"In all these cases of nervous disorders ... there are, negatively, degrees of loss of the most voluntary processes with, positively, conservation of the next most voluntary or next more automatic; otherwise put, there are degrees of loss of the latest acquirements with conservation of the earlier, especially of the inherited acquirements. Speaking of the physical side, there are degrees of loss of function of the least organized nervous arrangements with conservation of function of the more organized. There is in each reduction to a more automatic condition; in each there is dissolution, using this term as Spencer does, as the opposite of evolution." (Here I must acknowledge my great indebtedness to Spencer. The facts stated in the text seem to me to be illustrations from actual cases of disease, of conclusions he has arrived at deductively in his "Psychology." It is not affirmed that we have the exact opposite of evolution from the apparently brutal doings of disease; the proper opposite is seen in healthy senescence, as Spencer has shown. But from diseases there is, in general, the corresponding opposite of evolution.)." (John Hughlings Jackson, "Hughlings Jackson on Aphasia and Kindred Affectations of Speech," Brain: A Journal of Neurology, Vol. 38, pp. 1-190, 1915. Pp. 111, 111n.)


"I would not leave the impression that Spencer's theories had a large and immediate impact on [Hughlings] Jackson's analyses as early as 1864. They did not. In fact, Jackson had quoted Spencer only in regard to a single point, the distinction between intellectual and emotional expression, and this was intended to be just as much a physiological distinction as a psychological one. Rather, Jackson's first citations of Spencer are important because they mark the beginnings of what eventually became a very pervasive influence." (Samuel H. Greenblatt, "Hughlings Jackson's First Encounter With the Work of Paul Broca: The Physiological and Philosophical Background." Bulletin of the History of Medicine, Vol. 44, pp. 555-570, 1970. P. 568)

"Here, for the first time in this article I use the term Dissolution, I most gratefully acknowledge my vast debt to Herbert Spencer. What I have to say of the constitution of the nervous system appears to me to be little more than illustrating his doctrine on nervous evolution by what I may metaphorically speak of as the experiments of disease. I should make more definite acknowledgments were it not that I do not wish to mislead the reader, if, by any misunderstandings of his doctrines on my part, I impute to Mr. Spencer particular opinions he might not indorse. Anyone interested in diseases of the nervous system should carefully study Spencer's Psychology." (Selected Writings of John Hughlings Jackson, edited by James Taylor, 2 Vols., Basic Books, New York, 1958. Vol. 1, p. 147n.)
"These references to the associationist philosopher, Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) [about the contrast between intellect and emotion in speech from "The Origin and Function of Music"], are the earliest that I have been able to find in any of the Jacksonian material now available. There are other passages in Jackson's article which show, for the first time, that he was beginning to use Spencer's terminology. He also began to demonstrate an awareness of the aims and problems of psychology as a special science. These facts make it quite likely that Jackson had read at least part of Spencer's major psychological work, The Principles of Psychology. Thus, it is established that by late 1864 Jackson had started to assimilate Spencer's positivistic, evolutionary philosophy. In applying that philosophy to the solution of clinical problems, Jackson combines it with clinico-anatomical and the physiological traditions that he had already absorbed from Laycock, Hutchinson, and Brown-Séquard. To some extent, therefore, these three traditions had their entrance through Jackson into the modern study of the nervous systems and its diseases." (Samuel H. Greenblatt, "The Major Influences on the Early Life and Work of John Hughlings Jackson," Bulletin of the History of Medicine, Vol. 39, pp. 346-376, 1965. P. 374)

"Anyone who has read Herbert Spencer's works will find that I have borrowed largely from them. There is nothing in this article on Post-Epileptic States; A Contribution to the Comparative Study of Insanities which I can imagine to be of any value which has not been inspired by him. I should, however, be sorry if any crudities of mine were imputed to Mr. Spencer. I strongly urge all neurologists to study his works, and also Fiske's very valuable book, Cosmic Philosophy." (Selected Writings of John Hughlings Jackson, edited by James Taylor, 2 Vols., Basic Books, New York, 1958. Vol. 1, p. 366n.)

"A detailed study of this concept of Freud's theory of temporal regression makes it clear that, while it came to have characteristics of its own, it was derived from J. Hughlings Jackson's notion of dissolution, which, in turn, was a direct descendant of Herbert Spencer's idea of the same name." (Stanley W. Jackson, M.D., Department of Psychiatry, Yale University, "The History of Freud's Concepts of Regression," Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Vol. 17, pp. 743-784, 1969. P. 745)

"Before I go further I have certain obligations to acknowledge. I am under very heavy obligations to Herbert Spencer. I shall acknowledge these obligations in detail in later chapters. It will, however, be apparent in almost every part of the latter half of the present chapter that I am greatly indebted to him. Let me at once give a quotation from his Psychology with regard to evolution of nervous centres, a subject on which I have much to say: ...." (Selected Writings of John Hughlings Jackson, edited by James Taylor, 2 Vols., Basic Books, New York, 1958. Vol. 1, p. 167)
"For in disease the most voluntary or most special movements, faculties, etc., suffer first and most, that is in an order the exact opposite of evolution. Therefore I call this the principle of Dissolution—dissolution as the opposite of evolution. I have used as synonymous with dissolution, the expression "Reduction to a more Automatic Condition." The phenomena of dissolution, as seen in cases of "Diseases of the Mind," seem to me to illustrate in a very striking way Laycock's doctrines on the Reflex Function of the Brain and Herbert Spencer's doctrines on Evolution of the Nervous System. Insanity is dissolution, beginning in the very highest of all nervous centres, that is in the anatomical substrata of consciousness. In insanity there is always defect of consciousness. There is defective object-consciousness often along with increase of subject-consciousness." (Selected Writings of John Hughlings Jackson, edited by James Taylor, 2 Vols., Basic Books, New York, 1958. Vol. 1, p. 38, 38n.)

Again and again in his writings, John Hughlings Jackson quotes passages from Spencer's writings, especially Principles of Psychology and Principles of Biology, as shedding light on questions of neurology, and as providing him with insights and leads for the pursuit of his own studies and analyses on the subject. --RLC (See Selected Writings of John Hughlings Jackson, edited by James Taylor, 2 Vols., Basic Books, New York, 1958. Esp. Vol. 1)

"I should say that all that may appear to be of importance in this chapter [on the anatomy of the nervous system] is little more than a reflection of certain of Herbert Spencer's psychological teachings, or an application of them to cases of nervous disease, were it not for the fear that I might be guilty of the offence of distorting his doctrines or misapplying them." (Selected Writings of John Hughlings Jackson, edited by James Taylor, 2 Vols., Basic Books, New York, 1958. Vol. 1, p. 238n.)

"... Spencer's evolutionary theory was accepted wholeheartedly by Hughlings Jackson, whose influence was fundamental in the development of evolutionary neurology and neurophysiology." (Robert M. Young, Darwin's Metaphor, Nature's Place in Victorian Culture, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, P. 223)
"What an odd "revolutionary spirit" this was again, which embraced Spencer the great social reactionary, as well as Darwin, the pure scientist; but all manifestations of the "modern spirit" were apparently equally distasteful to the younger Henry James."

"I am writing this in the beautiful great library (of the Athenaeum). On the other side of the room sits Herbert Spencer, asleep in a chair (he always is, whenever I come here) and a little way off is the portly Archbishop of York with his nose in a little book. It is 9:30 P.M. and I have been dining here." (Letter from Henry James to his father dated February 13, 1877. Quoted in Leon Edel, Henry James, 1870-1881, The Conquest of London, J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1962. P. 283)

"I received a few days since your article on H. Spencer, but I have not yet had the time to read it." (Vol. 1, p. 60) "I met Herbert Spencer the other Sunday at George Eliot's, wither I had at last bent my steps. G. H. Lewes introduced me to him as an American; and it seemed to me that at this fact, coupled with my name, his attention was aroused and he was on the point of asking me if I were related to you. But something instantly happened to separate me from him, and soon afterwards he went away." (Letter from Henry James to William James dated May 1, 1878. Quoted in The Letters of Henry James, selected and edited by Percy Lubbock, 2 Vols., Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1920. Vol. 1, p. 61)
"In the first year (1877-78) of his instruction in psychology, the students read Taine "On Intelligence"; in the second year (1878-79) Spencer's "First Principles"; in the third year (1880-81) Taine's "Mental and Moral Science," and in the fourth year again Taine "On Intelligence." (p. 300) "Professor James likewise added from 1879 to 1881 and from 1883 to 1885 a systematic course in evolution based upon the works of Herbert Spencer." (p. 300) (Benjamin Rand, "Philosophical Instruction in Harvard University from 1636 to 1906," The Harvard Graduates' Magazine, Vol. 37, pp. 296-311, 1928-29)

"Professor James' book is entertaining and full of good things; but his attitude toward Spencer makes me think of a dream my father once had. He dreamed he met a dog. The dog annoyed him, so he struck him with a stick. Then the dog doubled in size and my father struck him again with the same result. So the thing went on till the universe was pretty much all dog. When my father awoke, he was, or rather had been, half-way down the dog's throat." (Selected Letters of Edwin Arlington Robinson, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1940. Letter from E. A. Robinson to John Hays Gardiner dated November 2, 1898. P. 15)

"I read this book as a youth when it was still appearing in numbers, and was carried away with enthusiasm by the intellectual perspectives which it seemed to open. When a /maturer companion, Mr. Charles S. Peirce, attacked it in my presence, I felt spiritually wounded, as by the defacement of a sacred image or picture, though I could not verbally defend it against his criticisms." (William James, Memories and Studies, Longmans, Green, and Co., New York, 1911. Pp. 127-128)

"The pragmatic philosophy of which I hope to begin talking in my next lecture preserves as cordial a relation with facts, and, unlike Spencer's philosophy, it neither begins nor ends by turning positive religious constructions out of doors--it treats them cordially as well." (William James, "The Present Dilemma in Philosophy," in Pragmatism and Four Essays from The Meaning of Truth, pp. 15-37, Meridian Books, The World Publishing Company, Cleveland, 1967. P.37)


"... few recent formulas have done more real service of a rough sort in psychology than the Spencerian one that the essence of mental life and of bodily life are one, namely, 'the adjustment of inner to outer relations.'" (William James, The Principles of Psychology, 2 Vols., Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1890, Vol. I, p. 6)

"William James, brought up in the austere traditions of New England Calvinism, attributed a great feeling of release and self-confidence to his abandonment of these beliefs for a philosophy stressing chance, free-will and personal decision." (J. D. Y. Peel, Herbert Spencer, The Evolution of a Sociologist, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1971, p. 110)

"Thousands of readers who are not technical students know him [Spencer] in the original; and to such readers he has given (what they care about far more than either method or theoretic temper) a simple, sublime, and novel system of the world, in which things fall into easy perspective relations, whose explanatory formula applies to every conceivable phenomenon ..." (William James, "Herbert Spencer," The Critic, Vol. 44, pp. 21-24, 1904. P. 21)


"The case of Herbert Spencer's system is much to the point here. Rationalists feel his fearful array of insufficiencies. His dry schoolmaster temperament, the hurdy-gurdy monotony of him, his preference for cheap make-shifts in argument, his lack of education even in mechanical principles, and in general the vagueness of all his fundamental ideas, his whole system wooden, as if knocked together out of cracked hemlock boards—and yet half of England wants to bury him in Westminster Abbey." (William James, Pragmatism and Four Essays from The Meaning of Truth, Meridian Books, The World Publishing Company, Cleveland, 1955. P. 37)

The "... practical outcome [of Spencer's philosophy] is the somewhat vague optimism which is so important a tendency in modern life." (William James, "Herbert Spencer," The Critic, Vol. 44, pp. 21-24, 1904. P. 21)

"... that "Spencerian of evolutionist school" toward which Dr. [William] James seems to cherish such intense antipathy." (John Fiske, "Sociology and Hero-Worship," The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 47, pp. 75-84, 1881. P. 77)
"To the present critic, the ethical and political part of Mr. Spencer's writings seem the most impressive and likely to endure. .... the antique spirit of English individualism is a factor in human life less changeable than the face of the sciences, and such expressions of it as Spencer has given will probably long deserve to be read." (William James, "Herbert Spencer," The Critic, Vol. 44, pp. 21-24, 1904. P. 23)


"But Spencer taught me that, roughly speaking, what is, is the best possible at the moment, and can be made better only by Evolution, which can be promoted by gradual and experimental succession, but not by blind destruction. Social questions are very complicated, and can be wisely settled only by the slow methods of trial and error." (Henry Holt, Garrulities of an Octogenarian Editor, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1923. P. 53)

"Another [critic, unidentified] has likened him [Herbert Spencer] to a kind of philosophic sawmill, delivering, year in and out, with unvarying rectilinear precision, paragraph after paragraph, chapter after chapter, and book after book, as similar one to another as if they were so many wooden planks." (William James, "Herbert Spencer," The Critic, Vol. 44, pp. 21-24, 1904. P. 22)

"Yet the fact remains that long before any of his contemporaries had seized its universal import, he grasped a great, light-giving truth—the truth of evolution; grasped it so that it became bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh; and with a pertinacity of which the history of successful thought gives few examples, had applied it to the whole of life, down to the minutest details of the most various sciences." (William James, "Herbert Spencer," The Critic, Vol. 44, pp. 21-24, 1904. P. 22)

"... what / really dismays us / about Spencer's philosophy / is the disconsolateness of its ulterior practical results.... it is ... not a permanent warrant for our more ideal interests, not a fulfiller of our remotest hopes. The notion of God, on the other hand, however inferior it may be in clearness to those mathematical notions so current in mechanical philosophy, has at least this practical superiority over them, that it guarantees an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved." (William James, "Some Metaphysical Problems Pragmatically Considered," in Pragmatism and Four Essays from The Meaning of Truth, pp. 63-86, Meridian Books, The World Publishing Company, Cleveland, 1967. Pp. 76-77)
"... the author's [Spencer's] habit of periodically pointing out how well the phenomena illustrate his law of evolution seems quite perfunctory and formal when applied to social facts, so strained and unnatural is it to conceive of these as mechanical changes in which matter is integrated and motion dispersed." (William James, "Herbert Spencer," The Critic, Vol. 44, pp. 21-24, 1904. P. 23)


"... I am completely disgusted with the eminent philosopher [Spencer], who seems to me more and more to be as absolutely worthless in all fundamental matters of thought, as he is admirable, clever and ingenious in secondary matters. His mind is a perfect puzzle to me, but the total impression is of an intensely two and sixpenny, paper-collar affair...." (Letter from William James to Thomas W. Ward dated Cambridge, December 30, 1876. Quoted in Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, Little, Brown, and Company. Boston, 1935. Vol. 1, p. 374.)

"Beside him [Wilhelm Wundt], Spencer is an ignoramus as well as a charlatan. I admit that Spencer is occasionally more amusing than Wundt. His "Data of Ethics" seems to me incomparably his best book, because it is a more or less frank expression of the man's personal ideal of living—which has of course little to do with science, and which, in Spencer's case, is full of definiteness and vigor." (Letter from William James to Carl Stumpf dated February 6, 1887. Quoted in The Letters of William James, edited by his Son, Henry James, 2 Vols., The Atlantic Monthly Press, Boston, 1920. Vol. 1, p. 264)

"Who, since he [Spencer] wrote, is not vividly able to conceive of the world as a thing evolved from a primitive fire-mist, by progressive integrations and differentiations, and increases in heterogeneity and coherence of texture and organization? Who can fail to think of life, both bodily and mental, as a set of ever-changing ways of meeting the "environment"?" (William James, "Herbert Spencer," The Critic, Vol. 44, pp. 21-24, 1904. P. 21)

"I often take a nap beside Herbert Spencer at the Athenaeum, and feel as if I were robbing you of the privilege." (Letter from Henry James, Jr., to William James dated London, February 28 [1877]. Quoted in Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, 2 Vols. Little, Brown, and Company. Boston, 1935. Vol. 1, p. 375.)
"The late William James was, I think, unequalled among philosophers in sheer dexterous felicity of utterance of his thought; but he is perhaps also unparalleled, among professors, in untrustworthiness as a thinker." (J. M. Robertson, Modern Humanists Reconsidered, Watts & Co., London, 1927. P. 173)

"Mr. Spencer's successors will probably not feel, as he now does, that the study of the habits of filthy savages is far better than that of the lives of illustrious Europeans ...." (Anonymous, "Herbert Spencer's Data of Ethics," The Nation, Vol. 28, pp. 178-179, 1879. P. 178)

"... it appears that his main concern was to redeem spontaneity and indeterminacy from the oppressive causal network of Spencerian social evolution." (Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, revised edition, The Beacon Press, Boston, 1955. P. 133)

William James, "Herbert Spencer's Definition of Mind As Correspondence," Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 12, pp. 1-18, 1878. (A critical discussion, the basis of the criticism being that the human mind is somehow more noble than is implied by Spencer's notion that it is the organ that adapts man for survival.)

