quoted in John Fiske, Edward L. Youmans, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1894. P. 169)

In his work The Rise of European Civilization all that Charles Seignobos, the celebrated French historian, found it necessary to say about Herbert Spencer was: "An English positivist, Herbert Spencer, amended the theory of positivism, "which reduced all knowledge to the "positive" knowledge acquired by observation of the phenomena accessible to the senses" by the idea of the "unknown", admitting that there is a part of reality which man has no means of knowing." (Charles Seignobos, The Rise of European Civilization, Translated from the French by Catherine Alison Phillips, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1942. P. 368)

"The stupid old public (begging its pardon, nothing personal intended) would probably have gone on calling us all "positivists" to this day, had not Huxley, once in a moment of happy inspiration, fired off the term "agnostic." It took so beautifully that people have by this time almost forgotten that there ever was any such thing as "positivism"; and as a missile of theological vituperation the word "agnostic" is so innocent of all definite significance that nobody need mind being pelted with it." (John Fiske, Edward Livingston Youmans, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1894. Pp. 291n.-292n.)

"When Huxley has his scrimmage with Richard Congreve, in 1869, over the scientific aspects of positivism, I was giving lectures to post-graduate classes at Harvard on the positive philosophy. I never had any liking for Comte or his ideas, but entertained an absurd notion that the epithet "positive" was a proper and convenient one to apply to scientific methods and scientific philosophy in general. In the course of the discussion I attacked sun-dry statements of Huxley with quite unnecessary warmth, for such is the superfluous of youth." (John Fiske, "Reminiscences of Huxley," Smithsonian Institution Annual Report, 1900 (1901), pp. 713-728. Pp. 715-716)
"Ten years after the publication of the article in which M. Laugel said of Spencer in the Revue des Deux Mondes, that he was condemning himself to poverty and obscurity from his devotion to speculations of an unpopular kind, the Revue Positive, of Paris, charged him "with having turned his back on the immortal Stuart Mill to sacrifice to the golden calf, the source of all popularity, in company with Darwin, Lubbock, Tyndall and Huxley." (Le Transformisme devant le Positivisme, in the Revue Positive for January and February, 1875)." (Count Goblet d'Alviella, The Contemporary Evolution of Religious Thought in England, America and India, translated by J. Moden, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1886. P. 138n.)
In 1882 Spencer visited the United States, and while in Washington was shown through the exhibits of the Smithsonian Institution by Major Powell. (Auto. II, 397-8)

"Should the philosophy of [Herbert] Spencer, which confounds man with the brute and denies the efficacy of human endeavor, become the philosophy of the twentieth century, it would cover civilization with a pall and culture would again stagnate." (John Wesley Powell, "From Barbarism to Civilization." American Anthropologist, Vol. 1, pp. 97-123, 1888. P. 122)

"Herbert Spencer, who was enjoying a great vogue in those years, he [John Wesley Powell] detested, but at least we know he was acquainted with Spencer's works." (Paul Meadows, John Wesley Powell: Frontiersman of Science, University of Nebraska Studies, New Series, No. 10, 1952. P. 77)

"The secretary of the Anthropological Society of Washington recorded the following illuminating minutes of a meeting for March 15, 1881. "He (Powell) said that the doctrines taught by Herbert Spencer and that school, would, at a rough estimate, if practiced, neutralize nine-tenths of the legislation of the world." (Paul Meadows, John Wesley Powell: Frontiersman of Science, University of Nebraska Studies, New Series, No. 10, 1952. P. 83)

"Powell rejected Spencer's sociology [here Darrah is apparently referring to Spencer's social philosophy of laissez faire] emphatically, but there is more than a little Spencerian nomenclature scattered throughout Truth and Error. Spencer held that some things were unknowable; the Major denied this, arguing that the mind cannot conceive an unknowable thing." (William Culp Darrah, Powell of the Colorado, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1951. P. 382)

"Now there is a cheap scholarship which goes far and wide to collect these prejudiced and ignorant statements [to the effect that the languages of other peoples are rudimentary and their customs absurd] and bases upon them a theory of savage culture. By these easy lessons it is discovered that savagery is a state of perpetual warfare; that the life of the savage is one of ceaseless bloodshed, that the men of this earliest stage of culture live but to kill and devour one another, and that infanticide is the common practice. Starting with man in this horrible estate these same scholars construct a theory of the evolution of mankind from savagery to civilization as the transition from militancy to industrialism. Such is the Spencerian philosophy of human development, and it has many adherents." (J. W. Powell, "From Barbarism to Civilization," The American Anthropologist, Vol. 1, pp. 97-123, 1888. P. 102)
"And now another philosopher has arisen in the world, and he has discovered another fundamental principle, a major premise; that human progress is by the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence; that the fittest may survive, the unfit must die. Then let the poor fall into deeper degradation, then let the hungry starve, then let the unfortunate perish, then let the ignorant remain in his ignorance—he who does not seek for knowledge himself is not worthy to possess knowledge, and the very children of the ignorant should remain untaught, that the sins of the fathers may be visited upon the children. Let your government cease to regulate industries, and instead of carrying the mails let them erect prisons; let government discharge their state-employed teachers and enlist more policemen. And they establish journals to advocate these principles, and edit papers to advocate these principles, and they have become the most active propagandists of the day, and the millions are shouting, "Great is philosophy and great are the prophets of philosophy." Thus it is that fundamental principles, "major premises," are discovered to justify injustice ...." (J. W. Powell, "Competition as a Factor in Human Evolution," The American Anthropologist, Vol. 1, pp. 297-323, 1888. P. 322-323)

"The savage tribes of mankind carried on petty warrares with clubs, spears, and bows and arrows. But these wars interrupted their peaceful pursuits only at comparatively long intervals. The wars of barbaric tribes were on a larger scale and more destructive of life; but there were no great wars until wealth was accumulated and men were organized into nations. The great wars began with civilization, and have continued to the present time. Steadily armies have become larger, and more thoroughly organized as naval and land forces, and the land forces as infantry, artillery, and cavalry; and with the progress of civilization armies have been equipped with implements of warfare more and more destructive.... Warfare has had its course of evolusion, as have all other human activities. That human progress has been from militancy to industrialism is an error so great that it must necessarily vitiate any system of sociology or theory of culture of which it forms a part." (J. W. Powell, "From Barbarism to Civilization," The American Anthropologist, Vol. 1, pp. 97-123, 1888. Pp. 102-103)

Without mentioning Spencer by name, but having him clearly in mind, Powell wrote: "Government does not begin in the ascending of chieftains through prowess in war, but in the slow specialization of executive functions from communal associations based on kinship. Deliberative assemblies do not start in councils gathered by chieftains, but councils precede chieftaincies. Law does not begin in contract, but is the development of custom. Land tenure does not begin in grants from the monarch or the feudal lord, but a system of tenure in common by gentes or tribes is developed into a system of tenure in severality. Evolution in society has not been from militancy to industrialism, but from organization based on kinship to organization based on property, and alongside of the specialization of the industries of peace the arts of war have been specialized. So, one by one, the theories of metaphysical writers on sociology are overthrown, and the facts of history are taking their place, and the philosophy of history is being erected out of the materials accumulating by objective studies of mankind." (J. W. Powell, "On Limitations to the Use of some Anthropologic Data," First Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology, 1879-’80, pp. 71-86, Washington, D.C., 1881. P. 83)