"Layer after layer of human perfection separates me from the central Africans who pursued Stanley with cries of "meat, meat!"" (William James, "The Importance of Individuals," The Open Court, Vol. 4, pp. 2437-2440, 1890-91. P. 2438)


"Edwin Arlington Robinson was almost as loyal to the synthetic philosopher. He said in a letter written in 1898 to one of his Harvard friends: 'Professor James' book is entertaining and full of good things; but his attitude toward Spencer makes me think of a dream my father once had. He dreamed he met a dog. The dog annoyed him, so he struck him with a stick. Then the dog doubled in size and my father struck him again with the same result. So the thing went on till the universe was pretty much all dog. When my father awoke, he was, or rather had been, half-way down the dog's throat.'" (Malcolm Cowley, "Naturalism in American Literature." In Evolutionary Thought in America, edited by Stow Persons, pp. 300-333. George Braziller, Inc. New York, 1956. [Yale University Press. New Haven, 1950]. P. 304.)
"When it comes to Spencer's style, I am afraid I cannot be quite so vehement in his defense. Still it is sincere (you will not admit this) and it intends to be dignified, while Willi~
James's is forever prostituting itself to contemporary slang and slipshod affectations, by which he hopes, I suppose, to strike the popular chord and conceal its arrogance. This is pretty un-
generous criticism, but I cannot think for a minute that the man is unconscious of what he is doing. If he is not, there is certainly a smallness in him that I would not suspect, and a spirit-
ual vulgarity not wholly unrelated to that of the Reverend Tal-
mage." (Edwin Arlington Robinson, Selected Letters of Edwin Ar-
Letter from E. A. Robinson to John Hays Gardiner dated Nov-
ember 2, 1898. Pp. 16-17.

"Whereas to all other evolutionary moralists the status belli has received a new consecration from the new ideas; whereas in Ger-
many especially the "struggle for existence" has been made the bapt-
ismal formula for the most cynical assertions of brute egoism; with Mr. Spencer the same theories have bred an almost Quakerish humanitarianism and regard for peace. Frequently in these pages \( \text{The Data of Ethics} \) does his indignation at the ruling powers of Britain burst forth, for their policy of conquest over lower races. Might, in his eyes, would hardly seem to be right, even when evol-
ution is carried on by its means." (Anonymous, "Herbert Spencer's Data of Ethics," \( \text{The Nation, Vol. 28, pp. 178-179, 1879.} \) P. 179)

"Later I have used it \( \text{First Principles} \) often as a text-book with students, and the total outcome of my dealings with it is an exceedingly unfavorable verdict. Apart from the great truth which it enforces, that everything has evolved somehow, and apart from the inevitable stimulating effect of any such universal picture, I regard its teachings as almost a museum of blundering reasoning." (William James, \( \text{Memories and Studies, Longmans, Green, and Co., New York, 1911.} \) P. 128)

"I read this book \( \text{Spencer's First Principles} \) as a youth when it was still appearing in numbers, and was carried away with enthu-
siasm by the intellectual perspectives which it seemed to open. When a / maturer companion, Mr. Charles S. Peirce, attacked it in my pre-
sence, I felt spiritually wounded, as by the defacement of a sacred image or picture, though I could not verbally defend it against his criticisms." (William James, \( \text{Memories and Studies, Longmans, Green, and Co., New York, 1911.} \) Pp. 127-128)

Appropos of Kirkman's parody of it: "Translate the whole for-
ma into Hottentot or Cherokee if you like; the truth for which it stands will not be made a whit less true." (William Henry Hud-
son, \( \text{An Introduction to the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, re-

Many people came to believe that Kirkman's parody of Spencer's definition of evolution was devised by William James, who apparent-
ly did nothing to dispel the illusion. One such is Gilbert Highet (\( \text{The Art of Teaching, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1951.} \) Pp. 233-234).

"Even before Fenollosa and Mendenhall were properly settled in Tokyo in 1872, their talents were pressed into service by their eager hosts. Along with E. S. Morse the two American professors were engaged immediately, before term opening, to speak every Sunday before the Lecture Association, a group of leading Japanese, primarily civil servants and mature students. For a time they were the only foreigners giving these public lectures, and their audience sat in close attention throughout the day as long as the lecturers would stay. Morse continued his teaching of Darwinian evolution; Thomas Mendenhall lectured on "Physical Science"; and Fenollosa expounded Herbert Spencer's scientific philosophy." (Lawrence W. Chisolm, Fenollosa: The Far East and American Culture, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1963. P. 38)

"Fenollosa began his lecturing at the University of Tokyo by expounding Herbert Spencer's systematic theories of social development. The young philosopher had been enthusiastic about Spencer at Harvard, and since Morse's lectures on evolutionary biology were so successful, Fenollosa concentrated on evolutionary sociology in the Sunday talks he gave with Morse before university classes convened. Spencer complemented Darwin and was well-suited to the members of the Lecture Association, many of them ranking civil servants who would have listened attentively all day if the Americans could have been persuaded. Fenollosa may have been asked specifically to expound Spencer, since the English philosopher seemed to explain Western progress—and everything else for that matter—in scientific and authoritative fashion. Spencer's reputation in Japan in 1878 was already considerable. A Japanese translation of his Social Statics had been published the year before, and many of those who could read English had sought in his other voluminous writings a key to Western learning. Spencer revealed the universe as a simple system, and his synthesis of all knowledge promised to be supremely useful—a staple argument and a frame for understanding complicated kinds of new information." (Lawrence W. Chisolm, Fenollosa: The Far East and American Culture, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1963. Pp. 40-41)

"One of Fenollosa's distinguished colleagues at the University of Tokyo, a professor of literature, Shoichi Toyama, had returned from the University of Michigan in 1876 thoroughly imbued with Spencer's system, which he presented to good effect. The combined advocates of Fenollosa and Toyama have been credited with making a lasting impression on Japanese thinking; certainly the moment was suited to Spencer." (Lawrence W. Chisolm, Fenollosa: The Far East and American Culture, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1963. P. 41)

"During the first three years his teaching at the University of Tokyo centered on Spencer ...." (Lawrence W. Chisolm, Fenollosa: The Far East and American Culture, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1963. Pp. 41-42)
"Hegelian idealism did not have Spencer's practical appeal to Japanese intellectuals; Hegel was not scientific in Spencer's materialist sense." (Lawrence W. Chisolm, Fenollosa: The Far East and American Culture, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1963. P.42)

"Of course no actual prohibition against eating flesh, such as existed under the old régime, exists now. But the custom of abstaining from it remains pretty general; and though beef and pork were introduced at the time of the late revolution, along with Herbert Spencer's philosophy and French chassepots, recent statistics show that meat-eating is again on the wane." (Basil Hall Chamberlain, Things Japanese, 2nd edition, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., London, 1891. P.168)


"He [Herbert Spencer] was full of the death of the late Japanese Ambassador. It seems he helped that worthy to draw up the new Constitution. On the day when it came in force, the Ambassador was assassinated, in revenge for his having lifted a curtain with his stick, in a temple of the old religion--which curtain he had been warned to respect, as none but the Emperor could go beyond it." (T. Sturge Moore, ed., "Herbert Spencer and Oscar Wilde: Extracts from 'Works and Days': The Diary of Michael Field," Entry by Edith Cooper for March 3, 1890. The Cornhill Magazine, Vol. 72, pp. 513-520, 1932. P.514)

"I once saw it stated, on the authority of a missionary, that the influence of the Spencerian philosophy was the chief obstacle to the spread of evangelical Christianity among the cultured classes of Japan." (William Henry Hudson, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, revised edition, Watts & Co., London, 1906. P.24n.)


"In the 1880's, however, its [The Japanese utilitarian philosophy of education] theoretical basis was derived from Herbert Spencer's Social Statics as well as from his Education, Intellectual, Moral and Physical, which placed emphasis on scientific knowledge as the chief aim of education, and from the works of Bain and Johnott." (Chitoshi Yanaga, Japan Since Perry, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1949. P.108)
"Herbert Spencer gained an even greater following than John Stuart Mill. Two scholars, a Japanese and an American, were responsible for the widespread popularity of Spencerianism in Japan. In 1876 Toyama Masakazu returned from the United States as a convert to Spencerianism after having spent several years at the University of Michigan, where he did both undergraduate and graduate work. Upon assuming his chair at Tōkyō University, he began his lectures dealing with Spencer's ideas on biology, psychology, and sociology. Ernest Fenollosa, professor of philosophy at Tōkyō University, expounded religion in terms of Spencer's sociology. So popular did Spencer become that his views and advice were sought eagerly even by the government on various and sundry problems. The most notable example perhaps was in the matter of advocating intermarriage, which was being seriously considered by the government as a means of securing recognition from the West. Spencer advised strongly against any sort of planned miscegenation by the state for the improvement of the race." (Chitoshi Yanaga, Japan Since Perry, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1949. Pp. 76-77)

"The year 1883 was appropriately enough the starting point in the development of Japanese sociology. That year represented the fruition of the efforts at importing and assimilating sociological ideas and methods from the West. This was marked by the publication of the translation of Herbert Spencer's Principles of Sociology and the appearance of the first Japanese book in the field. Sociology by Dr. Ariga Nagao was an ambitious attempt to establish a systematic sociology, using evidences obtained from Japanese, Chinese, Korean, and Asiatic experiences and tracing social evolution. Of the projected six volumes, he finished three, Social Evolution (1883), Religious Evolution (1883), and the Evolution of the Family System (1884), all of which were based on the organismic theory of society." (Chitoshi Yanaga, Japan Since Perry, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1949. P. 86)

"The advocacy of intermarriage with Occidentals as a sure means of improving the racial stock of the Japanese, begun in 1883 by Takahashi Yoshio, did not easily die out. It was seriously considered by the leading statesmen of the period, including such notables as Itō and Inoue. The question had become a subject of such heated discussion and agitation among scholars and politicians that Herbert Spencer's advice was sought in 1892. In his reply, Spencer was emphatic in stating that intermarriage should be positively forbidden on biological grounds. He argued that miscegenation inevitably produced bad results in the long run. Any thought of encouraging intermarriage seems to have been abandoned after 1892 although it was not banned for individuals. A letter from Herbert Spencer to Baron Kaneko Kentarō was published in the London Times of January 18, 1904." (Chitoshi Yanaga, Japan Since Perry, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1949. Pp. 97, 97n.)
"The decade of the 1880's was a period of gratifying progress for the missionaries in Japan since the enthusiasm for Western ideas and institutions was at its peak. Christianity, however, had to compete against the rising popularity of English empiricism and the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, the ideas of Spencer, Buckle, and Guizot, not to mention Darwinism."


"The Japanese loves to pack his ideas, and dovetail them with one another, with the same precision with which he makes two dozen lacquer boxes fit into one, or constructs a house to hold exactly eight hundred and twenty floor-mats, each of just the same size, without an inch to spare. What enchanted the Japanese was Herbert Spencer's solemn way of assuming that the heavens and the earth, and all that in them is, all space, all time, all life, and all humanity could be measured and reckoned up to a millimetre or a half-centime by his particular philosophical abacus." (E. T. Raymond, Portraits of the Nineties, T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., London, 1921. P. 112)

RUDYARD KIPLING

Rudyard Kipling thought, apparently, that Spencer and Comte "... deal with people's insides from the point of view of men who have no stomachs." By which he seems to have meant that they regarded men as being entirely rational, or at least dealt with them as such. (Rudyard Kipling, "The Conversion of Aurelian McGogggin," in Plain Tales from the Hills, pp. 101-108, Standard Book Company, London and New York, 1930. P. 101)

Rudyard Kipling has Hurree Babu say, after Kim asks him, "Will they kill thee?": "Oah, that's nothing. I am good enough Herbert Spencerian, I trust, to meet little thing like death, which is all in my fate, you know. But—but they may beat me." (P. 224) Later: "Under the striped umbrella Hurree Babu was straining ear and brain to follow the quick-poured French, and keeping both eyes on a kilta full of maps and documents—an extra large one with a double red oil-skin cover. He did not wish to steal anything. He only desired to know that to steal, and, incidentally, how to get away when he had stolen it. He thanked all the Gods of Hindustan, and Herbert Spencer, that there remained some valuables to steal." (P. 239) (Rudyard Kipling, Kim, Laurel Edition, Dell Publishing Company, New York, 1959)
Many people came to believe that Kirkman's parody of Spencer's definition of evolution was devised by William James, who apparently did nothing to dispel the illusion. One such is Gilbert Highet (The Art of Teaching, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1951. Pp. 233-234).


Appropos of Kirkman's parody of it: "Translate the whole formula into Hottentot or Cherokee if you like; the truth for which it stands will not be made a whit less true." (William Henry Hudson, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, revised edition, Watts & Co., London, 1906. P. 53)

"Regarded thus, civilization no longer appears to be a regular unfolding after a specific plan; but seems rather a development of man's latent capabilities under the action of favourable circumstances; ..." (Herbert Spencer, Social Statics, John Chapman, London, 1851. P. 415)
"When the company were about to disperse from the hall of the crematorium on the occasion of Spencer's funeral, a Parsee student, himself an Oxonian, arrested us for a moment in order to announce that he proposed to offer a thousand pounds to this university for the founding of a Spencer lectureship. If the offer was refused, the University of London was to be approached. Oxford, however, doubtless under the pressure of universal opinion, has decided to celebrate in perpetuity the name of him whom it flouted during his lifetime." (C. W. Saleeby, Evolution The Master-Key, Harper & Brothers, London and New York, 1906. P. 89n.)

"We have been receiving for some time past copies of a journal called The Indian Sociologist, an "organ of freedom, and of political, social, and religious reform." It is edited by Pandit Shyamaji Krishnavarma, M.A. (Oxon.), sometime lecturer at Oxford, and is published in London. It is a journal fearlessly edited, and the editor is imbued with the teaching of the late Herbert Spencer. The journal is evidently intended to model Indian opinion in accordance with Spencer's teachings. The Pandit is an Indian scholar of distinction, and has a fair amount of capital at his command." (Mahatma Gandhi, "An Indian Philanthropist," Indian Opinion, June 3, 1905. Quoted in The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 4, (1903-1905), The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Ahmedabad, 1960. P. 458)
"After having discussed the importance of mutual aid in various classes of animals, I was evidently bound to discuss the importance of the same factor in the evolution of Man. This was the more necessary as there are a number of evolutionists who may not refuse to admit the importance of mutual aid among animals, but who, like Herbert Spencer, will refuse to admit it for Man."

"When I was about twelve [ca. 1905 in Knoxville, Tenn.] I was taken to hear the Bishop [Gailor, an Episcopalian] ... during his annual visitation. His subject was Herbert Spencer, of whom I had never heard, but of whom the Bishop disapproved so eloquently that I sought Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy at the library the very next day. I don't think I ever got all the way through even the first volume, but I was so impressed by the introductory discourse on "The Knowable and the Unknowable" that on this basis alone I was for some years, say from twelve to sixteen, a devout Spencerian." (Joseph Wood Krutch, More Lives Than One, William Sloane Associates, New York, 1962. P. 22)
"The greatest name ever thrown into the scales for Individual­
ism and against Socialism is that of Herbert Spencer. He has the
reputation of having been the greatest Individualist of all times."
(Arthur M. Lewis, Evolution, Social and Organic, Charles H. Kerr &
Company, Chicago, 1908. P. 149)

"The poverty of the incapable, the distresses that come upon
the imprudent, the starvation of the idle, and those shoulderings
aside of the weak by the strong, which leave so many 'in shallows
and in miseries,' are the decrees of a large, far-seeing benevo­
ience." (Herbert Spencer, Social Statics, London, 1850. P. 323)

"As for Herbert Spencer, the world champion of individualism,
his failure to make his synthetic philosophy the basis of a true
social science is well known." (Harry Elmer Barnes, "Foreword"
in Samuel Chugerman, Lester Ward, The American Aristotle, pp. 9-12,
Duke University Press, Durham, N.C., 1939. P. 10)

"... the master formula of future progress must of neces­
ity be "the struggle against the struggle for existence."
(Rob­
ertson attributes this phrase to Lange, author of History of Ma­
terialism.) (John M. Robertson, Modern Humanists, Swan Sonnenschein

Harold J. Laski's "Citing Spencer for a Purpose," a review
of Truxton Beale's edition of The Man vs. The State (The New Re­
public, Vol. 10, No. 122, pp. 142, 144, 146, March 3, 1917) is very
critical of Spencer's political philosophy and of the "heavy artil­
ery of American conservatism" (p. 142) who contributed prefatory
remarks to each of the chapters of this edition.

"No tribe could maintain its unity for even a day if it were
to practice Spencer's individualism, for every man has his own
ideas as to how his needs should best be met." (Sir Arthur Keith,

"The intrusive idea that disturbed the tranquility, broke the
unity, and destroyed the finality of Spencer's individualistic sys­
tem was the idea of evolution." (P. J. C. Hearnshaw, "Herbert Spence­
er and the Individualists," in The Social & Political Ideas of
Some Representative Thinkers of the Victorian Age, ed. by P. J. C.
P. 79)

Spencer's laissez faire is described as "... Calvinism con­
veniently bereft of conscience ...." (William Miller, A New History
"The truth is, his political theories had never much real organic connection with his general system; they were legacies from the bourgeois political economy of the [eighteen] thirties and forties." (Grant Allen, "Personal Reminiscences of Herbert Spencer," The Forum, Vol. 35, pp. 610-628, 1904. P. 627)

"The net result, therefore, of Spencer's wide studies was a fresh justification, based on the findings of Victorian science, of the master principles of eighteenth-century speculation; its individualism, its liberalism, its passion for justice, its love of liberty and distrust of every form of coercion." (Vernon L. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, Vol. 3: The Beginnings of Critical Realism in America: 1860-1920, Harcourt, Brace, & Co., Inc., New York, 1930. P. 200)

"It is true that Spencer remained to the last a bitter champion of individual freedom and noninterference by government, but he shifted the ground for his belief considerably from the time of Social Statics. Later, he dwelt more on the inefficiency of and oppression by bureaucracy than on the necessity of progress through evolution." (Abram Kardiner and Edward Preble, They Studied Man, The World Publishing Company, Cleveland, 1961. P. 54)

... Spencer was completely saturated with, and possessed by, the characteristic traditions of this individualistic philosophy, simply, so to speak, by absorption, by respiration of the intellectual atmosphere...." (John Dewey, "The Philosophical Work of Herbert Spencer." The Philosophical Review, Vol. 13, pp. 159-175, 1904. P. 165.)

"It is true that Spencer remained to the last a bitter champion of individual freedom and noninterference by government, but he shifted the ground for his belief considerably from the time of Social Statics. Later, he dwelt more on the inefficiency of and oppression by bureaucracy than on the necessity of progress through evolution." (Abram Kardiner and Edward Preble, They Studied Man, The World Publishing Company, Cleveland, 1961. P. 54)

Those who believe that Spencer always manifested an uncompromising opposition to state functions will be surprised by the chapter "Political Organization in General."

"So Spencer became a sort of tutelary genius to rising big business in the United States and the accepted philosopher of the most influential class in the American community."

"In the sphere of social and political ideas he will rank high, not as the founder of a science of a visionary sociology, but as the dauntless champion in a collectivist and servile age of the claims of the individual and the cause of personal freedom." (F. J. C. Hearnshaw, "Herbert Spencer and the Individualists," in The Social & Political Ideas of Some Representative Thinkers of the Victorian Age, ed. by F. J. C. Hearnshaw, pp. 53-83, George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., London, 1933. P. 82)

Speaking of his political views, Spencer wrote: "Thus it appears that at twenty I entertained, though in a crude, unqualified form, a belief which much of my energy in subsequent years was spent in justifying and elaborating." (Auto. I, 198)

"... in an age of which the political and the economic ideals were alike libertarian it was only too natural that Spencer should become, with a Radical father and uncle, an advocate of laissez-faire." (J. M. Robertson, Explorations, Watts & Co., London, n.d. (ca. 1923). Pp. 123-124)

"... the influence of Herbert Spencer ... came near raising public shiftlessness to the dignity of a national philosophy. Everything would adjust itself--if only it was left alone." (H. G. Wells, in an article on "Planning" in the Daily Mail in 1912. Quoted in Wells, Experiment in Autobiography, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1934. P. 567)

"Now it is almost incredible that two systems so distinct and so conflicting as these Spencer's evolutionary and organicistic sociology on the one hand, and his individualism and laissez-faire on the other, could coexist for a lifetime in a mind so strong, so clear, so courageous, and so unconventional as Spencer's. Yet so they did." (F. J. C. Hearnshaw, "Herbert Spencer and the Individualists," in The Social & Political Ideas of Some Representative Thinkers of the Victorian Age, ed. by F. J. C Hearnshaw, pp. 53-83, George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., London, 1933. P. 73)
"... owing to preconceptions of his youth confirmed during his connection with the Economist, he was unduly frightened by the bugbear of collectivism, which is really nothing but social integration, and a necessary part of the very social evolution which he taught. For this must, as in both inorganic and organic nature, of differentiation and integration. His inability to perceive this made his system, so broad at its base, a frustum instead of a pyramid." (Lester F. Ward, "Herbert Spencer's Autobiography," Science, Vol. 19, pp. 873-879, 1904. P. 879)

"Reading Herbert Spencer confirmed me in my new gospel of private enterprise; Kelly had previously been a socialist, and I not only cursed the whole business of social reform by the State and the growth of trade unionism, but deplored that the post office was not a private commercial concern. The only association in the country which pleased me in this mood was one called the "Liberty and Property Defence League."" (Sir David Kelly, The Ruling Few, Hollis & Carter, London, 1952. P. 27)

"Seven of the nine members of the [Supreme] Court (early in the Franklin Roosevelt administration) had been appointed by Republican predecessors, and although six of the judges were over seventy years of age Mr. Roosevelt had not yet had a single appointment at his disposal, and in Justices McReynolds, Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler there was a solid nucleus of the Court which appeared to think that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments had 'enacted Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.'" (Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager, The Growth of the American Republic, 2 Vols., Oxford University Press, New York, 1942. Vol. 2, P. 623)

"Mr. Spencer has himself just published a very remarkable work, "The Man versus the State"; to which he hardly expects to make a convert except here and there, and about which an unfriendly critic might say that it might be entitled "Mr. Spencer against All England." I shall not certainly criticise him for that. But it is a signal instance of the isolated position assumed from time to time by philosophers." (Frederic Harrison, The Philosophy of Common Sense, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1907. P. 372)

In 1915 Truxton Beale, an American diplomat, arranged for a new edition of Spencer's The Man versus the State (Mitchell Kennerley, New York, 1915). In this edition, besides the four chapters in the original book (1884), five other essays of Spencer's dealing with questions of political philosophy were included. Beale asked distinguished public figures in the United States to write brief introductory statements to each of the nine essays included. Some of these men were Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, Elbert H. Gary, Nicholas Murray Butler, Harlan Fiske Stone, Charles W. Eliot, and William Howard Taft. All were generally in sympathy with Spencer's concern over the tendency of government to play an increasing role in the life of the society.
"Corporations, engaging the best lawyers, found it easy to convince courts that such labor laws were not a proper and reasonable exercise of the police power; and to point out conflicts with the Fourteenth Amendment, or other parts of the Federal Constitution. Where such a conflict could not be discovered, judges in the eighties began to postulate a theoretical liberty of contract, 'the right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper.'" (Justice Harlan in Adair v. U.S., 208 U.S. 161 (1908). This theory first appears in American law in 1886, and is first discussed in Herbert Spencer's Justice (1891).) (Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager, The Growth of the American Republic, 2 Vols., Oxford University Press, New York, 1942. Vol. 2, P. 170, 170n.)

"'Railway companies may smash their passengers into mummy and the State may not interfere! [Railway travelling was much more dangerous in England than on the Continent. Fatal accidents were more than fifteen times as frequent as in Germany.] Pestilence may sweep our streets and the state may not compel the municipalities to put their own powers in operation to check it! We have heard of the Curiosities of Literature and some day this book will be numbered among them.' So did Eliza Cook's Journal dispose of the already antiquated individualism of Herbert Spencer's Social Statics in 1851." (G. M. Young, Portrait of an Age: Victorian England, Oxford University Press, London, 1977. Second edition. P. 49)

"Worked out most thoroughly by the Englishman Herbert Spencer, this philosophy/the philosophy of progress of American industrialists following the Civil War/ won America as no philosophy had ever won a nation before. To a generation singularly engrossed in the competitive pursuit of industrial wealth it gave cosmic sanction to free competition. In an age of science, it "scientifically" justified ceaseless exploitation. Precisely attuned to the aspirations of American businessmen, it afforded them a guide to faith and thought perfectly in keeping with the pattern of their workaday lives." (Thomas C. Cochran and William Miller, The Age of Enterprise; A Social History of Industrial America, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1942. P. 119)

"Honored in the United States as no philosopher ever was in Greece, no artist in Renaissance Italy, no scientist anywhere in his own day, Spencer left an impression on America that was much more profound than his work. He supplied a rationale and a vocabulary that American businessmen were reluctant to abandon even when business practices made Spencerism obsolete. For this rather than for any contribution to knowledge, Spencer is important to us. From the Civil War to the New Deal, businessmen explained themselves to the "public" in his terms; and during the decade of the 1930's his thought, or textbook variations upon it, formed the basis for conservative attacks upon the reforms of Franklin Roosevelt." (Thomas C. Cochran and William Miller, The Age of Enterprise; A Social History of Industrial America, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1942. Pp. 119-120)
"... we meet continually with the paradox that, having spoken so convincingly of the progressive integration of systems into ever higher levels of organisation, he [Spencer] stopped short at nineteenth-century England and found in its individualism nature's supreme achievement." (PP. 248-249) "There is thus a striking contradiction in his evolutionary thought. By what strange arguments was he able to convince himself that the liberal economic individualism of the mid-nineteenth century was the high state of integration to which all cosmic development had been tending?" (P. 249) (Joseph Needham, "Integrative Levels: A Revaluation of the Idea of Progress." (Herbert Spencer Lecture at Oxford University, 1937) In Time: The Refreshing River, pp. 233-272. George Allen & Unwin Ltd. London, 1943.)

"He [Herbert Spencer] was also an exponent of an extreme laissez-faire individualism, seeing the struggle between individuals jockeying for position as the driving force of social progress (Kennedy 1978; Peel 1971; Taylor 1992). His ideas were welcomed with enthusiasm by the robber barons who masterminded the development of American industry in the late nineteenth century. It is easy, then, to see why Hofstadter should take Spencer as the archetypical social Darwinist, responsible for transmitting this harsh philosophy of progress through struggle across the Atlantic." (Peter J. Bowler, Evolution; The History of an Idea. 3rd edition. University of California Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2003. P. 308)

"The problem with Spencer is not that of showing that he conforms to the position being argued here. Rather, it is to get historians to see how central his work and influence were to the nineteenth-century debate, both among scientists and the broader public. His reputation has suffered most among the leaders of thought in the period because subsequent scientists (followed dutifully by historians) have anachronistically dismissed him for holding a "lamarckian" theory of the mechanisms of evolution. Two things should be recalled about his position. First, that it was a theory which, though embattled, was taken seriously throughout the nineteenth century and, indeed, was given increasing weight by Darwin (just as Spencer allowed an increasing role for natural selection). This point should lend perspective to the dismissal of Spencer as a serious figure. Second, he was unequivocal in pointing out that he attached great weight to the question of the mechanism of evolution precisely because of its ethical, educational, social, and political consequences. Throughout his mature life he was seeking a scientific basis for a doctrine of inevitable progress which would justify his belief in an extreme form of laissez-faire economic and social theory." (Robert M. Young, Darwin's Metaphor, Nature's Place in Victorian Culture, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985. Pp. 197-198)
"... development of language, as of thought, is a progress in establishing discriminations—a making of existing words more precise and introducing others to mark further differences." (Herbert Spencer, Facts and Comments, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1902. P. 18)

"Everyone now knows that languages are not devised but evolved." (Herbert Spencer, Principles of Sociology, Vol. 2, Section 399)

"There is an interesting passage in Herbert Spencer's Autobiography (i. 528) in which he calculates the number of 'good (i.e., presumably, easily distinguished) monosyllables that can be formed by the exhaustive use of good consonants and good vowel sounds' for the use of a contemplated 'universal language' on a purely a priori basis .... It is not easy to see what Spencer means by his 8/simple and 18 compound vowels and what simple and compound consonants he would admit in his scheme: he arrives at the number 108,264 good, possible monosyllables, but in later years suspected that the number of monosyllables would be considerably greater. This to some extent agrees with my own calculation, which is based on the fact that English as now spoken admits 21 simple initial consonants ... 45 initial consonant-groups ... 18 simple final consonants ... 100 final consonant-groups ... 21 vowels and diphthongs.... The result of my calculation is that the phonetic structure of the English language as actually spoken in our own times would admit the possibility of rather more than 158,000 monosyllables." (Otto Jespersen, "Monosyllabism in English," Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. 14, pp. 341-368, 1928. Pp. 346-347)

SIDNEY LANIER

"Sidney Lanier offers an example of this selective application of Spencerian evolutionary concepts to literature. In The English Novel (1883), ... Lanier interpreted Spencer's theory of evolution to mean the emergence of individualism and used it as his unifying theme in tracing the development of fiction. As Spencer saw the growth of individual personality as one aspect of increased heterogeneity, so Lanier saw the movement reflected in the treatment of personality in literature, from the total absence of distinct personality in Aeschylus to the intense study of complex personalities in George Eliot. Yet Lanier, though he made use of this aspect of Spencer, was able to reject both biological evolution and the determinism implicit in the entire system." (Donald Pizer, "Herbert Spencer and the Genesis of Hamlin Garland's Critical System," Tulane Studies in English, Vol. 7, pp. 153-168, 1957. P. 158)
"For Lanier this principle of opposition, of Form against Chaos, of Good against Evil, of Love against Selfishness, of Design against Accident, of Belief against Scepticism, is the fundamental principle of creation ... It comes in part too from Spencer, who [Lanier wrote:] "has formulated the proposition that where opposing forces act, rhythm appears, and has traced the rhythmic motions of nature to the antagonistic forces there found, such as the two motions which carry the earth towards, and away from, the sun and so result in the periodicity of the earth's progress, and others." (Aubrey Harrison Starke, Sidney Lanier, A Biographical and Critical Study, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1933. Pp. 372-373)


"After having discussed the importance of mutual aid in various classes of animals, I was evidently bound to discuss the importance of the same factor in the evolution of Man. This was the more necessary as there are a number of evolutionists who may not refuse to admit the importance of mutual aid among animals, but who, like Herbert Spencer, will refuse to admit it for Man." (Petr Kropotkin, Mutual Aid; A Factor of Evolution, Extending Horizons Books, Boston, 1955. Pp. xiv-xv)


The arguments of the English philosopher Sir William Hamilton, said Sidney Lanier, "... seemed to preclude the possibility of any relation from man to God, of the cognitive sort; but Mr. Herbert Spencer [in the first section of First Principles, undoubtedly] has relieved the blankness of this situation by asserting the possibility of a partial relation still. We cannot think God, it is true; but we can think towards Him." (This is an example of the manner in which some persons readily, even eagerly, seized upon the concept of the Unknowable in an effort to find in the writings of a scientist something with which to bolster their theism.) (Sidney Lanier, "From Bacon to Beethoven" [first written in 1878; first published in Lippincott's Magazine in May, 1888], in Paul Franklin Baum, ed., The Centennial Edition of the Works of Sidney Lanier, Vol. 2, The Science of English Verse, and Essays on Music, pp. 274-290, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1945. P. 286)
"I have read again Spencer's First Principles in order to review him—and really I couldn't help liking the old fellow. I hated his ideas but I appreciated their force more than ever before. I gave him to a student to read with results that impressed me and concluded that a critical edition of him would be very valuable." (Letter from Harold J. Laski to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., dated May 15, 1917. Quoted in Holmes-Laski Letters, The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski, 1916-1935, 2 Vols., edited by Mark DeWolfe Howe, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1953. Vol. 1, p. 86)

"... I think I remember hearing at one time that H. Spencer had a great vogue at Oxford. Bradley naturally wouldn't attribute any importance to him. Many first-rate Frenchmen have cited him with respect as I have noted from time to time—I think Faguet does in his volume I had the other day. All this simply to insist that de facto he has been an important influence." (Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Harold J. Laski dated September 21, 1916. Quoted in Holmes-Laski Letters, The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski, 1916-1935, 2 Vols., edited by Mark DeWolfe Howe, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1953. Vol. 1, p. 24)

"... to many people it might seem natural that physics should have as its subject the elements capable of entering into the relations and giving them a real content, and filling them up as it were. This was Spencer's idea in his classification of the sciences. However this idea cannot be considered a happy one. We register the elements of reality directly, immediately, just as they are and as they cannot help being." (V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Volume 38, Philosophical Notebooks, Translated by Clemens Dutt, Edited by Stewart Smith, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1961(?). P. 430)
"I owe him [Herbert Spencer] a debt of gratitude. My acquaintance with him was the brightest ray in a very dreary, wasted period of my life. I had given up all ambition whatever, lived from hand to mouth, and thought evil of each day sufficient. The stimulus of his intellect, especially during our long walks, roused my energy once more and revived my dormant love of science. His intense theorising tendency was contagious, and it was only the stimulus of a theory which could then have induced me to work."

Spencer's definition of life, according to Ward, "... constitutes the truest definition of life that we now possess." (Lester F. Ward, Dynamic Sociology, 2 Vols., D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1894. Vol. 1, p. 170)

In the last revision of his Principles of Biology Spencer wrote: "We are obliged to confess that Life in its essence cannot be conceived in physico-chemical terms." (D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1914. Vol. 1, p. 120) (Quoted from Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy; I have been unable to find this quotation in the place cited in the latest edition of Principles of Biology I have looked at.)

"The required principle of activity, which we found cannot be represented as an independent vital principle, we now find cannot be represented as a principle inherent in living matter. If, by assuming its inherence, we think the facts are accounted for, we do but cheat ourselves with pseud-ideas." (Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Biology, 2 Vols., D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1914. Vol. 1, p. 120)

After rejecting vitalism, but finding physico-chemical explanations inadequate, Spencer concludes: "In brief, then, we are obliged to confess that Life in its essence cannot be conceived in physico-chemical terms. The required principle of activity, which we found cannot be represented as an independent vital principle, we now find cannot be represented as a principle inherent in living matter. If, by assuming its inherence, we think the facts are accounted for, we do but cheat ourselves with pseud-ideas." (p. 120) "We find it impossible to think of Life as imported into the unit of protoplasm from without; and yet we find it impossible to conceive it as emerging from the cooperation of the components." (p.122) (Herbert Spencer, "The Dynamic Element in Life," Chapter VIA inserted into Vol. 1 of the 1898 revised edition of The Principles of Biology, 2 Vols., D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1904)

"Then [in "The Dynamical Element in Life"], after arguing that life can not be conceived either as a vital principle, a vis vitae, or in physicochemical terms, he adopts as the only possible alternative that it is another inexplicable manifestation of the unknown and ultimate reality,—a conclusion that is not only dubious philosophically, but questionable from the scientific standpoint as well." (Frank C. Becker, "The Final Edition of Spencer's 'First Principles: Part I'," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 3, pp. 287-291, 1906. P. 289)
"It is now possible to see that Herbert Spencer's conception of life as 'the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations' /Principles of Biology, revised edition, 1909, p. 123/7, though doubtless far from satisfactory as a characterization of life itself, is really a true statement of the phenomena of organization. Vague though it may be, it is confirmed by the results of experimental morphology, of physiology, and of the science of metabolism." (Lawrence J. Henderson, The Order of Nature. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, 1917. P. 83.)

"... Mr. Herbert Spencer's masterly elucidation of the chief phenomena of Life has placed philosophy and science under many obligations ...." (Henry Drummond, Natural Law in the Spiritual World, James Pott & Co., Publishers, New York, 1887. P. 145)
"I was so glad to see you again. If I in early life had had such a friend, I might have done something with myself; but I have always been among conventional or unlearned people, I have never been in the higher circles of thought and knowledge." (Letter from Mrs. Elizabeth Lynn Linton to Herbert Spencer written "a few years later" than 1881. Quoted in George Somes Layard, Mrs. Lynn Linton, Her Life, Letters, and Opinions, Methuen & Co., London, 1901. P. 204)
"The principal weakness of Indian Nationalism seems to be that it is not very Indian and not very national. It is all about Herbert Spencer and Heaven knows what. What is the good of the Indian national spirit if it cannot protect its people from Herbert Spencer? I am not fond of the philosophy of Buddhism; but it is not so shallow as Spencer's philosophy; it has real ideas of its own. One of the papers published by Indian nationalists in England, I understand, is called the Indian Sociologist edited by Shyamaji Krishnavarma. What are the young men of India doing that they allow such an animal as a sociologist to pollute their ancient villages and poison their kindly homes?" (p. 387) "If there is such a thing as India, it has a right to be Indian. But Herbert Spencer is not Indian; "Sociology" is not Indian; all this pedantic clatter about culture and science is not Indian. I often wish it were not English either." (p. 387) (G. K. Chesterton, "Our Note Book," weekly column in The Illustrated London News, Vol. 135, No. 3674, p. 387, September 18, 1909)

"Among the many letters of congratulation and praise received by my father, none gave him keener pleasure than a letter from Herbert Spencer, probably in 1891, asking him to go and see him. The Times criticism of the play The Dancing Girl by Jones, first produced on the London stage in 1891, referred to the lines where Sybil Craig, in speaking of Herbert Spencer, says, "I've found out." Guisebury, "What?" Sybil, "That he teaches exactly the same thing as Dante. Dante says, 'In His will is thy peace,' Spencer says, 'You must bring yourself into perfect agreement with your environment or get crushed!'" Herbert Spencer was very pleased at this quotation from his teaching, and H. A. J. derived the keenest pleasure from the talk he had with the great man. He told him how, as a boy not out of his teens, he had commenced reading all his works, and how deeply and lastingly he was indebted to their teaching for his intellectual development. My father said constantly, "Any clear thinking I've done I owe to Herbert Spencer."" (Doris Arthur Jones, The Life and Letters of Henry Arthur Jones, Victor Gollancz Ltd., London, 1930. P. 114) (Jones wrote 87 plays between 1869 and 1922, of which 49 were performed.)


"But there are two reasons, among many, why the name of Mr. HERBERT SPENCER must not be omitted from such a summary as ours: firstly, because no Englishman of his age has made so deep an intellectual impression on foreign thought, or is so widely known throughout Europe; and secondly, because of the stimulating effect which his theories have exercised over almost every native author of the last twenty years." (Edmund Gosse, A Short History of Modern English Literature, William Heinemann, London, 1898. P. 377)
"He [her husband] it was who gave me Wallace's "Darwin and Darwinism," and "The Origin of Species," and made known to me Huxley, Herbert Spencer, Romanes, Haeckel, Westermarck, and the various popular exponents of the great evolutionary movement. But it is idle to prolong the list, and hopeless to convey to a younger generation the first overwhelming sense of cosmic vastness which such "magic casements" let into our little geocentric universe." (Edith Wharton, A Backward Glance, D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1934. P. 94)

"... and simultaneously there appeared [In 1888 or shortly thereafter] from parts unknown a series of cheap reprints of scientific papers, including some of Herbert Spencer. I read them all, sometimes with shivers of puzzlement and sometimes with delight, but always calling for more." (H. L. Mencken, Happy Days, 1880-1892, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1940. Pp. 174-175)

"The last person to go to for a definition of literature is the half-educated scientist, just as the last person who can speak for or against science is the literary man who knows nothing about it. The typical half-educated scientist might be Herbert Spencer, who puts literature among the "miscellaneous activities which make up the leisure part of life, devoted to the gratification of the tastes and feelings." The condescension in those words is as revolting as their ignorance is awful. "We yield to none," says Spencer, "in the value we attach to aesthetic culture and its pleasures." Such a man can know nothing of literature, which is no more for leisure than botany is. If it is not necessary it is nothing." (Mark Van Doren, Liberal Education, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1943. P. 159)

"The better known works of Herbert Spencer also stirred me up. When Herbert Spencer died I wrote for the Saturday Evening Post an account of his life and works, one of the few things I ever asked George Lorimer, the magazine's editor, to print. Herbert Spencer, along with Whitman, Emerson and Dickens, became at the turn of the century one of my spiritual inspirations." (The Autobiography of William Allen White, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1946. P. 326)

"When I was about twelve [ca. 1905 in Knoxville, Tenn.] I was taken to hear the Bishop [Gailor, an Episcopalian] ... during his annual visitation. His subject was Herbert Spencer, of whom I had never heard, but of whom the Bishop disapproved so eloquently that I sought Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy at the library the very next day. I don't think I ever got all the way through even the first volume, but I was so impressed by the introductory discourse on "The Knowable and the Unknowable" that on this basis alone I was for some years, say from twelve to sixteen, a devout Spencerian." (Joseph Wood Krutch, More Lives Than One, William Sloane Associates, New York, 1962. P. 22)
"During the 1860's in California, the poet Edward R. Sill found himself in a cultural wasteland, and wrote: "one's only companions are Shakespeare, Shelley and Mill and Browning and Spencer and the others." (Quoted in San Francisco's Literary Frontier by Franklin Walker, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1939. P. 235)

An anonymous writer in The Nation had said, off-handedly, that while Herbert Spencer was accepted by the general public, he was scoffed at by the experts in the various fields in which he wrote. John Fiske replied to this that "... it is not the "expert" who do the scoffing at Mr. Spencer, but almost without exception the literary dilettanti who have never received the special scientific training without which Mr. Spencer's works cannot possibly be understood or appreciated." (John Fiske, "Herbert Spencer and the Experts," The Nation, Vol. 8, p. 434, June 3, 1869. P. 434)


"I expect to go to England [from Paris] in about a month. I wish you could send me some letters of introduction. I should like especially to know Herbert Spencer. -- I am such an intense admirer of his writings that it would be a great delight to me to converse with him ...." (Letter from Steele Mackaye to William R. Alger dated November 1, 1872. Quoted in Epoch: The Life of Steele Mackaye, Genius of the Theatre, A Memoir by his Son Percy Mackaye, 2 Vols., Boni & Liveright, New York, 1927. Vol. 1, p. 183)

At a party at Madame Mohl's in Paris there were a number of persons present, including Anne Thackeray and Ernest Renan: "He [Renan] said that nobody ever persecuted to prove a thing that was provable, such as a problem of Euclid, but only to prove a thing that was unprovable such as religion or dogma, and then they all began to praise Herbert Spencer like mad." (Letter from Anne Thackeray Ritchie [Thackeray's daughter] to Leslie Stephen, undated /1875/. Quoted in Hester Thackeray Ritchie, Thackeray and His Daughter, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1924. P. 178)

"I was so glad to see you again. If I in early life had had such a friend, I might have done something with myself; but I have always been among conventional or unlearned people, I have never been in the higher circles of thought and knowledge." (Letter from Mrs. Elizabeth Lynn Linton to Herbert Spencer written "a few years later" than 1881. Quoted in George Somes Layard, Mrs. Lynn Linton, Her Life, Letters, and Opinions, Methuen & Co., London, 1901. P. 204)
"But this new religion of the mystical Whitman, in harmony with post-transcendental thought, was deeply impregnated with the spirit of science. He was in the very fullness of his powers when the conception of evolution came to him and he greeted it gladly, weaving it into all his thinking and discovering in it a confirmation of his idealistic philosophy. It was the evolution of Herbert Spencer, it must be remembered, that Whitman accepted—teleological, buoyantly optimistic, dominated by the conception of progress, shot through with the spirit of the Enlightenment; and such an evolution was a confirmation and not a denial of his transcendental premises." (Vernon L. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, Vol. 3: The Beginnings of Critical Realism in America: 1860–1920, Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., New York, 1930. P. 80)

In a chapter entitled "The Evolution of the German Novel," Boyesen wrote: "Evolution, according to one of the several definitions presented by Herbert Spencer, is a development from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, and if the novel is to keep pace with life, it must necessarily be subject to the same development; it must, in its highest form, convey an impression of the whole complex machinery of the modern state and society, and, by implication at least, make clear the influences and surroundings which fashioned the hero's character and thus determined his career." (Hjalmar Hjorth Boyesen, Essays on German Literature, third edition, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1893. P. 232) (Boyesen was Professor of Germanic Languages and Literatures at Columbia University)

"Instinctively the new writers of the latter half of the 19th century began a search for older allies. There were a few of these to be found in America, but not enough of them to serve as the basis of a new literary movement. For most of their support the rebels had to look eastward across the Atlantic. They were especially attracted by the English evolutionary scientists and pamphleteers. Most of the young writers read the works of this whole English group, beginning with Darwin, whose observations were too rigorously set forth to please their slipshod literary tastes. They could not find much to use in Darwin's books, except his picture of natural selection operating through the struggle for life; most of their Darwinism was acquired at second hand. Huxley they seem to have read with less veneration but more interest, chiefly because of his arguments against the Bible as revealed truth and because of his long war with the Protestant clergy. Young writers, feeling that the churches were part of a vast conspiracy to keep them silent, believed that Huxley was fighting their battle. It was Herbert Spencer, however, who deeply affected their thinking. Spencer's American popularity during the last half of the nineteenth century is something without parallel in the history of philosophic writing." (Malcom Cowley, "Naturalism in American Literature," in Evolutionary Thought in America, edited by Stow Persons, pp. 300-333. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1950. P. 302)
"Bergson belongs to my "youth" (tailor shop days). How much he influenced me is imponderable. The great influences were Nietzsche, Spengler, yes, Emerson, Herbert Spencer (!), Thoreau, Whitman--and Elie Faure." (Letter from Henry Miller to Lawrence Durrell dated March 14, 1949. Quoted in Lawrence Durrell and Henry Miller a Private Correspondence, edited by George Wickes, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York, 1963. P. 261)

"Eye the bye, see if they have any of Herbert Spencer's books in the Mechanics' Institute Library. He is perhaps our greatest living philosopher." (Letter from George Gissing to Algernon Gissing dated January 19, 1879. Quoted in Letters of George Gissing to Members of His Family, Collected and arranged by Algernon and Ellen Gissing, Constable and Company, Ltd., London, 1927. P. 40)

"... limited truths discernable in the various phases of literature may, nay, in order to be understood even as limited truths, must be grouped round certain central facts of comparative permanent influence. Such facts are climate, soil, animal and plant life of different countries; such also is the principle of evolution from communal to individual life which we shall hereafter explain at length. The former may be called the statical influences to which literature has been everywhere exposed; the latter may be called the dynamical principle of literature's progress and decay." [Spencer not mentioned specifically, but this formulation seems to reflect him.] (Hutcheson Macaulay Posnett, Comparative Literature, Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., London, 1886. P. 20)

"Is there nobody else to talk to?"
"Not about the things we talk of. There's a lot of things that you're not interested in, that ----"
"What things?"
Mrs. Morel was so intense that Paul [her son] began to pant. "Why--painting--and books. You don't care about Herbert Spencer."
"No," was the sad reply. "And you won't at my age."

"When [Kate] Chopin returned to St. Louis after her husband's death [in 1883], her family doctor, Frederick Kolbenheyer, became one of her closest friends. A radical intellectual and, according to Per Seyersted [Chopin's biographer], a "determined agnostic," he persuaded her to read Darwin, Huxley, and Spencer; to abandon in all but name the faith of her Catholic girlhood; and to begin writing fiction in earnest." (Sandra M. Gilbert, Introduction to The Awakening and Selected Stories, by Kate Chopin, pp.7-33. Penguin Books. New York, 1986. P. 11)
"To tie a prominent statesman to her train and to lead him about like a tame bear, is for a young and vivacious woman a more certain amusement than to tie herself to him and to be dragged about like an Indian squaw. This fact was Madeleine Lee's [the heroine of Henry Adams novel] first great political discovery in Washington, and it was worth to her all the German philosophy she had ever read, with even a complete edition of Herbert Spencer's works into the bargain." (Henry Adams, Democracy. Meridian Classic. New American Library. New York, 1983. [Originally published anonymous in 1880] P. 53)

"Van Wyck Brooks regards the rejection of Spencer's Education by Ticknor & Fields when offered them in 1860 by Youmans as "one of the first signs of the passing of Boston as the intellectual centre of the country. As a result of this first refusal, all these works of science, which dominated the mind of the coming epoch, were published by the Appletons of New York," New England: Indian Summer (New York, 1940), 110." (Charles M. Haar, "E. L. Youmans: A Chapter in the Diffusion of Science in America," Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 9, pp. 193-213, 1948. P. 209)

"George Cable has been here, creating worshipers on all hands. He is a marvelous talker on a deep subject. I do not see how even Spencer, could unwind a thought more smoothly or orderly, and do it in cleaner, crisper English." (Letter from Mark Twain to William Dean Howells dated November 4, 1882. Quoted in Mark Twain-Howells Letters; The Correspondence of Samuel L. Clemens and William D. Howells, 1872-1910, 2 Vols., edited by Henry Nash Smith and William M. Gibson, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960. Vol. 1, p. 419)

"The decline of this series [the International Scientific Series] by Ticknor and Fields, to whom, in 1860, Youmans offered Spencer's Education, was one of the first indications of the passing of Boston as the intellectual centre of the country. As a result of this first refusal, all these works of science, which dominated the mind of the coming epoch, were published by the Appletons of New York." (Van Wyck Brooks, New England: Indian Summer, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York, 1965. P. 114n.)
"After talking of Herbert Spencer for an entire evening with a very literary transcendental commission-merchant, she could not see that her time had been better employed than when in former days she had passed it in flirting with a very agreeable young stockbroker ...." (Henry Adams, Democracy, An American Novel. A Meridian Classic, New York, 19__ P. 13. [The character described is Mrs. Lightfoot Lee, perhaps the heroine of the novel])

"Note Laevsky's description of his romance in Chekhov's The Duel (1891): 'To begin with, we had kisses, and calm evenings, and vows, and Spencer, and ideals and interests in common,' .... (John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, A Pelican Book, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1968. P. 534)

Darwin and Spencer are referred to in Frank Norris' (1870-1902) "Kiplingesque" story, "A South Sea Expedition," (Norris, Complete Works, Vol. 10, p. 88)
"To give up Spencer," said Jack London's autobiographical hero, "would be equivalent to a navigator throwing the compass and chronometer overboard." Later, when he heard a California judge disparaging Spencer, the hero burst into a rage. "To hear that great and noble man's name upon your lips," he shouted, "is like finding a dewdrop in a cesspool." (Malcolm Cowley, "Naturalism in American Literature," in Evolutionary Thought in America, ed. by Stow Persons, pp. 300-333, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1950. P. 304)

Jack London affords an example of someone who was both a Socialist and a Spencerian. What he absorbed from Spencer was his determinism and evolutionism as expressed in First Principles, and not anything that Spencer had to say about individualism and laissez faire. European socialists somehow found this difficult to do. They read his political philosophy and recoiled from it, and left his science largely unread. An exception may be Enrico Ferri.

Main Currents in American Thought. Vol. 3: The Beginnings of Critical Realism in America. Harcourt, Brace and Company. New York, 1930. P. 198. Those literary men specifically cited by Parrington as having been influenced by Spencer during their formative years include Walt Whitman, Hamlin Garland, Theodore Dreiser, and Jack London (pp. 80, 198). In his largely autobiographical novel, Martin Eden, London has the hero make an impassioned speech in which he refers to Spencer as "the man who has impressed the stamp of his genius over the whole field of scientific research and modern thought." (Dell Publishing Co., Inc. New York, 1958. P. 304)

"But it was not until he struck Herbert Spencer's First Principles that he found his long-sought method of correlating the varied trends of thought he had assimilated into a working philosophy. His meeting with the mind of Herbert Spencer was perhaps the greatest single adventure in a life fraught with adventures. One night, after long study-bouts with William James and Francis Bacon, and after writing a sonnet as a nightcap, he crawled into bed with a copy of First Principles. Morning found him still reading. He continued reading all the next day, abandoning the bed for the floor when his body tired." (p. 98) "Jack was more thrilled by this discovery than he had been at the discovery of gold on Henderson Creek, for he knew that Spencer's monism could never turn out to be mica. Herbert Spencer made him drunk with comprehension." (p. 98) (Irving Stone, Sailor on Horseback, the Story of Jack London, The Bodley Head, London, 1948. P. 98)
"The essence of science is its objectivity, its thoroughness, its contempt of authority. Spencer exhibited these qualities, not in the limited domain of the specialist, but in the whole field of human knowledge and action. Whatever subject he treats, he never truckles to established canons. He is not less of an independent scientist, opposed to dogma, in indignantly denying homage to Homer and Raphael, the fetishes of the critical guild, than in demanding the evidence for special creation." (Robert H. Lowie, "Tolstoi or Spencer?" The Liberal Review, Vol. 1, pp. 515-520, 1904. P. 517)

"A Columbia student /Lowie is speaking of himself/ who from a boy had accepted Darwinism as a dogma, who had steeped himself as an undergraduate in Herbert Spencer's First Principles and hailed Ernst Haeckel's Die Welträtsel as a definitive solution of all cosmic enigmas, was profoundly disturbed when browsing in the departmental libraries of Schermerhorn Hall or talking to age-mates who majored in zoology. Bewildering judgments turned up in the new books and journals. Haeckel, it seemed, was an irresponsible hotspur, if not a forger of evidence. For William James, Herbert Spencer was a "vague writer," and in Pearson's opinion the British philosopher cut a sorry figure when using the terms of physics. Darwin himself, esteemed for his monographs, was not always taken seriously as a theorist. In the building where our student spent most of his time Thomas Hunt Morgan, a prophet of the new dispensation, held forth on the weakness of the Darwinian philosophy." (Robert H. Lowie, "Reminiscences of Anthropological Currents in America Half a Century Ago," American Anthropologist, Vol. 58, pp. 995-1016, 1956. P. 1005)

"... I find a letter /probably dated March or April, 1895/ from Mr. Herbert Spencer /to Sir John Lubbock/ enquiring where, in his books, may be found information on the following point: "The gods are conceived by many uncivilized peoples as very stupid and easily deceived by sham sacrifices. I have remembrance somewhere of a case in which it was said by the people that their god So-and-So was stupid, or something of / that kind; and that for this reason they deluded him." Mr. Spencer says that, not finding it in Tylor, he concludes it must be in Sir John's writings." (Horace G. Hutchinson, editor, The Life of Sir John Lubbock, Lord Avebury, 2 Vols., Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1914. Vol. 2, pp. 45-46)


"It is perfectly possible, I think, as Mr. Herbert Spencer has shown in a recent admirable volume [The Man versus The State], to revive even in our day the fiscal tyranny which once left even European populations in doubt whether it was worth while preserving life by thrift and toil." (Sir Henry Sumner Maine, Popular Government, John Murray, London, 1885. P. 49)

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"I quite think, with Grote, that the master-error of Buckle was his absurd underrating of the accidents of history; and Herbert Spencer represents the same tendency in an even more exaggerated form. Sir Henry Maine once said to me that he knew no modern reputation which had declined so much in so short a time as Buckle's, and that he believed that the reputation of everyone who, like Herbert Spencer, treated society mainly as an organisation must suffer a similar collapse." (W. E. H. Lecky, quoted in A Memoir of the Right Hon. William Edward Hartpole Lecky, by His Wife /Elizabeth Lecky/, Longmans, Green, and Co., New York, 1909. P. 122)

**MARRIAGE & THE FAMILY**

p. 35. Did Spencer believe that kinship terms were used by preliterate peoples to designate what they conceived to be biological relationships? Or, did S. see clearly that these terms designate social, rather than biological, relationships (from scientific point of view)? — L.A. White


Spencer did not see monogamy as necessarily the best form of marriage, in some Victorian sense, toward which all societies were striving. He says: "In competition with polygyny and monogamy, polyandry may, in some cases, have had the advantage for reasons cited above (having several "fathers", the children of a polyandrous household would be better off): polygynic and monogamic families dying out because the offspring of them were relatively ill-fed" (Vol. I, p. 681, 1st ed.)

It is true that Spencer considered monogamy to be the highest form of marriage, but not because it was the system prevalent in Victorian England, but for structural and functional reasons which he took pains to set forth in considerable detail (Vol. I, pp. 700-704, 1st ed.).
Thus it appears that Herbert Spencer, like Karl Marx suffered in that their scientific propositions about society have been ignored or resisted because of the fact that, combined with these, were political doctrines strongly defending certain courses of action, while attacking others.

"He [Karl Marx] made much the same impression on me [when Harris called on him in the early 1880's] that Herbert Spencer made twenty years later; but Spencer was contemptuously angry under contradiction [i.e., when Harris contradicted him], whereas Karl Marx was inattentively courteous. But both had shut themselves off from hearing anything against their pet theory, one sided though it was. And just as Herbert Spencer was worth listening to on everything but "the field I've made my own", so was Karl Marx." (Frank Harris, His Life and Adventures: An Autobiography, The Richards Press, London, 1952. P. 177)

There is no evidence that Spencer was aware of any of the writings of Karl Marx, or even, to judge from Spencer's Autobiography, of Marx' existence. His aversion to socialism probably kept him from reading any socialist literature, since, as he says himself, he had no patience to read anything theoretical with whose basis he was out of sympathy. (But Marx' name is cited once in Principles of Sociology)

"Open almost any book dealing with the problems of our time and you will find .... Darwin and Marx repeatedly coupled as the great pair whose conceptions revolutionized the modern world .... Darwin as the scientist and Marx as the sociologist." (Jacques Barzun, Darwin, Marx, Wagner: Critique of a Heritage. Doubleday & Company, Inc. Garden City, N.Y., 1958. F. 1.)

Yet Spencer was much more of a scientist than Darwin in that he dealt with many more fields of science and was much more concerned with the philosophy of science and scientific method. And Spencer was much more of a sociologist than Marx in encompassing more human societies, in many more aspects, and societies over a much longer period of development.
"... Wither Marx (with Engels's help) was the Darwin of the social sciences, or nobody was." (Marvin Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1968. P. 218)

governments are not in themselves powerful, but are the instrumentality of a power." (Vol. II, p. 318). This sounds very Marxian.

"Later on the bourgeois sociologists, as for example Spencer, made use of the doctrine of the social organism to draw the most conservative conclusions." (G. Plekhanov (N. Beltov), The Development of the Monist View of History, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1956. P. 82)

Anathema as socialism was to Spencer, he foresaw, with Engels, a "withering away of the state" under a fully industrial type of society in which: "Nearly all public organizations save that for administering justice, necessarily disappear." (Vol. II, p. 612).

"In my opinion, Engels was correct when he attributed to Marx the "discovery of the law of evolution in human history." (Compare Thorstein Veblen's view that Marx' philosophy was, in some important ways, pre-evolutionary.) (Marvin Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1968. P. 219)

"Herbert Spencer, into whose empiricism Darwin inculcated the idea of "evolution" as a special vaccine, taught that in the moral sphere evolution proceeds from "sensations" to "ideas." (Leon Trotsky, "Their Morals and Ours" (1938), in The Basic Writings of Trotsky, edited by Irving Howe, pp. 370-399, Vintage Books, Random House, New York, 1965. P. 376)

"Spencerism has done nothing but to collate a vast amount of scientific evidence, from all branches of human knowledge, in support of these two abstract thoughts of Leibnitz /sic/ and Hegel: "The present is the child of the past, but it is the parent of the future," and "Nothing is; everything is becoming."" (Enrico Ferri, Socialism and Modern Science (Darwin--Spencer--Marx), Translated by Robt. Hives La Monte, International Library Publishing Co., New York, 1900. [Original French edition, 1895] (P. 94)

"Now the Marxists, like the anarchists, are out to abolish the State. Marx agreed to a surprising extent with the extreme nineteenth-century liberals, and with philosophers like Herbert Spencer, when he characterized the State as a "parasitic excrescence" to be "amputated."" (J. B. S. Haldane, The Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences, Central Book Depot, Allahabad, India, 1946. P. 171)
"When Marx sent Spencer the second German edition of the first volume of *Das Kapital*, Spencer replied with a brief note in the third person. After remarking that he was "obliged to Dr. Karl Marx" for the gift, he went on: (Transcribed from a photocopy of the original provided by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, Moscow. This letter, catalogued as CPA IML (Moskau) f. I, op. 5, N 3325, is quoted by permission of the Institute and of the International Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Amsterdam.) "... When, presently, Mr. Spencer comes to deal with politico-economic questions, as included in Sociology at large, Dr. Marx's volume will have an interest for him, but he fears that his ignorance of German will prevent him from gaining any adequate idea of its contents." (Nineteenth-Century Thought: The Discovery of Change, edited by Richard L. Schoenwald, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965. Pp. 161-162)

One thing that may be of interest to you is that Plekhanov had more than a passing interest in Spencer. In *Unaddressed Letters*, Foreign Languages Publ. House, Moscow, 1957, he devotes several pages to Spencer's theory of play, along with the criticisms of Groos and Bucher. In "The Development of the Monist View of History," vol. 1, Selected Philosophical Works, Moscow, n.d., or by itself, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1947, he defends Spencer as having strong affinities with Hegel, attacking the views of the Narodnik, Nikolai Mikhailovsky. But in sum, he regards Spencer's "organic" philosophy of society as being essentially conservative—a weapon for bourgeois intellectuals to use to defend the social status quo. (Letter from John Moore, dated November 28, 1967)

"The strong utopian ingredient in Marx's vision of progress is illustrated in the distinctive motto of ultimate communism: "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." However, the ultimate stages of Spencer's industrial society do not lack for similar manifestations of spontaneous altruism. As Marxism predicted the end of exploitation in the communist millennium, Spencerism predicted a future society in which the desires of each individual would be in adaptive equilibrium with the desires of all others and with the means of satisfying them." (Marvin Harris, *The Rise of Anthropological Theory*, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1968. P. 222)

"To the question, whence arose the need for special bodies of armed men, placed above society and alienating themselves from it (police and standing army), the West-European and Russian philosophers are inclined to answer with a few phrases borrowed from Spencer or Mikhailovsky, by referring to the growing complexity of social life, the differentiation of functions, and so forth. Such a reference seems "scientific," and effectively dulls the senses of the man in the street by obscuring the most important and basic fact, namely, the cleavage of society into irreconcilably antagonistic classes." (V. I. Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, n.d. P. 17)
"... Engels, who explicitly associated his view about the mathematical capacities of various races with Spencer's belief that the sense of mathematical proof is acquired and transmitted through heredity: "Spencer is right in as much as what thus appears to us to be the self-evidence of these axioms is inherited."" (F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature, Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, P. 340) (Marvin Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1968, P. 239)

Those who have always thought of Spencer as the arch apostle of individualism and the rights of private property may be surprised to learn that Spencer foresaw "a stage still more advanced [than the one in which slavery had been done away with in which] it may be that private ownership of land will disappear" (Vol. II, p. 553). Spencer is very undogmatic and his vision and perspective are not easily clouded by personal predilections.

"Note that there is a curious similarity between Spencer's ultimate industrial phase and the nebulous stateless and classless utopia which Marx had promised would follow the proletarian victory. Both Marx and Spencer continued to expect the triumph of the individual over society as in the dream of Rousseau. For both Spencer and Marx, the withering away of the state was a withering away not only of the political apparatus but of the entire supra-individual, sociocultural nexus of restraint." (Marvin Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1968, P. 468)

Marxian criticism of Spencer's survival of the fittest: "The very idea of the survival of the strong through a victory won over the weak, must, consequently, be regarded as an unconscious and inexact reminiscence of experiences encountered in the capitalistic society, and inapplicable, therefore, to the social phenomena belonging to economic equality." (Achille Loria, The Economic Foundations of Society, translated by Lindley M. Keasbey, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1902, Pp. 66-67)

"Until these last few years a vain effort was made to consign, by a conspiracy of silence, the masterly work of Marx to oblivion, but now his name is coming to rank with those of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer as the three Titans of the scientific revolution which begot the intellectual renaissance and gave fresh potency to the civilizing thought of the latter half of the nineteenth century." (Enrico Ferri, Socialism and Modern Science, (Darwin--Spencer--Marx), Translated by Robt. Rives La Monte, International Library Publishing Co., New York, 1900. (Original French edition, 1892) (P. 159)
"This situation bore upon my attitude toward the church. I could not abide the men who controlled it; and as I had thrown out the Bible as revelation, and the miracles as nonsense, my religious position was definite at an early time. [Ca. 1890; Masters was born in 1869.] Very soon I made friends with a man named Homer Roberts, a schoolteacher, and a student of Huxley and Spencer ...." (pp. 80-81). "So I was going along feeding my hungry mind. I read Huxley and Spencer with Homer Roberts, particularly First Principles, and the Data of Ethics." (p. 85). (Edgar Lee Masters, Across Spoon River; An Autobiography, Octagon Books, New York, 1969)

"She [Rachel Yarros, a Russian Jewess, who was a medical doctor, whom Masters met in Chicago] was deeply read in Spencer's philosophy, and as I had gone rather well into him at Lewistown we had Spencer for a subject to talk about in the evenings, and about the doctrine of equal liberty and philosophical anarchy." (p. 183). (Edgar Lee Masters, Across Spoon River; An Autobiography, Octagon Books, New York, 1969)


Wrote Charles Horton Cooley: "The best known representative of this way of thinking is Herbert Spencer, whose whole philosophy assumes the primacy of material facts, and aims to show how mental and social facts grow out of them." (Quoted by Albion W. Small in "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 21, pp. 721-864, 1916. P. 812)

"Spencer has avowed in his Autobiography (ii, 75) what might be surmised by critical readers, that he wrote the First Part of First Principles in order to guard against the charge of "materialism." This motive led him to misrepresent "atheism," which he quite untruly described as a profession to explain the universe, and there was a touch of retribution in the general disregard of his disavowal of materialism, at which he expresses surprise." (J. M. Robertson, A History of Freethought in the Nineteenth Century, Watts & Co., London, 1929. P. 214)

"Indeed, the English thinker Herbert Spencer attempted a kind of summa of nineteenth-century evolutionary, scientific materialism, and was for several generations a kind of culture-hero for "advanced" people generally." (Crane Brinton, The Shaping of the Modern Mind, Mentor Book. The New American Library. New York, 1953. P. 158)

"Spencer tried to subject the whole evolution movement to the mechanical conception of causation; and he failed most signally. He interpreted all development in terms of successive transformations of energy. Thus life and mind alike were eviscerated of all their richer meaning." (James Mark Baldwin, Darwin and the Humanities, Review Publishing Co., Baltimore, 1909. Pp. 86-87)
"... in one and all of which \(\text{mental phenomena}\) he finds what he finds in the bodily life, / namely, "the adjustment of internal to external relations." This is an exposition of psychical phenomena which will find little favour except with those who advocate materialism." (Anonymous (George H. Lewes), "Herbert Spencer's Principles of Psychology," The Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science, and Art, Vol. 1, pp. 352-353, 1856. Pp. 352-353)

"So long as it does not concern itself with the nature of ultimate reality, which it deems to be unknowable, it \(\text{Spencer's philosophic system}\) is quite sound, because it deals with phenomena and not with noumena, and with these in a most systematic and comprehensive way. It is only when reality is dismissed as unattainable that it becomes a fabric in mid-air." (John Butler Burke, "Herbert Spencer and the Master Key," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 89, pp. 783-794, 1906. P. 785)

"However, with all the author's \(\text{Spencer's}\) disclaimers, the general effect left on the reader's mind is that throughout the universe there is an unceasing change of matter and motion, that evolution is always such a change, that it begins with phenomena in the sense of physical facts, gradually issues in life and consciousness, and ends with phenomena in the sense of subjective affections \(\text{of consciousness}\)." (Thomas Case, "Metaphysics," The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edition, Vol. 18, pp. 224-253, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1911. P. 227)

"Lastly, when a theory of the world supposes a noumenal power, a resistant and persistent force, which results in an evolution, defined as an integration of matter and a dissipation of motion, which having resulted in inorganic nature and organic nature, further results without break in consciousness, reason, society and morals, then such a theory will be construed as materialistically as that of Haeckel by the reader, whatever the intention of the author." (Thomas Case, "Metaphysics," The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edition, Vol. 18, pp. 224-253, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1911. P. 227)

"The truth is that his \(\text{Spencer's}\) theory of evolution can be carried through the whole process without a break only by giving the synthetic philosophy a materialistic interpretation, and by adhering consistently to \(\text{Spencer's own materialistic definition of evolution; otherwise there will be a break at least between life and mind. If everything knowable is an example of evolution, and evolution is by definition a transformation of matter and motion, then everything knowable is an example of a transformation of matter and motion.}\)" (Thomas Case, "Metaphysics," The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edition, Vol. 18, pp. 224-253, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1911. Pp. 227-228)
"... I saw that it would be needful to preface the exposition of First Principles by some chapters setting forth my beliefs on ultimate questions, metaphysical and theological; since, otherwise, I should be charged with propounding a purely materialistic interpretation of things. Hence resulted the first division --"The Unknowlable." My expectation was that having duly recognized this repudiation of materialism ...

(Auto. II, 75)

"As to the charge of materialism it has been thrown at me continually for the last thirty years and when one man has been answered another man somewhere else presently throws it again." (Letter from Herbert Spencer to John Fiske dated May 20, 1891. Henry E. Huntington Library, Cat. No. HM 13750. Unpublished)

Spencer said of force or energy: "... there is as much warrant for calling it spiritual as for calling it material." (Herbert Spencer, "Professor Ward on "Naturalism and Agnosticism,"" The Popular Science Monthly, Vol. 56, pp. 349-357, 1900. P. 350)

"It would be unfair to class the coarse materialism of Büchner with the thoughtful realism of Spencer." (Friedrich Max Müller, "Lectures on Mr. Darwin's Philosophy of Language," Fraser's Magazine, n.s., Vol. 7, pp. 525-541, 1873. P. 525)

"Though Mr. Spencer objects to the characterization, I can only describe this philosophy as materialistic, since it accounts for the world and all it contains, including the human ego, by the interactions of matter and motion, without reference to any such thing as intelligence, purpose or will, except as derived from them." (Henry George, A Perplexed Philosopher, Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, New York, 1965. P. 115)

"It is on this vital point of the existence or non-existence of spirit as a prime motor that the real issue raised by theories of evolution comes. Such evolutionism as is represented by the men of whom I have spoken (Alfred Russel Wallace, St. George Mivart, and Joseph Le Conte), sees in evolution only a mode in which the creative spirit works. Such evolutionism as is formulated in the Spencerian philosophy eliminates spirit from its hypothesis, and takes into account only matter and motion." (Henry George, A Perplexed Philosopher, Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, New York, 1965. P. 122)

"In this elimination of any spiritual element lies, it seems to me, the essential characteristic of the Spencerian philosophy. ... the peculiarity of its teachings as to evolution arises from its ignoring of the spiritual element, from its assumption that, matter and motion given, their interactions will account for all that we see, feel or know." (Henry George, A Perplexed Philosopher, Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, New York, 1965. P. 119)
"John Fiske does not truly represent Spencerianism, but has grafted his own ideas on it. So too, I think, with Professor LeConte—or rather that he holds what I should call the external of evolution, with which I do not quarrel; for though I do not see the weight of the evidence with which it is asserted, it seems to most reasonable. What I do quarrel with is the essential materialism of the Spencerian ideas; and this seems to me to inhere in them in spite of all Spencer's denials." (Letter from Henry George to Edward R. Taylor dated April 18, 1892. Quoted in Henry George, Jr., The Life of Henry George, Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, New York, 1960. P. 570)

"To an abstract objection an abstract rejoinder suffices; and so far as one's opposition to materialism springs from one's disdain of matter as something 'crass,' Mr. Spencer cuts the ground from under one. Matter is indeed infinitely and incredibly refined. To any one who has ever looked on the face of a dead child or parent the mere fact that matter could have taken for a time that precious form, ought to make matter sacred ever after. It makes no difference what the principle of life may be, material or immaterial, matter at any rate co-operates, lends itself to all life's purposes. That beloved incarnation was among matter's possibilities." (William James, "Some Metaphysical Problems Pragmatically Considered," in Pragmatism and Four Essays from The Meaning of Truth, pp. 63-86, Meridian Books, The World Publishing Company, Cleveland, 1955. P. 71)

"I remember a worthy spiritualist professor who always referred to materialism as the 'mud-philosophy,' and deemed it thereby refuted. To such spiritualism as this there is an easy answer, and Mr. Spencer makes it effectively. In some well-written pages at the end of the first volume of his Psychology he shows us that a 'matter' so infinitely subtile, and performing motions as inconceivably quick and fine as those which modern science postulates in her explanations, has no trace of grossness left. He shows that the conception of spirit, as we mortals hitherto have framed it, is itself too gross to cover the exquisite tenuity of nature's facts. Both terms, he says, are but symbols, pointing to that one unknowable reality in which their oppositions cease." (William James, "Some Metaphysical Problems Pragmatically Considered," in Pragmatism and Four Essays from The Meaning of Truth, pp. 63-86, Meridian Books, The World Publishing Company, Cleveland, 1957. Pp. 70-71)

"He [Durkheim] expresses the fear that his attempt to study social phenomena objectively will be "judged crude and will possibly be termed 'materialistic.'" Yet he assures the reader that "we would more justly claim the contrary designation."" (In The Rules of Sociological Method, 1938, pp. xxxviii–xxxxix.) (Marvin Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1968. P. 473)

"If a new moral world is built upon materialism, Herbert Spencer will have been one of the chief builders." (Goldwin Smith, Reminiscences, edited by Arnold Haultain, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1910. P. 139)
"About the only kind of formal instruction he had submitted to had been a course in the "Inventional Geometry" by the father of Herbert Spencer, which Raphael now often says was the foundation of his education. "This is a primer that every child should be blessed with before the ordinary teacher, or school, has a chance to show how unnecessary it is to do any thinking. The primer consists of some 300 or more questions and no answers. The child, having easily answered the first question, can with a little thought answer the second, and so on to the end. Provided with ruler and divider, the child, in answering these questions, constructs all the problems in plane and solid geometry, and gets a training in logical thinking and in visualizing. I introduced the primer to the head of the Bainbridge Academy in Georgia, and the next year he told me that it had been the delight of the whole school. Only one or two children had failed to answer every question." (Raphael Pumpelly, My Reminiscences, 2 Vols., Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1918. Vol. 2, pp. 681,681n.)

"In no point of any importance did he make it clear to me that Spencer was wrong, and the only result of our conversation was to show me that in my opinion it was only my ignorance of mathematics that prevented me from seeing that Mr. Spencer is merely a 'word philosopher.' Upon which opinion I reflected, and still reflect, that the mathematicians must be a singularly happy race, seeing that they alone of men are competent to think about the facts of the cosmos." (Letter from George J. Romanes to Charles Darwin, dated February 6, 1880. Mrs. E. Romanes, The Life and Letters of George John Romanes, Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1896. P. 95) [the unidentified person might be found in Darwin’s Life and Letters, which I believe includes this letter too]

"I might add that there is nothing in the world which pleases even famous men (and men who have used disparaging language about mathematics) quite so much as to discover, or rediscover, a genuine mathematical theorem. Herbert Spencer republished in his autobiography a theorem about circles which he proved when he was twenty [publish then, proved when he was about 17-RLC] (not knowing that it had been proved over two thousand years before by Plato)." (G. H. Hardy, "A Mathematician’s Apology," in The World of Mathematics, edited by James R. Newman, Vol. 4, pp. 2027-2038, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1956. P. 2028)

"I might add that there is nothing in the world which pleases even famous men (and men who have used disparaging language about mathematics) quite so much as to discover, or rediscover, a genuine mathematical theorem. Herbert Spencer republished in his autobiography a theorem about circles which he proved when he was twenty (not knowing that it had been proved over two thousand years before by Plato)." (G. H. Hardy, A Mathematician’s Apology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967. P. 88)
"True, he [Prof. Tait] has given us some mathematics, by which he considers the reconciliation to be effected; and, possibly, some readers, awed by his equations, and forgetting that in symbolic operations, carried on no matter how rigorously, the worth of what comes out depends wholly on what is put in, will suppose that Prof. Tait must be right." (Herbert Spencer, Various Fragments, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1898. P. 88)

At the age of 16 or 17 Spencer discovered a property of a circle which had never been previously discovered; this was in the field of Descriptive Geometry. The theorem and its demonstration were published in The Civil Engineer and Architect's Journal in 1840.

MAX MULLER

From the Journal of Lord Amberley: "Sunday, March 23 [1873]. This afternoon we had an interesting meeting at our house, 30, Weymouth Street. Max Müller at Oxford had expressed himself as anxious to make H. Spencer's acquaintance, & I had invited him to come to us for the purpose when he was in London for some lectures he was giving. To-day the meeting occurred. Herbert Spencer, J. S. Mill ... Max Müller ... and others were present by invitation.... It was very pleasant." (Quoted in Bertrand and Patricia Russell, The Amberley Papers, The Letters and Diaries of Bertrand Russell's Parents, 2 Vols., W. W. Norton & Company Inc., New York, 1937. Vol. 2, p. 538)

Regarding an essay of Grant Allen's on the ghost theory of the origin of religion Spencer wrote: "Not that you will convince Max Müller and Co. Men in their position are beyond the reach of reason." (Letter from Herbert Spencer to Grant Allen dated November 26, 1892. Quoted in Grant Allen, A Memoir by Edward Clodd, Grant Richards, London, 1900. P. 144)

"To my mind Mansel's Bampton Lectures and the reception they met with were a sign of the times. They seemed to me far more irreligious than Herbert Spencer. Frederick Maurice saw the tendency of that school of thought which erects an insurmountable barrier between the finite mind and the infinite, but he could not make himself understood. Mansel and Herbert Spencer seem to me at the present moment to rule at Oxford in the two opposite camps, and I do not wonder that they produce in each much the same results." (Letter from Friedrich Max Müller to Canon Farrar, dated January 6, 1873. Quoted in The Life and Letters of the Right Honourable Friedrich Max Müller, edited by his wife [Georgina Grenfell Müller], 2 Vols., Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1902. Vol. 1, p. 447)

The Victorian Age seems to have felt a hankering after the simplification of thought offered by the mechanistic monism which Herbert Spencer and John Fiske contrived to apply to all history and to all phenomena of life. (Gustav FECHNER, Religion of a Scientist, edited and translated by Walter Lowrie, Pantheon Books, New York, 1946. P. 61)

And it is an astonishing and humiliating fact, that he Spencer has utterly ignored the earnest efforts and large achievements made by the greatest thinkers of the world since the time of Anaxagoras towards lifting the plane of philosophical conceptions above the dead level of mere mechanism. (William C. Morey, "Herbert Spencer in the Light of History," Baptist Quarterly Review, Vol. 5, pp. 279-309, 1883. P. 306)

It is not the mere employment of mechanical principles to explain the character of physical phenomena which constitutes the distinguishing feature of his Spencer's method; it is the exclusion of every other principle from the entire domain of a universal science. (William C. Morey, "Herbert Spencer in the Light of History," Baptist Quarterly Review, Vol. 5, pp. 279-309, 1883. P. 306)

But did Spencer fully realize how big a hole this half of the added chapter, "The Dynamic Element in Life" knocks in the bottom of the purely mechanical interpretation of nature he had for so long championed? (C. Lloyd Morgan, Spencer's Philosophy of Science, The Herbert Spencer Lecture for 1913, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1913. P. 33)

... Spencer's total influence upon sociology, ... operated for a time to concentrate attention upon the mechanical and vital elements in social combinations, and to obscure the psychic elements which are in excess of the physical. While the Spencerian influence was uppermost, the tendency was to regard social progress as a sort of mechanically determined redistribution of energy which thought could neither accelerate nor retard. (Albion W. Small, General Sociology, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1905. P. 82)
"According to the modern standpoint, the living cell is a complex chemico-physical system which is regarded as a dynamical system of equilibrium, a conception suggested by Herbert Spencer and which has acquired a constantly increasing importance in the light of modern development in physical chemistry." (George Klebs, "The Influence of Environment on the Form of Plants," in A. C. Seward, editor, Darwin and Modern Science, pp. 223-246, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1909. P. 227) (Klebs was Professor of Botany at the University of Heidelberg.)

"... nothing that men could do could alter or hasten anything. Society, in Spencer's version, was simply a gigantic organism endowed with an unalterable amount of energy, and this energy would inexorably redistribute itself according to laws lodged in itself. Men were simply points of the emergence of this energy. They were victims of illusions if they supposed they were generators of new energies not already striving for expression in the different repositories of nature's force." (Albion W. Small, The Meaning of Social Science, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1910. P. 82)

William McDougall was opposed to mechanism, materialism, and "a rigid determinism" in psychology. (He stressed the role of "genius.") He spoke admonishingly to beginners in the field of what such an approach would lead to: "... the sturdy figure of T. H. Huxley, struggling vainly in his old age (apparently in "Evolution and Ethics") to lay the spectre he had so confidently helped to create; there also he may descry the forlorn figure of Herbert Spencer, once acclaimed the king of mechanists, but now remembered as the author of a "chromo-philosophy" of scandalous vagueness." (William McDougall, Outline of Psychology, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1924. P. 29)

"Most of the writers who have passed judgment of Mr. Spencer's sociological doctrines have failed to inform themselves upon the underlying principles from which his conclusions have been drawn. They have sought his sociological system in those of his books that bear sociological titles, while, in fact, the basal theorems of his sociological thought are scattered throughout the second half of the volume called "First Principles."" (pp. 8-9) Then, after pointing out that Spencer there talks of the statics, dynamics, and equilibration of social forces, Giddings says: "All this, obviously, is a physical explanation of social forms and metamorphoses, and Spencerian sociology in general ... is to a large extent a physical philosophy of society, notwithstanding its liberal use of biological and psychological data." (p. 9) (Franklin H. Giddings, The Principles of Sociology, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1896)
"The difficult but necessary work of sociology is to endeavor to discover what this organization /.../ an order of things which will create economic responsibility, and ensure to each the integral enjoyment of the produce of his labor." (p. 497) should be, and to prepare its advent." (p. 497) (Emile de Laveleye, "The State versus The Man: A Criticism of Mr. Herbert Spencer," The Contemporary Review, Vol. 47, pp. 485-508, 1885)

"Every other science rests upon a body of uniform laws which have been discovered by investigation, and which, as soon and as fast as discovered, can be put to immediate use in furthering the interests of life and ameliorating the condition of mankind. The science of sociology as taught by Spencer is a complete exception in this respect." (Lester F. Ward, "Herbert Spencer's Sociology," The Independent, Vol. 56, pp. 730-734, 1904, P.731)

"To every science there corresponds an art. If there is a social science there must be a social art." (Lester F. Ward, "Herbert Spencer's Sociology," The Independent, Vol. 56, pp. 730-734, 1904, P.731)

"The Principles of sociology, great as are its intrinsic merits, does not represent a science like other sciences, upon which man can lay hold and use as an instrument for his own advancement. Every other science rests upon a body of uniform laws which have been discovered by investigation, and which, as soon and as fast as discovered, can be put to immediate use in furthering the interests of life and ameliorating the condition of mankind. The science of sociology as taught by Spencer is a complete exception in this respect. Its laws are not pointed out, and there is not only no intimation that if there are social laws they may be utilized to human advantage, but there is a distinct implication, repeatedly expressed, that no such use can be made of them." (Lester F. Ward, "Herbert Spencer's Sociology," in Glimpses of the Cosmos, Vol. 6, pp. 171-177. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1918. P.172)

"... as man has been able to make practical use of every other science, it must follow that when social laws are really known and a social science is established he will be able to make a practical use of it. This in Spencer's Principles of sociology is at least impliedly denied, and in his other works it is expressly and vehemently denied." (Lester F. Ward, "Herbert Spencer's Sociology," in Glimpses of the Cosmos, Vol. 6, pp. 171-177. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1918. P.173)

"When Ward wrote Dynamic Sociology (1883), however, the sociological fashion set by Spencer was to treat social forces as through they were mills of the gods which men could at most learn to describe, but which they might not presume to organize and control." (Albion W. Small, General Sociology, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1905. P. 84)
"Spencer's Sociology ends precisely where Sociology proper should begin. De Greef, a Belgian sociologist, has very justly asserted that Mr. Spencer not only fails to show that there is a place for Sociology, but his own reasoning proves more than anything else that there is no social science superior to Biology. It is true that Mr. Spencer's interpretation of social facts reduces the scope of Sociology to description of what is and has been, with an outline, in his statical or ethical theory, of what will be when a perfect society has been evolved. There is no room in his system for the theory and application of active, in addition to passive Social Dynamics. Such Sociology can have no more direct influence upon human progress than a census of the waves of the ocean could have upon the speed of ships." (Albion W. Small and George E. Vincent, An Introduction to the Study of Society, American Book Company, New York, 1894. P. 46)

"In spite of his recent protestations, Herbert Spencer makes of Sociology, at most, only a descriptive science of conditions upon which human ideals can have hardly more influence than they can upon climate. The sciences of pure fact are the foundation of all the arts, but they are not themselves the arts. Unless Mathematics and Physics and Chemistry and Biology taught us what to avoid and what to attempt, they would avail no more toward increase of human welfare than the rules of the game of chess or the genealogies of the British Peerage." (Albion W. Small and George E. Vincent, An Introduction to the Study of Society, American Book Company, New York, 1894. P. 66)

"Sociology is, accordingly, not the abortive affair which Herbert Spencer has made it appear. Sociology is, first, we must repeat, the synthesis of all that has been learned about society, as it has been, and as it is, in its structure and in its essence. Sociology is, second, the science of social ideals; it is a qualitative and approximate account of the society which ought to be."

"Not only her [Beatrice Webb's] political opinions, but her notion of what 'social science' should be--the accumulation of data needed to implement a social policy--diverged widely from Spencer's, and long dominated the British sociological tradition." (J. D. Y. Peel, Herbert Spencer, the Evolution of a Sociologist, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, New York, 1971. P. 3)

"His censure was distributed impartially to politicians, administrators, and reformers. What it did was to drive a wedge through all the patterns of nineteenth-century thought at which we have / so far looked. It split apart the ideas of social science and social action, pulverizing the linkages which statisticians and ameliorists alike had taken for granted." (Philip Abrams, The Origins of British Sociology: 1834-1914, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968. P. 75-76)
"During the progressive stages of militancy, the welfare of the aggregate takes precedence of the welfare of the individual, because his life depends on preservation of the aggregate from destruction by enemies; and hence, under the militant régime, the individual, regarded as existing for the benefit of the State, has his personal welfare consulted only so far as consists with maintaining the power of the State. But as the necessity for self-preservation of the society in conflict with other societies, decreases, and industrialism increases, the subordination of individual welfare to corporate welfare, becomes less and less; and finally, when the aggregate has no longer external dangers to meet, the organization proper to complete industrialism which it requires, conduces to individual welfare in the greatest degree." (Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology*, Vol. 1, first edition, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1878. P. 618b)

Spencer's militant type vs. industrial type societies were polar types, like Morgan's societas and civitas and Tönnies gemeinschaft and gesellschaft, and Maine's status and contract.

In describing the militant type of society and the industrial type (polar types) Spencer made it clear that his sympathies were with the latter. Here he becomes normative, and his individualism and laissez-faire attitude show through.

"I am glad that you like the two chapters on The Militant Type and The Industrial Type. They are, in fact, the culminating chapters of the part, and, indeed, of the whole work /Principles of Sociology/, in point of importance." (Letter from Herbert Spencer to Edward L. Youmans dated September 21, 1881. Quoted in John Fiske, *Edward Livingston Youmans*, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1894. P. 374)


"Little did he [Spencer] dream that modern industry with its ideologists and its ramifications through the international relations of the States, would become one of the most potent causes of the most devastating war in history, nor that centralized state control, rising to a culminating point, under the exigencies of the war situation, would prove a source of unprecedented industrial activity and efficiency." (Alexander A. Goldenweiser, "Spencerian Philosophy in 1920," *The Freeman*, Vol. 1, pp. 228-230, May 19, 1920. P. 229)
"Who can read Herbert Spencer's imperishable description and analysis of militarism and industrialism, viewed respectively as contrasting social types, without perceiving that any account of German social efficiency that could be written within limits of truth would coincide point by point with Spencer's account of the militaristic, regimented state?" (Franklin H. Giddings, "The Crisis in Social Evolution," in Problems of Readjustment after the War, [no ed.], pp. 73-97, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1915. P. 88)

"Are not modern "Industrialism" and "Militarism," it might be asked, two opposite forms of hypertrophy in the body politic, rather than two successive normal developments of it? If so, do we not need a political physician to bring them down, one as much as the other?" (Anonymous, Review of Herbert Spencer's The Principles of Sociology, Vol. 3, The Athenaeum, Vol. 108, pp. 865-866, December 19, 1896. P. 866)

"... we are in a course of rebarbarisation, and ... there is no prospect but that of military despotisms, which we are rapidly approaching." (Letter from Herbert Spencer to Grant Allen, dated July 19, 1898. Quoted in Edward Clodd, Grant Allen, A Memoir, Grant Richards, London, 1900. P. 199)

"Thus, by 1900, the Spencerian evolutionary concept of slow but steady cosmic progress was being replaced by new trends in social theory and by the optimistic philosophy of pragmatism." (Sidney B. Fay, "The Idea of Progress," American Historical Review, Vol. 52, pp. 231-246, 1947. P. 238)

"It had always been envisiaged that sociology should have technical uses, as a means to help man realize their ends, and there was a vast gulf between the major evolutionary theorists, who were more concerned with the latter, and the ideas of such people as Charles Booth or the members of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, engaged in painstaking factual investigations with purposes of social amelioration. Nothing is more indicative of the antipathy of these two uses of social science than the fact that Herbert Spencer, the prophet of laissez-faire, and Karl Marx, the apostle of revolution, should share a contempt for these ameliorationists. The tragedy of British sociology was that serious social theory, and the ameliorative impulse, remained distinct. In America they came to be united, but only as Spencer's dominance through figures like Sumner was weakened." (J. D. Y. Peel, "Spencer and the Neo-Evolutionists," Sociology, Vol. 3, pp. 173-191, 1969. P. 186)
"Marx's incitement to total identification with the proletariat as the revolutionary vanguard of history, and Spencer's (early) belief in the absolute unstoppability of radical, industrial, pacifist forces, working their changes, were equally opposed to that spirit which saw social science as an aid to find means for a tinkering, interventionist, ameliorative approach to politics, which found its expression in the writings of such people as Francis Place or Beatrice Webb. Here the end is not portrayed as necessary, but simply as desirable, though contingent." (J. D. Y. Peel, "Spencer and the Neo-Evolutionists," Sociology, Vol. 3, pp. 173-191, 1969, p. 184)

"Sociology is reproached, even by those who admit its legitimacy, with being impractical and fruitless. The prevailing methods of treating it, including those employed by its highest advocates [i.e., Spencer] to a great extent justify this charge. There are dead sciences as well as dead languages. The real object of science is to benefit man. A science which fails to do this, however agreeable its study, is lifeless. Sociology, which of all sciences should benefit man most, is in danger of falling into the class of polite amusements, or dead sciences. It is the object of this work to point out a method by which the breath of life may be breathed into its nostrils." (Lester F. Ward, Preface to 2nd ed. of Dynamic Sociology, 2 Vols., D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1926. Vol. 1, p. xxvii)
"The relation of father and son in the tale /The Ordeal of Richard Feverel/ was suggested to George Meredith's mind by Herbert Spencer's famous educational article in the British Quarterly Review for April 1858." (Mary Sturges Gretton, The Writings & Life of George Meredith, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1926. P. 29)

"It has been suggested that the publication in 1858 of Herbert Spencer's famous essay on the place of natural reactions in education acted as a stimulus to Meredith's satirization of Sir Austin Feverel's despotic parental system. (If this was so, I must confess that it is a bit of enlightenment which I could have done without.)" (Siegfried Sassoon, Meredith, The Viking Press, New York, 1948. P. 25)

"... it is the sociological evolutionist point of view from which he [George Meredith] regarded his subject and which made him a teacher and reformer of human society.... Meredith is rightly recognized as the "poet of evolution." (p. 199) "His poetic fancy makes the dry theories of Comte, Mill and Spencer glow with animation." (p. 215) "Evolution was the basis of the whole of Spencer's philosophy, and it is woven in the texture of Meredith's novels. The author's ideas are built upon it, and he makes it a part of his realism. He not only presents a social, but also a spiritual and a moral evolution. The newly acquired perception that mankind is not yet perfect, but is capable of improvement, was the source of his optimism. He does not look with horror at our primitive origin, but he sees above all the possibility to advance and grow." (p. 290) (Guy B. Petter, George Meredith and His German Critics, H. F. & G. Witherby Ltd., London, 1939)

METAPHYSICS

"Many a time I have heard Spencer conclude some discussion by saying, "Thus you see it is ever so; there is no physical problem whatever which does not soon land us in a metaphysical problem that we can neither solve nor elude."" (John Fiske, "Evolution and the Present Age," pp. 251-284, in Essays Historical and Literary, 2 Vols. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1902. Vol. 2, p. 283)"
"I dare say you are not aware that in the last edition of the "Logic" I added a chapter in reply to Mr. Spencer, in which may be seen what I have to say against his own doctrine, but, if I remember right, I scarcely, if at all, touched upon his remarks on myself." (Letter from John Stuart Mill to Dr. W. G. Ward dated November 28, 1859. Quoted in The Letters of John Stuart Mill, edited by Hugh S. R. Elliot, 2 Vols., Longmans, Green and Co, London, 1910. Vol. 1, p. 228)

"I will read again Spencer's "Psychology." I remember thinking his account of Extension very good; and I shall be glad not only to profit by it, but to have an opportunity of quoting from him something with which I agree. I sometimes regret (considering that he is, and deems himself, unsuccessful) that when I have had occasion to speak of him in print it has almost always been to criticise him. He is a considerable thinker, though anything but a safe one—and is on the whole an ally, in spite of his Universal Postulate. His speculations on mathematical axioms I do not now remember, but when I read them I did not attach any importance to them. His notion that we cannot think the annihilation or diminution of force I remember well—and thought it out—Whewelled WhewWell. The conservation of force has hardly yet got to be believed, and already its negation is declared inconceivable. But this is Spencer all over; he throws himself with a certain deliberate impetuosity into the last new theory that chimes with his general way of thinking, and treats it as proved as soon as he is able to found a connected exposition of phenomena upon it. This is the way with his doctrine of "Heredity," which, however, will very likely prove true." (Letter from John Stuart Mill to Alexander Bain dated November 22, 1863. Quoted in The Letters of John Stuart Mill, edited by Hugh S. R. Elliot, 2 Vols., Longmans, Green and Co, London, 1910. Vol. 1, p. 310)

"I have not seen very much of Spencer, but what I have seen adds to the favourable side of the impression his writings make on me. I am not inclined, from anything I know, to consider him as on the whole disposed to magnify his differences from others whose philosophical opinions are allied to his own. He did so in the case of Comte, who he knew very imperfectly. But in his controversies with me it is rather I who have magnified the differences, and he who has extenuated them. With regard to his reputation, no doubt it has not yet reached its height, but it is constantly growing. His is the rising philosophical name at the present, and will probably stand very high ten years hence: ...." (Letter from John Stuart Mill to George Grote dated December 2, 1866. Quoted in The Letters of John Stuart Mill, edited by Hugh S. R. Elliot, 2 Vols., Longmans, Green and Co, London, 1910. Vol. 2, p. 72)

"Indeed, it is one of the surprising things in the case of Mr Buckle as of Mr Spencer, that being a man of kindred genius, of the same wide range of knowledge, and devoting himself to speculations of the same kind, he profited so little by M. Comte." (John Stuart Mill, Auguste Comte and Positivism, 3rd edition, Trübner & Co., London, 1882. P. 47n.)
"It is very desirable that there should be some one in the Senate of the University of London who would give you a more effective backing than you have at present. But there are others besides me who could do this. Bain being unattainable, have you ever thought of Herbert Spencer? He is as anticlergymanish as possible; he goes as far as the farthest of us in explaining psychological phenomena by association and the "experience hypothesis"; he has a considerable and growing reputation, much zeal and public spirit, and is not, I should think, more suspect on the subject of religion than I am. I think he would be of great use in the Senate on the subjects on which you most need to be supported, and a very valuable acquisition otherwise. I do not know whether the duty would be agreeable to him, but from the little I know of his tastes and habits I should expect that rather than the contrary." (Letter from John Stuart Mill to George Grote dated November 12, 1866. Quoted in The Letters of John Stuart Mill, edited by Hugh S. R. Elliot, 2 Vols., Longmans, Green and Co, London, 1910. Vol. 2, p. 71)

"The same doctrine (the relativity of knowledge) is very impressively taught by one of the acutest metaphysicians of recent times, Mr. Herbert Spencer ...." (John Stuart Mill, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, 2 Vols. in One, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1884. [Original edition, 1865] Vol. 1, p. 23)

"Mr. Spencer is one of the small number of persons who by the solidity and encyclopedical character of their knowledge, and their power of co-ordination and concatenation, may claim to be the peers of M. Comte, and entitled to a vote in the estimation of him." (John Stuart Mill, Auguste Comte and Positivism, 3rd edition, Trübner & Co., London, 1882. P. 41)

"While Spencer is the bolder reasoner, and perhaps the greater genius, Mill's high social position and practical turn of thought enabled him to exercise a greater influence." (Simon Stern, "Mill's Essays," The New York Social Science Review, Vol. 1, pp. 150-164, 1865. P. 161)

"In this respect (Spencer's education) his case was like that of Mr. Mill, but the plan pursued was very different. For, while young Mill's mind was forced out by a strong coercive discipline, that of Spencer was led out by awakening an interest in knowledge, and guiding and encouraging the spontaneous tendencies of his mind. .... Mr. Mill's early education was purely one of books, and in his autobiography he expresses regret that he never had the discipline of trying experiments in science, or even the advantage of seeing them. Young Spencer, on the other hand, went early into the practical work of science. He cultivated natural history, collected an herbarium, and experimented in physics and chemistry." (Edward L. Youmans, "Herbert Spencer and the Doctrine of Evolution," Appendix to M. E. Cazelles, Outline of the Evolution-Philosophy, Translated from the French by Rev. O. B. Frothingham, D. Appleton & Company, New York, 1875. P. 161)
"Herbert Spencer said to me to-day [May 8, 1881] at Pembroke Lodge, "Mill thought the object of living was to learn and work. I think the object of learning and working is to live."" (Sir Mount-stuart E. Grant Duff, Notes from a Diary 1873-1881, 2 Vols., John Murray, London, 1898. Vol. 2, p. 315)

"John Stuart Mill styled him [Herbert Spencer] "one of the acutest metaphysicians of recent times, one of the most vigorous as well as the boldest thinker that English speculation has yet produced."" (Henry George, A Perplexed Philosopher, Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, New York, 1965. P. xii)

"The large acceptance of Spencer's "system of nature" as a whole was prepared for and promoted by the great influence, previously attained and then expanding, of the essential "naturalism" of John Stuart Mill's 'System of Logic' (1843). Without any discussion of religious issues, that treatise from the first created among students a zeal not merely for the formalities of logic but for searching thought on all real issues. The constant reference to scientific results, as giving the working tests for reasoning, told strongly in favor of the scientific as against the theological habit." (J. M. Robertson, A History of Freethought in the Nineteenth Century, Watts & Co., London, 1929. P. 218)

"All originality had been crushed out of John Stuart Mill by the ponderous loads of erudition with which his infant intellect had been burdened." (F. J. C. Hearnshaw, Herbert Spencer and the Individualists," in The Social & Political Ideas of Some Representative Thinkers of the Victorian Age, ed. by. F. J. C. Hearnshaw, pp. 53-83, George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., London, 1933. P. 56)

"He [Spencer] is a considerable thinker, though anything but a safe one, and is on the whole an ally, in spite of his Universal Postulate.... But this is Spencer all over; he throws himself with a certain deliberate impetuosity into the last new theory that chimes with his general way of thinking, and treats it as proved as soon as he is able to found a connected exposition of phenomena upon it. This is the way with his doctrine of Heredity, which, however, will very likely prove true." (Letter from John Stuart Mill to Alexander Bain, quoted in Hugh S. R. Elliot, ed., The Letters of John Stuart Mill, 2 Vols., London, 1910. Vol. 1, p. 310)

In commenting on Prof. Means intimation that he had cribbed an illustration of a point from John Stuart Mill, Spencer wrote: "Some thirty years ago I probably was "cognisant of this passage" in Mill. I read Mr. Mill's Logic in 1851 or 1852, and save those parts which, in successive editions, have concerned the amicable controversy carried on between us respecting the test of truth, I have not read it since."

(Herbert Spencer, "Replies to Criticisms on The Data of Ethics," Mind, Vol. 6, pp. 82-98, 1881. P. 90)

"Mill's mind was forced as in a hot-house; Spencer's was allowed to develop in the open air and with the least possible pressure from without." (William Henry Hudson, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, Chapman and Hall, London, 1897. P. 8)

"An Empirical Law (it will be remembered) is an uniformity, whether of succession of or coexistence, which holds true in all instances within our limits of observation ...." (p. 537) "The Empirical Laws of Society are of two kinds; some are uniformities of coexistence, some of succession." (p. 578) (John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Harper & Brothers, Publishers, New York, 1846)

"But before Spencer took the place, Mill, succeeding Carlyle, was the leading influence among men reading English." (Henry Holt, Garrulities of an Octogenarian Editor, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1923. P. 46)


"In consequence mainly of your last letter, I have been reading Spencer's "First Principles" over again. On the whole I like it less than the first time. He is so good that he ought to be better. His a priori system is more consistent than Hamilton's, but quite as fundamentally absurd; in fact, there is the same erroneous assumption at the bottom of both. And most of his general principles strike me as being little more than verbal or at most empirical generalisations, with no warrant for their being considered laws. As you truly say, his doctrine that the Persistence of Force is a datum of Consciousness is exactly Hamilton's strange theory of Causation. But how weak his proof of it." (Letter from John Stuart Mill to Alexander Bain dated March 18, 1864. Quoted in The Letters of John Stuart Mill, edited by Hugh's R. Elliot, 2 Vols., Longmans, Green and Co, London, 1910. Vol. 2, p. 4)
"Bergson belongs to my "youth" (tailor shop days). How much he influenced me is imponderable. The great influences were Nietzsche, Spengler, yes, Emerson, Herbert Spencer (!), Thoreau, Whitman--and Elie Faure." (Letter from Henry Miller to Lawrence Durrell dated March 14, 1949. Quoted in Lawrence Durrell and Henry Miller a Private Correspondence, edited by George Wickes, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York, 1963. P. 261)
Cite distinction between militant and industrial type of society—which I failed to do in my Intro. Give this with other dichotomies: operative vs. regulative, and typology of political evolution.

"Mr. Spencer sees more clearly than any other thinker of eminence in the present generation that there is an irreconcilable antagonism between the growth of militancy and the march of human progress." (W. D. Morrison, Review of The Principles of Sociology, Vol. 3, by Herbert Spencer, Mind, Vol. 6, n.s., pp. 241-245, 1897. P. 245)

"He [Spencer] ignored what became clearer when the scale of industry was bigger and alliances were formed between business capital and the landed aristocracy—that power and status are coordinates of wealth and function, and that industrialism does not mean the abolition of power relationships." (J. D. Y. Peel, Herbert Spencer on Social Evolution, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1972. P. xxxv)

"Not everyone accepts Spencer's extreme formulation [of the distinction between military and industrial societies], but the liberal image remains strongly entrenched in the modern mind and most of us instinctively feel that his position reflects an important truth." (David C. Rapoport, "Military and Civil Societies: The Contemporary Significance of a Traditional Subject in Political Theory," Political Studies, Vol. 12, pp. 178-201, 1964. P. 195)

"Warfare has had its course of evolution, as have all other human activities. That human progress has been from militancy to industrialism is an error so great that it must necessarily vitiate any system of sociology or theory of culture of which it forms a part." (J. W. Powell, "From Barbarism to Civilization," The American Anthropologist, Vol. 1, pp. 97-123, 1888. P. 103)
"Thus we are brought to the conclusion that what we are conscious of as properties of matter, even down to its weight and resistance, are but subjective affections produced by objective agencies that are unknown and unknowable. All the sensations produced in us by environing things are but symbols of actions out of ourselves, the natures of which we cannot even conceive." (Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1896. P. 206)

"While some objective existence, manifested under some conditions, remains as the final necessity of thought, there does not remain the implication that this existence and these conditions are more to us than the unknown correlates of our feelings and the relations among our feelings. The Realism we are committed to is one which simply asserts objective existence as separate from, and independent of, subjective existence. But it affirms neither that any one mode of this objective existence is in reality that which it seems, nor that the connexions among its modes are objectively what they seem. Thus it stands widely distinguished from Crude Realism; and to mark the distinction in may properly be called Transfigred Realism." (Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1897. P. 494)

"... whilst there is a remarkable parallelism between the phenomena of Mind and the phenomena of the nervous system (a parallelism which Herbert Spencer has detailed with a wonderful insight and supported by a prodigious number of illustrations), yet it is always unsafe to assert, on this account, anything like a dependence of mind upon matter; much more to erect a theory that mind is made of matter, in any way." (Letter from Sidney Lanier to Clifford A. Lanier, dated July 21, 1873. Quoted in Charles R. Anderson and Aubrey H. Starke, eds., The Centennial Edition of the Works of Sidney Lanier, Vol. 8, Letters, 1869-1873, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1945. P. 364)

"How many worthy critics have been heard to object to the doctrine of evolution that you can not deduce mind from the primeval nebula unless the germs of mind were present already! But that is just what Mr. Spencer says himself. I have heard him say it more than once, and his books contain many passages of equivalent import. [E.g., Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2, pp. 145-162] He never misses an opportunity for attacking the doctrine that mind can be explained as evolved from matter. But, in spite of this, a great many people suppose that the gradual evolution of mind must mean its evolution out of matter, and are deaf to arguments of which they do not perceive the bearing. Hence Mr. Spencer is so commonly accredited with the doctrine which he so earnestly repudiates." (John Fiske, "The Doctrine of Evolution: Its Scope and Influence," The Popular Science Monthly, Vol. 39, pp. 577-599, 1891. P. 593)
"A system of monism like Mr. Spencer's, with its delusive simplicity, has an inexpressible fascination for those whose intellectual pride cannot brook the perpetual tyranny of pressing but unsolved problems." (Augustus Hopkins Strong, Philosophy and Religion, A. C. Armstrong and Son, New York, 1888. P. 55)

"Another lasting triumph, already referred to, is his Spencer's welding together in a grand unity all the phenomena of the universe. This makes him a monist, and monism is the highest expression of philosophy, ...." (Arthur M. Lewis, An Introduction to Sociology, Charles H. Kerr & Company, Chicago, 1913. P. 73)

"... he was a dualist who accepted the equal reality of, and the fundamental difference between, the self and the not-self." (F. J. C. Hearnshaw, "Herbert Spencer and the Individualists," in The Social & Political Ideas of Some Representative Thinkers of the Victorian Age, ed. by F. J. C. Hearnshaw, pp. 53-83, George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., London, 1933. P. 70)

"Herbert Spencer, as we have noticed, used five "ultimate scientific ideas,"--space, time, matter, motion, force,--and adds consciousness as an awkward something else. He speculated that all of these may be manifestations of one reality, whose best name is force, energy, power; but how this one reality accounts for space and time and consciousness remains obscure. Spencer aspires to a monism, but he only achieves a pluralism with a faint hope of unity in the unknown!" (William Earnest Hocking, Types of Philosophy, Revised edition, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1939. P. 217)
"For the mid-Victorian thinker it was a foregone conclusion requiring only statement not proof that monogamy is the highest form of marriage ...." (Robert H. Lowie, Primitive Society, New York, 1920, P. 56)

"... the men who, under a polygamous regime are able to obtain and to support more wives than one, must be men superior to the average; and hence there must result an increased multiplication of the best, and a diminished multiplication of the worst." (Herbert Spencer, "The Use of Anthropomorphism," The Leader, Vol. 4, No. 189, pp. 1076-1077, November 5, 1853. P. 1076)

Spencer believed that monogamy dated back as far as any other marital arrangement (Vol. I, p. 698, 1st ed.). "Always the state of having two wives must be preceded by the state of having one. And the state of having one must in many cases continue because of the difficulty of getting two where the surplus of women is not great." (Vol. I, p. 699, 1st ed.)

"The monogamic form of the sexual relation is manifestly the ultimate form; and any changes to be anticipated must be in the direction of completion and extension of it." (Herbert Spencer, The Principle of Sociology, Vol. 1, 3rd ed., D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1890. P. 752)